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This introduction is based on scripts for ten lectures held at the 
College for New Europe that was organised by the International 
Culture Centre at the Jagellonian University in Krakow, July 1991.
Its main aim consisted initially in presenting the theory of Inter­
national Relations/International Political Economy (IR/IPE) to an 
audiance, where different Western understandings of international 
affairs could not be taken for granted. Having only ten lectures (in 
three weeks) at the disposal, I opted for a presentation that would be 
organised around the historical evolution of theories.
Since histories of theories always imply a particular view about 
how to find, in fact, the significant historical events (material or 
ideal), some assumptions should be made explicit.
Theories do not fall from heaven. There are two stories to be told 
about them. One is the internal history. It refers to intra-theoretical 
developments, refinements or rebuttals of already existing approa­
ches, sometimes carried till the breaking up of a school of thought. In 
this respect, the theoretical discourse of IR/IPE can be said to turn 
around, approving or discarding, the leading school of thought of the 
discipline, Realism. Realism becomes hence the reference point of the 
internal history of IR/IPE.
The idea of an external history refers to the environment within 
which this debate occurs. Two parts of this should be stressed. There 
is, on the one hand the environment of the scholar in IR/IPE that will 
influence the way, theories are constructed, the criteria that will be 
accepted as ’scientific’ (or at least as proper to a discipline), and the 
material pressures that can arise in a century of largely outside fun­
ded research. On the other hand, there is the external history of the 
subject-matter itself, i.e. the developments in international affairs 
that affect the fields of immediate interest and study, and the perti­
nent subjects to be treated.
It is the exchange between these two stories that is the tale of 
these lectures. Ten lectures on an introductory level offer, however, 
a limited space. Therefore, one should emphasise what this short 




























































































It is not a history o f ideas in international thought. That would 
start earlier and could not be organised around a leading school of 
thought. It is only possible, to make such a short presentation by 
looking at the disciplines of IR/IPE as they become institutionalised 
first, for IR, in the after WWI period, and then, for IPE, at the 
beginning of the 1980s.
It is not developing a general theory of IR/IPE, that would be the 
accumulated result of past research. There is none. Putting Realism 
as a reference point does not entail that a whatever revised version 
of it is the stories’ last word: another end of history. Quite the 
opposite might be true. But it seems historically justifiable to conceive 
of international thought after 1945 as a constant rehearsal of the 
ideas that came to the forefront during and especially after WWII. 
The Cold War might be over now. Yet, thinking that was part of it, 
still lingers on. One might even argue that that the end of the Cold 
War makes a close look to Realism more important than ever before. 
Several reasons plead for this. First, Realism has been the leading 
school of a discipline which has been so widely influenced by and 
influencing U.S. academics and practitioners to be called an "Ameri­
can Social Science". The second reason is due to the fact that the end 
of the Cold War was followed immediately with the shattering of the 
Soviet sphere of influence. It was the end of bipolarity. Therefore, 
U.S. thought and politics might be now more influential than any 
other national policy after 1945.1 Realism is the starting point for 
any analysis that wants to know "what the hegemon thinks." Making 
Realist premises clear represents an attempt to see how the intellec­
tual agenda is set, i.e. how good or ill-prepared it is to understand 
and respond to the changing environment.
Thirdly, it does not cover in detail every subpart of IR/IPE. With 
the exception of the slightly idiosyncratic analysis of Realism and the 
history of IR/IPE-theory, this introduction does not aim to develop in 
an academic original way different schools and frameworks of analy­
sis. Some fields are barely mentioned, as e.g. the study of intematio-




























































































nal organisations or peace research. Others, as e.g. foreign policy ana­
lysis, get a short entry, which will certainly not satisfy a specialist. 
The diplomatic and socio-economic history is rudimentary. I apologise 
for it. My justification remains always the same: the aim is not a 
comprehensive textbook on IR/IPE, but a specific view of the inter­
action between the practice of world politics (in a large sense) and its 
contemporary theoretical frameworks. It aspires to give some clues to 
those who want to understand IR/IPE; it tries to provide some tools 
to organise the ever expanding amount of information and to show 
how theory has attempted to give it a more coherent shape.
Finally, the linear (chronological) analysis might give the impres­
sion that the history followed rather smooth lines. This is a fallacy of 
exposition. Even though academic disciplines react in a more predicta­
ble way than world politics, theories of IR/IPE follow several different 
tracks at the same time. This introduction privileges the main one, 
but, for sure, not the only one.
The lectures were initially conceived for those that will never read 
again IR/IPE. This attempt is still visible in the way Part I, II and 
the Interlude are presented. The objective consisted in making clear 
how major statesmen have actually conceived of world politics, and 
in showing the historical or ideological relativity of many of the 
taken-for-granted arguments. This means that the participants 
should be introduced to look differently to world events, becoming 
aware of informations they had never considered relevant before. Yet, 
in this revised and extended version, many academic arguments have 
been included and especially Part III and the Conclusion aim at an 
original analysis of the state of the art.
Acknowledgements are due to too many people that I could list 
them all here. Be, however, especially mentioned the particular inter­
disciplinary environment at the European University Institute from 
whose multiple research agendas I tried continuously to profit. In 
Krakow, the special Central/Eastern European teaching environment 




























































































syllabus. To an unforeseeable extent, this College has been a common 
enterprise of all who were there, an ongoing process of deciding what 
to do together. Even though ths presentation is not a close reproduc­
tion of the courses held in July 1991 Krakow, I would very much like 
to dedicate these lectures to those who made this very intense experi­
ence possible, to all those who participated in the College for New 
Europe.




















































































































































































































































































Before starting to tackle the development of Realism and its histo­
rical setting, the underlying assumptions of these lectures will be suc­
cinctly presented.
This first lecture is about the status of International Relations (IR) 
and now also International Political Economy (IPE).
By status, I mean two things.
First, its ’scientific’ status. I will assume that IR/IPE are part of 
the human sciences. This does not imply necessarily that it is a disci­
pline which can come close to the ideal of a natural science. The 
anglo-american shorthand of science as reserved to the natural scien­
ces only is a specific view which is not shared here. The assumption 
that the discipline of IR is a human science means exactly that the 
whole debate about the scientific status of human sciences, and in 
particular the social sciences, will be mirrored also in IR/IPE. So for 
instance, what are the criteria to judge that a specific work is accep­
table for the discipline? What is the status of facts? How can we 
arrive at knowledge? Is there a direct link or is knowledge always 
constructed? Where do we start the analysis, at the level of the whole, 
or the individual level? To what extent are different methodologies 
compatible or mutually exclusive?
The first part of this lecture will touch this problem by presenting 
the basic thrift between those approaches that try to follow the natu­
ral science path, or naturalism, different human science or even the 
internal inconsistency of the explanation approach, the school of inter - 
pretivism.
Second, its status in the division of labour within the social scien­
ces. How does one demarcate or distinguish IR or IPE from other 
fields? Is that necessary? IR/IPE has been a field which always knew 
an acute problem of self-identity: What is International Relations I In­
ternational Political Economy ? The second chapter of this first part 
will attempt to order different thoughts about it.
Both presentations are also used to make my own assumptions 
clear - and indirectly the aim of the whole series of lectures. It is 
impossible to provide an even remotely comprehensive account of the 



























































































12 Part I. Theoretical assumptions
aim. What I should try to do is to provide some tools that analysts 
have used to make order in the ever expanding amount of informa­
tion. Especially now in Eastern Europe, the problem is less to get 
informations, but more and more, as in the West, to select the 
significant ones.
Setting the tools in their historical context should also make aware 
of the sometimes particular interest that made people think of some 




























































































International Relations - a human science?
Broadly speaking, two schools are opposing each other about the 
question of what is a human science? Is there any science different 
from the natural sciences?
1.1. Naturalism
One school supports the idea, that there is only one way to under­
stand science: like the natural science. The main proponent of this 
school is positivism. It is not the place to enter into epistemological 
discussions, but a point on methodology must be made at the begin­
ning of these lecture series.
Methodology means the way one uses to get to propositions that 
will be considered valid following the particular standards of a field. 
Let us treat step by step these three items: the method, validity claim 
and standards.
The method generally employed by positivism is a deductive 
approach whereby one tries to subsume a particular event under a 
general law. The ideal aim is the finding of these general laws. Take 
the following example.
General law: The law of gravity. Any object is attracted towards the 



























































































14 Part I. Theoretical assumptions
Particular case: A stone is thrown. What will happen?
Hypothesis: If the stone can be considered an object, (1st condition) 
if it is not hindered, (2nd condition)
it will fall down (or be attracted by the mass of the earth). 
Experiment: The stone is thrown.
Result: It falls. The general law has not been falsified. The particular 
case can be seen as an incident of the general law.
With regard to the validity claim, i.e. what is the truth-claim this 
approach assumes? The approach assumes that there exists an objec­
tive nature outside, independent of the interpretation of the observer. 
If it is raining, you become wet, whether you think it is raining or 
not. Few authors would go so far as to think that the general laws 
discovered are objective truth. There are only an approximation and 
must necessarily remain axiomatic, i.e. impossible to verify.
This brings us to the standards to apply to a research. The subsu­
ming under a general law and the finding of the general law should 
be done in a way as to falsify them. That is: starting from a general 
law, one should develop hypothesis, and state the criteria for the 
possible test of these hypothesis. Is a test unsuccessful, the hypothe­
sis is considered falsified, and can be taken as an indication that the 
general law is may be to be falsified as well. The standards are not 
standards of absolute truth, but of scientific method.1
Two specific fallacies, i.e. logical mistakes, are the most castigated 
by this approach. Both cannot be conduced to the falsification 
principle.
One is the fallacy of so-called infinite regress. Let us take an 
example of the literature in the political theory of power2:
- Our state is governed by a ruling elite.
- The analysis finds out that those usually held for the elite are not 
prevailing in the most important decisions.
- Counter-argument: This is, because behind this elite of facade there 
is another elite that actually rules.
1 See C.G. Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation and other Essays in the 
Philosophy o f Science (London: The Free Press, 1965).
2 This refers to the dispute between the (positivist) pluralist school of e.g. Robert 
Dahl and the elitist school (Wright Mills). See Robert A. Dahl, "A Critique of the 



























































































International Relations - a human science ? 15
- Counter-analysis: This elite does not exist, because there is no clear- 
cut pattern that the group prevails in decision-making.
- Counter-argument: This is, because behind this elite of facade there 
is another elite that actually rules.
And so on.
This means that if theory and findings do not coincide, the empirical 
research (and not the theory) was wrong. The move consists in immu­
nising the theory and shifting the weight of justification to the empi­
rical findings. No falsification is possible.
The second fallacy is tautological or circular reasoning. This is the 
result of an imprecise articulation of the test. For a test to work, the 
hypothesis should state a relation between one independent variable 
(or: cause) and a dependent variable (or: effect). Circular reasoning 
occurs when the two variables are actually not independent from 
another, i.e. the result is already included in the assumptions. Take 
an example, still from the analysis of power:
The (often tacit) assumption is: Being powerful means possessing the 
means to prevail in conflicts.
Hypothesis: If two actors meet in a conflict, then the more powerful 
will prevail (i.e. the law of the strongest).
Hence, since power and outcome-prevailing are circularly defined, 
there can be no incidence to falsify this theory.
The paradigmatic case of a positivist scientific analysis is the 
economical or rational choice approach to social sciences.
1.2. The interpretative approach
1. Interpretative (or heuristic) approaches towards science oppose 
several fundamental tenets of Positivism (explanation or Erklaren):
- methodological monism, i.e. the idea of the unity of scientific method
amidst the diversity of subject matter of scientific investigation;
- mathematical ideals o f perfection, i.e. the idea that mathematics and
physics set the standard of the development of a science, including 
the humanities. This entails the research for universal or general 



























































































16 Part I. Theoretical assumptions
- a subsumption-theoretic view o f scientific explanation, i.e. the
explanatory methodology whereby from covering (generally causal) 
laws hypothesis are deduced and particular cases subsumed and 
thereby explained;
- falsification as the scientific demarcation criterion, i.e. what
separates science from other undertakings and scientific theory 
from ideology.3
2. The starting point of the hermeneutical approach is the idea 
that whereas in the natural sciences the subject of the science (i.e. the 
researcher) and ’its’ external object (nature) are independent, humani­
ties have to deal with an internal intersubjective relation. Human 
beings cannot be subsumed under the category of unanimated or un­
conscious ’objects’. Humanities always and by definition have to inte­
grate human mind, in its psychological (individualist) and semantic 
(intersubjective or structural) component. For all of their differences, 
Weberian historical sociology as much as post-structural discourse 
analysis can be put close to hermeneutics. There is an explicit claim 
that human beings cannot be objectivised (becoming a kind of Plastic 
Man) and the interplay of individuals is not analysable with a kind 
of universalised rational behaviour. Central point for the heuristic 
approach remains the interpretation of meaning, either at the indi­
vidual or the communicative level.4 *
3. Consequences on the level of reception of the other:
- The constructivist position: Facts imply theory. There is no ’fact’ 
without interpretation. Discussing Weber, Raymond Aron shows, how 
historians (and in this case any social scientists) have to choose what 
they consider the significant material, by giving an example of a 
novel: Michel Butor’s La Modification. It is the story of one day in the
3 Georg Henrik von Wright, Explanation and Understanding (Ithaca, New York: 
Cornell University Press), p.4.
4 For a convincing recent discussion of this approach, see Davide Sparti, Se un
leone potesse parlare. Indagine sul comprendere e lo spiegare (Firenze: Sansoni 



























































































International Relations - a human science ? 17
life of one person and it takes several hundred pages to cover this. 
History as a discipline would be impossible, if we would, indeed, 
register all what happens inside and outside the human mind.5
Thus, acts are not authentically explainable, because the explana­
tion (giving of reasons) is already another act (second order observa­
tion). General theory, i.e. the critical reconstruction of shared know­
ledge, is only a necessary means, and not the end of scientific investi­
gation.6
- The Neo-Wittgensteinian and Post-Structural position: there is no 
even potentially shared universal knowledge, but theories resemble 
incommensurable language games.7 The expression ’language game’ 
refers to the way knowledge is acquired. One presupposes that one 
learns a language like a game. There are basic rules, and then the 
real game it is the result of an ever ongoing communication and prac­
tice. Incommensurability refers to the impossibility to find a common 
standard or measure on which two or more items can be ordained. 
Theories as languages are self-contained bodies (or structures or 
paradigms) from which different concepts derive their meaning. 
Meaning can only be assessed through a process of translation, which 
is always incomplete. On the way, something is lost. The claim here 
is not that translation is impossible, but that it is never exact. It is 
always a reconstruction within the other language and it acquires its 
meaning following the rules and the cultural system embodied in the 
language.8 This is because there exists no language of a higher level 
to which all languages can refer. The same reasoning applies for theo­
ries. Theories construct the reality they are then able to see and ana­
6 Raymond Aron, Les étapes de la pensée sociologique (Paris: Gallimard, 1967), 
p.508.
6 See for a recent statement of a radical constructivist position: Niklas Luhmann, 
Die Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1990).
7 See for this line especially Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962/19702). See also Barry 
Barnes, T.S.Kuhn and Social Science (London: Macmillan, 1982); and Peter Winch, 
The Idea o f a Social Science and its relation to philosophy (London and Henley: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul & New York: Humanities Press, 1963).




























































































18 Part I. Theoretical assumptions
lyse. The shift from one theory to another denotes a shift in the con­
struction of reality. Yet, this means, that there is no objective or 
neutral ground on which to judge theories. Falsification which presup­
poses in the empirical world this neutral ground, is therefore not 
possible.
4. Consequences on the level of interpretation/explanation (the 
status of the interpreter):
- The validity (or the truth claim) of a hypothesis cannot be tested 
against an independent outside world. This would not only presuppo­
se a direct access to an external, that is mind-independent, world, but 
also a shared language among the audience for which the test has 
been pursued. Falsification in the sense of a test with the real world 
is, therefore, not a possible demarcation criterion for (human) scien­
ces. The validity can only be assessed by the intersubjectively shared 
conventional criteria of the participants in a specific (here scientific) 
language game. These might imply a strong stress on procedures. 
(This, as much as the neo-Wittgensteinian position above, concerns 
also the natural sciences.)
- The scientific project consists therefore in making sense (within 
one’s intersubjectively shared meanings) of particular moments in 
history. Only ex post rationalisations are possible, generally no 
predictions. For this, two main areas of research are necessary: the 
theoretically informed interpretation of history for its own sake (and 
not for getting laws) and the theoretical/conceptual internal criticism 
of the given interpretations; i.e. historical sociology, and social and 
political theory.
- The problem of relativism: Without the assumption of an at least 
potentially discoverable T(t)ruth and its reduction to (pure ?) conven­
tion, does, at least potentially, "anything go"? This is the mirror 
criticism into which the debate gets easily trapped. Positivism implies 
a claim for universality for which no foundation can be found. 
Interpretativism comes close to relativism, where it is difficult to 





























































































What is IR/IPE ?
There are mainly three different ways of deciding what IR/IPE is. 
The first is the definition through its subject-matter, as economics 
(which is about the distribution of value in a world of scarcity), or 
sociology (which should about society as a whole), psychology (mind 
and consciousness), and so forth.
The second is the methodological division by defining disciplines 
through their approach: the economistic (individual value-maximi­
sing) approach, the intersubjective or communicative approach, the 
holistic approach (sometimes called the sociological approach). 
Finally, and following a sociological analysis, one could try to locate 
the particular theoretical and practical conventions that underlay the 
discipline of IR/IPE.
2.1. Definition by its subject-matter
International Relations encounters rather formidable difficulties to 
define a particular subject-matter of its own. Yet, it is on this account 



























































































20 Part I. Theoretical assumptions
The first chairs in International Relations9 were put up immedia­
tely after the Great War 1914-1918 with the explicit aim in mind to 
avoid a similar catastrophe. Therefore, it is the study of war and 
peace that became to be identified with the study of International 
Relations. More precisely, International Relations consisted in a 
specific focus on war and peace by drawing on a variety of different 
disciplines that existed before, especially international law, philoso­
phy, and international history. Undeniably, peace and war remain 
central features of today’s discipline of International Relations. But 
it is not enough to demarcate from other sciences. The explanation of 
war, or the avoidance of conflict are covered by different other disci­
plines as well, as e.g. social psychology and philosophy.
In a second step, therefore, International Relations came to be un­
derstood as what its name implies, the behaviour (conflicting or not) 
between states. This has been the taken-for-granted view of many 
Realist writers after World War II. The focus on the external rela­
tions of states would be the subject-matter. Yet also this demarcation 
seems difficult. One does not straightaway see how it would be possi­
ble to study the external relations of states, without knowing any­
thing about the internal relations - and vice versa.
Take some examples.
The British government (as representative of the state) had lowered 
in the mid-Eighties the taxation of managers, in order to make econo­
mic activities more attractive to be located in GB. This had a certain 
impact on the ongoing decisions of the German government which 
was also negotiating a tax reform at that time. This is just one 
example, of a specific domestic policy which has immediate internatio­
nal repercussions. These repercussions must not be intended or fore­
seen as in this case. The change of the interest rate in New York is 
a domestic decision, but its repercussions are at every place which is 
linked to the international financial structure. There are less and less 
spheres where domestic decision makers are actually able to carry out



























































































What is IR/IPE ? 21
decisions independently, without taking into account the direct or 
indirect (re)actions of other states.
In a further step, one stretches a bit the original definition. Then 
whatever international event that effects states could be subsumed 
under international relations, integrating thereby international orga­
nisations, and transnational actors, as e.g. firms. International actors 
are certainly not only states.
All this contributes to the falling down of the initial focus on ex­
ternal relations: it is more and more difficult to demarcate the exter­
nal from the internal affairs of the state: we are living in a period of 
internationalisation of politics (in the widest sense: public affairs).
Finally, one could say, as e.g. John Burton does10 1, that conflict is 
the actual subject-matter of International Relations. This might be a 
good way to bypass some of the more restrictive definitions we have 
just mentioned. But it suffers from the opposite flaw: conflict/coopera- 
tion is one of the underlying themes of all social sciences.
Therefore, IR has its specificity in the military and political aspects 
of war (strategic studies). But this is certainly not enough to define 
IR/IPE as a discipline. As a discipline, it has tried to couch this part 
into larger framework of international studies. It seems thus that 
everything which has an international effect is at least potentially 
part of the discipline. Marcel Merle has, in lack of another defining 
principle, defines International Relations as the flows that pass or 
even tend to pass a border,n
As a preliminary definition that is, however, not sufficient to 
encompass the whole study of International Affairs, one could point 
to the two levels of International Relations. The one, also called the 
macro-level treats the ruling of the international system, whereas the 
other, the micro-level deals with the foreign policies of international 
and transnational actors. IR/IPE can then be seen as the integration 
and articulation of the macro and micro-level for either the explana­
10 John W. Burton, Global Conflict. The Domestic Sources o f International Crisis 
(Brighton: Harvester Press, 1984/19862).




























































































22 Part I. Theoretical assumptions
tion and prediction of outcomes or the understanding of specific histo­
rical phenomena.
2.2. Definition by its own approach
In the social sciences, it has become usual to presuppose one common 
social science, that is, to give up the difficult definition of disciplines 
via their subject-matter, and to declare all human affairs at least po­
tentially part of any discipline. The division of labour between disci­
plines does thus not consist in cutting out a specific part of the cake, 
but by approaching the whole cake from different angles. Since my 
aim is not a presentation of different methodologies, I will take one 
as an example, and quote some others.
One of the possible angles, and probably the most advanced "scien­
tifically" is the economic (rational choice) approach to the social 
sciences. Its name indicates that it has become absolutely preponde­
rant within economics, in a way that other approaches have to be con­
tent to get the labels economic history or political economy. This 
approach can be presented as both methodological individualist and 
positivist. Since positivism has already been dealt with, just a suc­
cinct account of the meaning of methodological individualism.
The pure case of the economic approach is the rational actor model 
(rational choice approach). The analysis starts with the individual. It 
assumes that these individuals have specific preferences. It is consid­
ered rational that they will try to realize as much of their preferences 
as they can afford, i.e. they are assumed to be value or utility-maxi­
mising. Since they have only limited (or scarce) resources at their dis­
posal, value-maximizing implies that every decision be submitted to 
a calculus of estimated costs and benefits. The final choice is the win­
ner of this calculus. Rational choice theory is obviously not as simple. 
The decisions have to be made under particular constraints, so e.g. 
under conditions of insufficient information. Another difficulty is the 



























































































What is IR/IPE ? 23
of the theory.12 This has not changed the basic tenet of its metho­
dological individualist methodology: collective behaviour can be suf­
ficiently explained by the aggregation of these individually understood 
actions. The social is the addition of the individual. At least as an 
explanatory device. The economic approach is increasingly applied 
also in other disciplines than economics. In International Relations, 
it was originally applied to strategic studies (e.g. deterrence), but has 
subsequently become part of present mainstream IR (see Part III).
Another approach to the field of humanities is the historical 
approach. It is part of the hermeneutical tradition. This was very pro­
minent in International Relations, and it is still so, when IR comes 
close to diplomatic history.
Finally, there is the sociological or structuralist approach which is 
the opposite to the individualist one. Generally it is anti-positivist, 
sometimes influenced by anthropological studies. It starts from the 
critique of individualism that collective actions is not possibly under­
stood only through the aggregation of individual behaviour. The 
whole is more than the sum of its parts. This methodology was impor­
ted into International Relations when system-theory became the pro­
minent approach of sociology and political science in the 50’s and 60’s. 
The more anthropological approaches are rather uncommon and to be 
found primarily in recent literature.
Unfortunately, there is no internationalist approach (this concept 
does not even exist) which could be demarcated at the methodological 
level. Therefore, the definition of IR/IPE through its methodology is 
as impossible, as it is for political science, for example. This does, 
however, not mean that one can mix indiscriminately insights from 
different other disciplines or approaches to the social sciences. The 
specific substantial and methodological mix must always be stated 
and justified.
12 Mancur Olson, The Logie o f Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of 



























































































24 Part I. Theoretical assumptions
2.3. A Historical-sociological definition
Therefore, it seems that a mixture of the first thematic and this last 
historical-sociological definition seems most appropriate to deal with 
the discipline of International Relations. The thematic definition tries 
to see the internal logic of theory-building. And indeed, disciplines 
and their debates seem to follow a certain logic that can not be sub­
sumed under historical explanations. It is, however, not enough to 
give a sufficient appraisal of international studies. It is my assump­
tion, that the sole reference to this internal logic is not enough. I 
follow thereby the more hermeneutical tradition for the understan­
ding of the phenomena of international studies: there is no even 
slightly ahistorical subject or methodology on which accumulation of 
knowledge can occur as it is supposed to be in the natural sciences. 
A discipline is a construct. Its knowledge is also construct of the 
particular scholar and the academic community as a whole. Yet, this 
knowledge is not developed, the debates are not insulated from the 
environment in which research occurs and from the way the academic 
community defines the criteria to judge research and truth. Therefore, 
this more constructivist vision must integrate an external history, that 
is a historical-sociological definition.
Realism is taken here as the meeting point of the internal and 
external history. It worked like a papradigm. Thereby it defined inter­
nally the boundaries of the subject-matter and of the scientific com­
munity. But it is simultaneously shaped by its external environment 
which happens to be largely dominated by one superpower, the U.S. 
Thus, IR can only be understood as it historically emerged after 1945, 
i.e. as the analytical tool provided for the understanding of world 
politics and actual policy formulation of Western powers in a bipolar 




























































































Realism - the USAmerican paradigm
FTI---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
i - i-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- LJ
A paradigm governs, in the first instance, not a subject 
matter, but a group o f  practitioners. Any study o f  para­
digm directed or paradigm shattering research must 
begin by locating the responsible group or groups.
Thomas S. Kuhn
(The Structure o f Scientific Revolutions, p.180)
3.1. The concept of paradigm
The first meaning o f paradigm is embedded in Kuhn’s approach to 
"mature science". Here lies his own definition of paradigm:
"one or more past scientific achievements", which were
1. "sufficiently unprecedented to attract an enduring group of 
adherents away
from competing modes of scientific activity"
2. "sufficiently open minded to leave all sorts of problems for the 
redefined group of practitioners to resolve."13
If theses achievements are "universally received" (p. 13), "Pre-Para- 
digm-science", characterized by an "inter-school debate" about as­
sumptions ceases to exist and science becomes "mature" or "normal 
science”. Normal science can start with exploring the unresolved, but



























































































26 Part I. Theoretical assumptions
now defined problems, "puzzle - solving". It develops the potential 
richness of the underlying framework, the paradigm.
Without paradigm, there is no deepening, no criterion to chose 
problems (p.37) and for establishing the main focus of research, 
legitimising, and legitimated by, the scientific community. Without 
paradigm, no scientific community, no firmly established discipline 
(p. 19), no "mature science".
Kuhn’s central idea of "revolution" will introduce a second aspect 
o f paradigm which is more abstract or "metaphysical", because it is 
"far wider than and ideologically prior to theory, i.e. a whole Welt­
anschauung."14 For Kuhn, revolutions, i.e. the replacement of one 
paradigm by another, are changes of "world view": "When Aristotle 
and Galilei looked at swinging stones, the first saw constraint fall, 
the second a pendulum."15 This is, what Kuhn refers to as a 
"gestalt-switch".
Since paradigms constitute the basic tool of research, of "normal 
science", normal science in turn cannot correct the paradigm (p. 122). 
Hence, a new paradigm can only be bom by a radical new world view, 
by the abandonment of the old paradigm. This is why Kuhn calls it 
a "revolution". A revolution comes after a debate between proponents 
of competing paradigms. Since their logical contact is incomplete, 
"paradigm debates always involve the question : which problem is 
more significant to have solved ?" (p.110)
The "gestalt-switch” will come not because the new paradigm explains 
all things better, or more phenomena, than the replaced one did, but 
because it resolves some important problems, "anomalies" and 
promises greater achievements. It also can correspond to changed 
values in the environment.
Kuhn does not elaborate this last point. He stresses more the 
consequence of the necessary "gestalt-switch" for the notion of pro­
gress. Since a revolution changes only the way we see the world,
14 Margaret Mastermann, "The Nature of a Paradigm." In Imre Lakatos and Alan 
Musgrave, eds., Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge et al.: 
Cambridge University Press), p.67.



























































































What is IR/IPE ? 27
Kuhn merely sees a "process", but towards no goal, i.e. no "progress". 
He cannot see "truth" residing in the real world, which ever refined 
theories might discover. Paradigms that guide research, also deter­
mines perception. "Truth" is limited to the paradigm.
Hence, two views of paradigms exists. Paradigms are once consti­
tuting factors of a "mature science" and its scientific community, once 
a "Weltanschauung". This last definition is linked to important con­
cepts: "revolution" as "gestalt-switch" after a normative "paradigm- 
debate" of limited logical contact. It is the notion of "incommensurabi­
lity" which is the logical consequence of a concept of paradigm which 
expresses a Weltanschauung.
3.2. Paradigms and social sciences
In social sciences, two different attitudes towards Kuhn prevail.
A first group of scholars attempted to reformulate the history of 
social sciences in a Kuhnian way. Part of them discussed the notion 
of incommensurability and applied it to a normatively conceived para­
digm debate within IR/IPE.16 Others focused on the first concept of 
paradigm as "normal science", i.e. as a legitimated and dominating 
theoretical source for puzzle solving17. A last category finally refused 
to consider, at least in some special sciences, Kuhn’s "revolution" as 
convincing. The more cumulative (albeit also not teleological) view of
16 See e.g. Michael Banks, "The evolution of International Relations" In his edited 
Conflict in World Society. A new perspective on International Relations (Brighton: 
Harvester Press), pp.3-21; Michael Banks, "The Inter-Paradigm Debate" In M. Light 
& A.J.R. Groom, eds., International Relations. A  Handbook of current theory,(London: 
Frances Pinter), pp.7-26; K.J. Holsti, The Dividing Discipline. Hegemony and 
Diversity in International Theory (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985); and Margaret 
Mastermann, "The Nature of a Paradigm." In Criticism and the Growth of 
Knowledge.
17 See e.g. R.W. Mansbach & J.A. Vasquez, In search for theory; A new paradigm 
for global politics (New York et al.: Columbia University Press, 1981); John Vasquez, 



























































































28 Part I. Theoretical assumptions
scientific progress as superseding research programmes, seemed to fit 
reality better than a "gestalt-switch": Lakatos versus Kuhn18.
A second group of scholars refused to ask how social sciences fit 
Kuhn’s approach, but what Kuhn’s approach contributes to social 
sciences.19 This understanding of Kuhn emphasises the reasons why 
one specific paradigm has been chosen by pointing to the "profoundly 
purposive, goal-oriented character of all human activity and cognition 
(p.114). Thus, the sociologist has to ask which interests guide the 
judgements in the scientific community, vested professional interests 
of scientists and/or socio-political interests of their environment. 
This latter attitude will be followed here. Although chapters 10 and 
16 will treat it in detail, some reasons will be given here for discard­
ing the first and usual application of Kuhn to IR/IPE.
The first problem is linked to the very applicability of Kuhn’s 
history of science to social sciences. Kuhn thinks that social sciences 
(he calls them proto-sciences) have not acquired a universally received 
paradigm, although he does not exclude this possibility. Social scien­
ces are at the pre-paradigm stage. Therefore, some scholars proposed 
to consider social sciences as "multi-paradigm sciences"20, where 
Kuhnian normal science applies to the level of subfields. On the 
general level of the discipline however, the discussion about funda­
mentals remains and long-run progress (as opposed to local progress) 
fails to occur. Popper in his discussion of Kuhn, insists that this also 
happens in "mature" science.21 To have one dominating paradigm is 
neither necessary, nor impossible.
Kuhn later admits that the "proto-sciences” are qualitatively dif­
ferent from "mature science". Social sciences are, in other words, in
18 This is the view of Robert O. Keohane, "Theory of World Politics: Structural 
Realism and Beyond" In his edited Neorealism and its Critics (New York: Columbia 
University Press), pp. 158-203; and Marc Blaug, "Kuhn versus Lakatos, or paradigms 
versus research programmes in the history of economics." History o f Political 
Economy vol.7, no.7, 1975.
19 Barry Barnes, T.S.Kuhn and Social Science (London: Macmillan, 1982).
20 Margaret Mastermann, "The Nature of a Paradigm", p.74.
21 Karl R. Popper, "Normal Science and its dangers." In Imre Lakatos and Alan 



























































































What is IR/IPE ? 29
a permanent crisis. Kuhn does not follow Mastermann’s conception. 
He probably prefers a strong concept of paradigm limited to "mature" 
science to a looser one in all sciences, where the implications of 
’paradigms-as-Weltanschauung’ and of the central concept of incom­
mensurability might not apply. He acknowledges, that Popper’s 
method of criticism and falsification is essential in "proto-sciences".22
Thus, and this is a second problem, the concept of incommensura­
bility is far from being sufficiently analysed. If it applied to IR/IPE, 
it would provide a comfortable intellectual solution for the little accu­
mulation in social sciences. Debates do not cumulate, because they 
are about assumptions, value premises, in short, because they are in­
commensurable. Yet, this might not be Kuhn’s position. When Kuhn 
restated his concept of incommensurability, he used a language meta­
phor.23 Theories are as incommensurable as different languages are. 
They can be learned. They can even be translated. But during the 
translation, the ontological environment of the language is, at least 
partly, lost. The best translation will not be the same as Popper’s 
neutral language, which provides the ground for ’objective’ tests.
Yet, a translation still occurs. Communication is limited, but 
possible. Even though the choice for one language/theory is, in the 
last resort, not made on rational grounds, theories/languages develop 
and can come closer when communication continues. Incommensura­
ble does not mean entirely incomparable, but that, once the debate 
has eliminated inconsistencies, the last choice will express a prefe­
rence which can not be rationalised. Kuhn’s concept of Weltanschau­
ung, his second definition of paradigms, implies more than just 
incompatible values: People can see the same world, and judge it 
differently.24
Therefore, "paradigm" will be used in its sociological meaning, i.e. 
as being constitutive for a discipline and its scientific community, and
22 Thomas S. Kuhn, "Reflections on my critics." In Imre Lakatos and Alan 
Musgrave, eds., Criticism and the Growth o f Knowledge, p.244.
23 ibid., p.267.
24 In chapter 10, we will see that in the discussion of IR theory, not all the 
writers are aware of the fact that to use Kuhn’s concept of paradigm without its 




























































































30 Part I. Theoretical assumptions
as a body of resonance of its mainly USAmerican environment.25 
Realism does not imply a coherent world view. It is not inherently 
linked to a specific ideology, even though it reflects the interests of 
"its" practitioners in a global context dominated by the North (West). 
It implies specific assumptions about world politics that are continu­
ously reshaped by internal debate and external constraints and oppor­
tunities. It is the pivotal point of reference for academics and practi­
tioners alike and a place of intellectual struggle for both (in the 
West).
3.3. The sociological approach to paradigms in IR
In IR, two different ways to introduce "paradigms" for a better under­
standing of the evolution of IR theory can be identified. They are by 
no means exclusive. But their focus is slightly different and this will 
be emphasised, for the purpose of easier presentation.
Common to both approaches is the perception that IR has or had 
one single paradigm: the realist school or simply, realism. Yet, the 
first approach focuses on why and how realism developed as a para­
digm, whereas the second stresses the present "crisis" and the resul­
ting debate between competing paradigms, the so called "Inter-Para­
digm Debate". We will now take up the first discussion. Realism in 
crisis will constitute the interlude to Part III.
A sociological approach stresses two things. First, Realism is the 
school of thought which suited the best the interests of the scientific 
community and its social and political environment. Second, Realism 
is the consequence of the fact that after 1945 the overwhelming part 
of this scientific community happened to be located and paid in one 
country, the U.S. More bluntly, if  IR is an American social science, 
then realism is its paradigm.
25 Sometimes the scholars are not even aware of their implicit Western bias. Only 
on the Western side of the Elbe did "Since the birth of the modern nation-state in 
Western Europe, a single paradigm ... held sway over efforts to theorize about global 
politics." See R.W. Mansbach & J.A. Vasquez, J.A., In search for theory: A new 



























































































What is IR / IPE ? 31
Kuhn’s description of the function of a paradigm fits well the 
development of realism and of its discipline, IR. Starting from an 
analysis of the scientific community in IR, i.e., its activity, the 
resources available for that activity and the communal goals towards 
the attainment of which the activity is directed, some scholars have 
identified similarities in the development of IR theory after World 
War I and World War II26. They analysed the link between the 
dominance of certain states in the international system and the study 
of IR in and outside these countries.
Idealism after World War I had thus the same function as Realism 
after World War II: it provided legitimacy for the foreign policy of the 
dominant states and for the state of the international system.
This is not to make the functional fallacy to assume these to be the 
only reasons. Nor to see idealism and realism as necessarily con­
sciously used tools of legitimation. Only when peaceful change, 
advantageous for less powerful states, appeared more and more 
difficult, this function became important. In E.H.Carr’s words:
The utopian assumption that there is a world interest in peace which is 
identifiable with the interest of each individual nation helped politicians 
and political writers everywhere to evade the unpalatable fact of a funda­
mental divergence of interest between nations desirous of maintaining the 
status quo and nations desirous to change it.27
World War II was seen as the bankruptcy of the idealist position. 
"Anti-appeasement was the new consensus. The dynamics of changing 
power relations were acknowledged, peaceful change discredited. The 
only way to cope with change was to "contain" it by "power-poli­
tics".28 As Britain before, the U.S. perceived itself as having "global 
responsibilities" as a superpower. Thus, for national purposes, the 
scientific community was encouraged to look at global phenomena. A 
distinct discipline developed. Yet, this "American school" differed on
26 See e.g. Stanley Hoffmann, "An American Social Science: International 
Relations." Daedalus, voi. 106,1977; and Steve Smith, "The Development of Interna­
tional relations as a Social Science." Millennium, voi. 16, 1987.
27 Edward Hellet Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis (London: Macmillan, 1939/46), 
p.53.



























































































32 Part I. Theoretical assumptions
one very important point from the British scientific community: the 
ties to "politics"29. The American academic community was characte­
rised by:
- a "scientific" approach to social sciences, inspired by "economics"
- the dominance of scholars emigrated from Europe with strong 
historical backgrounds and who "wanted to find out the meaning and 
the causes of the catastrophe that had uprooted them, and perhaps 
the key to a better world"30
- the general desire of social scientists to be helpful to the national 
community, i.e. for IR scholars, to reflect and improve American 
foreign policy.
Moreover, the ties between university and power (the so-called 
"Kissinger-Syndrome") and the network of research foundations laid 
the ground for the development of one school to a "paradigm" which 
suited best American foreign interests: Realism31. Realism functio­
ned as a paradigm in setting the boundaries of "legitimate" research. 
As John Vasquez has shown, it provided the basic tool of analysis for 
generations of "puzzle-solvers". Or, in his own words, it "tells the 
scholar what is known about the world, what is unknown about it, 
how we should view the world if we want to know the unknown and 
finally what is worth knowing".32 Thus, Realism has another very 
important paradigmatic function. It defines a community by setting 
the boundaries of the discipline. The community, in turn defines the 
discipline. This aspect is of double importance. First, it explains why, 
once IR established as an independent discipline in the U.S., the new 
departments created outside the U.S. tended to adopt Realism as its 
leading paradigm. In the beginning, these countries imported the
29 The following relies heavily on S. Hoffmann, An American Social Science...; S. 
Smith, The Development of International Relations... See also Alfred Grosser, 
"L’Etude des Relations Internationales: Spécialité Américaine?" Revue Française de 
Science Politique, vol.III, 1956, pp.634-651.
30 Stanley Hoffmann, "An American Social Science: International Relations", p.47.
31 Fred Halliday notes very rightly that American IR theory knows a great 
diversity within and outside the realist paradigm, but that this was denied by 
mainstream scholars. See his "State and Society in International Relations: A second 
agenda.” Millennium, vol.16, 1987, p.227.



























































































What is IR/IPE ? 33
department with its constituting research-programme. In a certain 
sense, IR and Realism were identic. Perhaps only in the UK where IR 
had an older tradition, an independent, so-called "British school of IR" 
survived. On the other hand, in Germany, where IR is still today 
overwhelmingly part of the political science department, the dominant 
power-approach linked both. Realism became the American up-to-date 
formulation of the traditional German "Realpolitik", the echo of 
German emigrants back home33. Secondly, and perhaps more impor­
tant, by one of its assumptions, Realism gave IR a very suitable 
demarcation from other sciences. Beside the assumption of the state 
being the most important actor, and power the most important goal 
of politics, Realism claims that there is a qualitative difference 
between the laws which govern domestic societies and the "nature" of 
the international system34. As R.Aron described it:
Mais tant que l’humanité n’aura pas accompli son unification dans un Etat 
Universel, il subsistera une différence essentielle entre politique intérieure 
et politique étrangère...Les Etats ne sont pas sortis, dans leurs relations 
mutuelles de l’état de nature: il n’y aurait plus de théorie des relations 
internationales s’ils en étaient sortis.35
Therefore the following chapters in Part II will try to present Realism 
as it became the leading school after 1945 and the evolution of Realist 
thought till the crisis of Realism at the beginning of the Seventies.
33 The Munich school of "Neorealism” claims to be a German-American synthesis. 
See Gottfried-Karl Kindermann, ed., Grundelemente der Weltpolitik (Miinchen: Piper 
Verlag, 1977/19863).
34 Some scholars, considered generally within the Realist school, do however not 
subscribe to this assumption, so e.g. E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis: "War lurks 
in the background of international politics just as revolutions lurk in the background 
of domestic politics...and the international community has in this respect the closest 
analogy to those states, where the possibility of revolution is most frequently and 
most conspicuously present to the mind." (p.109), or "Those who seek international 
conciliation may study with advantage the conditions which have made the process 
of conciliation between social classes in some degree successful."Cp.237)
35 Raymond Aron, Paix et guerre entre les nations (Paris: Callman-Levy, 












































































































































































































































































































































































Classical Realism: Carr, Morgenthau 
and the Crisis of Collective Security
n r i ------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------- HTI[ L J J ------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------ [LJJ
Nous entrons dans L’avenir à reculons
Paul Valéry
The conception of politics is strongly influenced by the historical con­
text in which it is formulated. Thus, the lessons of the "the Great 
War", World War I brought many people to the conviction that a new 
policy must be implemented. The massive destruction, the use of 
mass-destructive weapons (gas), the collapse of the European Concert 
and its traditional (aristocratic) diplomacy, and the impossibility to 
treat war as a limited means for the achievement of certain political 
goals1 seemed to require a political rethinking. As often, the new 
policy is defined as the opposite of the classical one. Unable to dis­
tinguish between the really important reasons of the past failure, a 
radical change is sought after: it implies domestic politics, the means 
and ends of foreign policy, the very Weltanschauung that had guided
1 This alludes also to the actual outbreak of WWI which was more the mechanical 



























































































38 Part II. Realism from containment to détente
behaviour before. And for the first time, Europe was not able any 
longer to decide about its destiny. The end of the War is sometimes 
seen as the rise of the two new superpowers. It certainly is the 
beginning of the US’ international role. And it was the US President 
Wilson who became the most fervent advocate of a radical policy 
change. "New Diplomacy" should avoid another disastrous war.
Here lies the birth of a discipline of International Relations: the 
study and recommendations for the avoidance of war. W ar and peace’ 
is the first main subject of our discipline. The avoidance of war its 
main purpose, the study of the behaviour of nations in a potential 
world community its basic paradigm.
We will treat first the basic tenets of Idealism, its critique by Carr 
and eventually the presentation of a fully worked out Realist alterna­
tive by Morgenthau.
4.1. The Crisis of Idealism before World War II: basic tenets 
and their applications to IR
The basic tenets of a idealist approach to IR derive largely from the 
tradition of Enlightenment (Aufklarung). Take just those points that 
will be particularly different from the Realist tradition.
First, the view o f human nature. The idealist strand of thought 
that was prominent after WWI in international affairs was deeply 
convinced of the idea that human behavior is not reducible to egoistic 
motivation and material needs. Without taking into account specific 
aims and the way ideals influence these aims, human behaviour can­
not be sufficiently understood.
Second, the view o f ideals. The ideals that deeply affect human 
aims and therefore human behaviour are understood as potentially 
universal. By this is meant that they represent the real long-term 
interests of mankind, i.e. individuals, states and the whole interna­
tional political system. There exists a potential harmony o f interests.
Third, the importance o f reason. Reason is the way, mankind can 



























































































Classical Realism: Carr, Morgenthau... 39
and translate them rationally in norms, ethics and behaviour. 
(Kantian approach).
These basic tenets have been applied generally to politics and 
particularly to International Relations. Politics should thereby be con­
cerned with the rational and public understanding of the universal 
principles and their translation into law and government. In order to 
fulfil this function, it should
- encourage the education of people in order to make them under­
stand their own long-term interests
- encourage the democratization of politics.
International Relations and foreign policy had consequently to be con­
ceived of differently. The basic aim was peace as the avoidance o f war. 
Idealist politics derives from a specific view of the different causes of 
war. There are, on the one hand, the objective causes linked to hu­
man nature and the nature of politics, and, on the other, the subjec­
tive causes that are to be found in the traditional diplomacy that the 
European system had known after 1648.
With regard to the objective causes o f war, they are derived from 
the basic tenets of idealism. Since mankind is considered potentially 
good, since there exists at least a potential harmony of interests, war 
is the failure or breakdown of the rational communication that poli­
tics should provide to translate the more harmonious universal princi­
ples into reality. Thus, not citizens, but governments are responsible 
for the outbreak of war. They start it - against the interests of their 
citizen. The avoidance of war is done through the democratization of 
politics, starting from local to national to international politics. Non- 
democratic governments are one of the primary causes of war. WWI 
was interpreted as the result of the non-democratic politics that 
boosts egoism to nationalism which inevitably leads - in a non-demo- 
cratic environment - to war.
The subjective causes o f war were the features of a wrong foreign 




























































































40 Part II. Realism from containment to détente
1. The diplomats were deciding in many countries over the top of 
their people. Foreign policy should become democratized and open to 
the will of the sovereign, the people.
2. The primacy of foreign politics (Primat der Aufienpolitik) not 
only meant its independence from the domestic environment, but 
even the disclosure of information from other diplomats: secret 
diplomacy. This diplomacy was only considered responsible for the 
outbreak of the war, implying that if Germany had known about the 
two front war and the British solidarity with France, it would have 
avoided a war it could have hardly won. Instead of stabilising the 
international realm, secret diplomacy eventually de-stabilises it. In 
line with the overall philosophy, there is also the general mistrust of 
non-publicised policy, because it avoids the clash of reasoning and the 
eventual prevailing of the most reasonable solution coming near to 
the potential harmony of interests of mankind.
3. The main means of international politics, the balance o f power, 
far from being a guarantee against war, is the main reason for its 
outbreak. The balancing up done by some diplomats plays with the 
very possibility of conflict. One does not look for a system of interna­
tional control, but clinches on the egoistic powers of the nation. Power 
politics is seen as the incarnation of the elite arrogance to play with 
politics.2
4. Therefore, new means have to be introduced on the internatio­
nal level to guarantee a future peace. There is most prominently the 
right o f national self-determination as a recognition of the empires 
special role in the outbreak of WWI (why did war start in Austria- 
Hungary?). It comprised the idea of a democratization of nations as 
a prerequisite for the democratization of international politics. Thus, 
not power politics, but collective security. Not the balance of power, 
but the League o f Nations should be the means of international diplo­
macy. Public deliberation of the best solutions for peace decided and
2 For a thought-provoking critique from the radical angle of the games diplomats 
play, see Ekkehart Krippendorff, Staat und Krieg. Die historische Logik politischer 
Unvernunft (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp, 1985); and Ekkehart Krippendorff, "Wie die 



























































































Classical Realism: Carr, Morgenthau... 41
implemented by all nations on an equal standing against all nations 
that do not comply with the decisions taken democratically. Peace 
should become possible through a procedural solution o f reason: "war 
does not pay."
In short, by taking national rights seriously and removing hence 
the nationalist reasons for international conflict, an international 
peace-settling and security system should override those national 
interests detrimental to the avoidance of war. The precondition for 
the acceptance of such a system is its publicity. It is the attempt to 
transpose the principles of the domestic liberal-democratic system to 
the international realm.
4.2. The Realist Critique of Idealism: E.H. Carr’s attack on the 
harmony o f interests
Was the first predominant approach inspired by the avoidance of a 
war that nobody wanted (at least that way it actually happened), so 
is Realism inspired by the will to avoid war that is actually consi­
dered a privileged aim of foreign policy. Idealism presupposed the 
underlying principle of 19th century diplomacy, moderation, and tried 
to apply it to a new context, where war was considered no possible 
means of politics any longer. It aimed at applying a system of col­
lective security to moderated states. Realism, on the other hand, 
wants to adjust international politics to the phenomenon of total war 
which results in the reversal of the Clausewitzian dictum, i.e. that 
peace becomes the prolongation of war with other means. Here, the 
balance of power is reapplied, because in an epoch of total war, no 
satisfactory security can ever be achieved. Power politics is no histo­
rical accident, but a logical necessity.
The certitude that international politics does not conform to the 
wishes and the entire Weltbild of Idealism becomes more and more 
preponderant with its policy failures:
- the world economic crisis (1929-1933) with its impact on the inter­



























































































42 Part II. Realism from containment to détente
international cooperation and the reappearance of mercantilism 
("beggar-thy-neighbour")
- the failure of the disarmament conference in Geneva (1933/34),
- the failure of the League of Nations to provide security even for its 
own members (Ethiopia 1935),
- the remilitarization of the Rhineland 1936,
- and finally the symbol of Munich (1938) and the politics of appease­
ment which were held responsible for the outbreak of World War II.
Carr’s critique of the prevailing Idealism of the inter-war period 
(written in 1939) organises the analysis around a basic dichotomy: 
utopia and reality. He concedes that aims precede (human) sciences. 
To have -even utopian- ideals is necessary for the very outset of 
disciplined thinking: the purpose provides the stimulus and the aim 
of research. Yet, then he departs, at least prima facie, from idealism. 
After the breakdown of a phase of applied utopian thinking, a neces­
sary second stage has to come in: Realism.
Both are actually two sides of the same coin. They are just needed 
in different epochs of thought. The utopian climax of the inter-war 
period required, so Carr, now a Realist period. This Realism remains 
mrerely defined in opposition to Idealism. His actual aim is to provide 
a synthesis of utopianism (his word for idealism) and realism that 
tries to avoid the shortcomings of both approaches. Utopianism suf­
fers from its impracticability. Pure Realism3, on the other hand, lacks 
perspectives and would reduce politics to a daily, blind and pragmatic 
adjustment to the necessities of international relations; being able to 
defend itself (building up power) and being exposed to the power aims 
of the others. It is fatality and determinism. As a historian and also 
as a politically responsible person, Carr refuses this deterministic 
approach to politics. His synthesis proposes to start from the histo­
rical limitations Realists set out - without ever forgetting the Realists’ 
restrictions on intellectual creativity.
3 It is important to note that for Carr, there does not yet exist a Realist school. 
His Realist references are therefore including not only prominently Machiavelli, but 



























































































Classical Realism: Carr, Morgenthau... 43
But let us first see, why he considers Utopianism unrealisable. 
There is first of all, and this is the main subject of his critique, the 
non-existing harmony o f interests. Idealism operates from a priority 
given to reason, to ethics over politics, and theory over practice. 
Realism starts from the opposite side. It is a consequentialist reaso­
ning. Not the theoretical blueprint, but its actual work, its effects and 
consequences are used to judge and justify politics. Realism has thus 
a strong utilitarian bias. It does not address the possible dynamics of 
preferences, it takes them for granted and tries to adapt to them - 
and not vice versa, as in the doctrine of the harmony o f interests.
The first criticism of the harmony of interests is levelled against 
the derivation from enlightenment, the primordial place assigned to 
reason.
In pursuing his own interest, the individual pursues that of the com­
munity, and in promoting the interest of the community he promotes his 
own. This is the famous doctrine of the harmony of interests. It is a 
necessary corollary of the postulate that moral laws can be established by 
right reasoning. The admission of any ultimate divergence of interests 
would be fatal to this postulate; and any apparent clash of interests must 
therefore be explained as the result of wrong calculation.4
Second, Carr criticises the derivation o f values from power, ethics 
from politics. If the actual world shows anything, but a harmony of 
interests, then it is no use to take that as the general underlying 
potential feature of mankind. Or stronger. Since ethics derive from 
politics and not vice versa, the claim to a harmony of interests is 
nothing more than the result of a specific configuration of power and 
the successful implementation of a particular interest so as to let it 
appear a universal one.
Once industrial capitalism and the class system had become the recognised 
structure of society, the doctrine of the harmony of interests acquired a 
new significance, and became...the ideology of a dominant group concerned 
to maintain its predominance by asserting the identity of interests with 
those of the community as a whole/...) No country but Great Britain had 
been commercially powerful enough to believe in the international 
harmony of economic interests.5
4 E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939, p.42.



























































































44 Part II. Realism from containment to détente
Finally, Carr makes it obvious that the harmony of interests actually 
corresponds to the powerful’s ideology of the status quo.
The utopian assumption that there is a world interest in peace which is 
identifiable with the interest of each individual nation helped politicians 
and political writers everywhere to evade the unpalatable fact of a funda­
mental divergence between nations desirous of maintaining the status quo 
and nations desirous of changing it.6
Carr criticises very strongly the behavior of the victorious powers 
after World War I who regarded every change (and be it by peaceful 
means) as disturbance of peace. Yet, if peace meant nothing else then 
the keeping of the status quo of benefits and power, then it is doomed 
to fail. Politics is in a continuous change and must readapt. The ques­
tion of collective security as used by the winners of 1918 mounted not 
to the management of conflict that necessarily arises between agents, 
but to the very negation that such a conflict can exist.
A new foreign policy has to derive from this critique of utopianism. 
Since one denies the legitimate existence of conflict, idealism cannot 
perceive the conflict when necessary, and consequently, that collective 
security as realized after 1918 provides no means to cope and to ma­
nage conflict between nations. This is not so much a critique of collec­
tive security as such. Since Carr argues for taking the necessary ad­
justment as starting point, peaceful change, i.e. the mechanical reor­
dering without resorting to war, becomes the central task o f a foreign 
policy. In those situations where conflicts cannot be avoided, conflict 
management is the best we can and should do.7
Concluding on Carr, one should once more stress his conception 
that not only Idealism, but also Realism is a limited approach.
6 ibid., p.53.
7 This is also the main point of one of the main critics of Power Politics in the 
early 60’s, namely Inis L. Claude jr., Power and International Relations (New York: 
Random House, 1962). By overstressing the extent to which Realist writers are 
compelled to believe in the balance of power, critics of Realism have quoted Claude 
for an idealist critique. Yet, Claude certainly shares the reserves about the 
implemented collective security system that existed in the inter-war period and also 
the Realist assumption of conflict and not harmony. He argues forcefully against the 
kind of Realism that wants to reduce international politics to the law of the jungle. 



























































































Classical Realism: Carr, Morgenthau... 45
Realism’s determinism leaves no role for human action, i.e. foreign 
policy, and for willful change. Realism becomes utterly unrealistic 
when pushed to its extreme, because neither relativism, nor fatalism, 
nor stasis is what actually characterises the international realm. 
Mankind is not powerless.
In the four criticisms he advances, i.e. that realism excludes a fini­
te goal, emotional appeal, a right of moral judgement, and a ground 
for action, it is certainly the last that retains his interest. In the 
perpetual move between the deconstruction of the universal values of 
an epoch and the reestablishing of new ones, Realism is ill-prepared 
to provide a help for the second. Yet, politics is, by its nature, for a 
Realist, ambiguous. The truth of today is the myth of tomorrow. 
Truths are nevertheless part of and guides for human action.
4.3. The new paradigm: Morgenthau’s Politics among Nations
This mitigated Realist critique did, however, not prevail in the 
aftermath of World War II. The anti-totalitarian struggle that nearly 
failed against Hitler (and Japan) should not repeat the mistakes 
made by appeasement. Even though Morgenthau was not so Machia­
vellian as he is often interpreted to be, there is a certain change in 
tone compared with Carr. Whereas Carr’s anti-idealism addressed 
also the last imperial power, Great Britain, so is Morgenthau’s power 
politics developed in an epoch where a new hegemon arises that has 
not yet been scrutinized for its ideological posture. Anti-Idealism is 
not yet implemented against the USAmerican version of the harmony 
of interests. So, the critique is strongly against a collective security 
system and the general move to reapply concepts from the domestic 
to the international sphere. Whereas Carr did not at all treat the 
balance of power, and only little the nature of power, the struggle for 



























































































46 Part II. Realism from containment to détente
Morgenthau’s book8 became the most widely read textbook of 
International Relations and provided the basic tenets to at least one 
generation of scholars and probably more practitioners. The modern 
and USAmerican discipline of International Relations starts here.
Yet, had Morgenthau written in a time where the Cold War was 
not starting, his critique of a pure Hobbesian state of nature, of 
Machiavellism, of the United Nations (also because it could have been 
a really collective security system) would have not been so quickly 
forgotten. Instead, it was the struggle for power that impressed most 
readers. This is partly Morgenthau’s fault. Since he wanted to influ­
ence and advise the foreign policy of the most powerful, yet interna­
tionally very unexperienced country, he stressed the necessary, inevi­
table aspects of Realist reasoning. Those necessities should be the 
base for any rational foreign policy. Thereby he gives the impression 
to remove the uncertainties of the study of international politics that 
he is aptly describing in his historical examples.
In a nutshell, his approach can be characterised as: an elaboration 
of the basic tendencies and forces of international politics (the objec­
tive background) that are necessary to assess the possibilities of the 
preservation of peace through self-regulatory mechanisms (balance of 
power) and normative limitations (law, morality, world public 
opinion).
The study of international politics should provide the analyst with 
the ability to ascertain the national interest, maximising thereby the 
instrumental rationality of available means to possible ends. Staats- 
rason in the atomic era. He uses thereby an approach that derives 
war fundamentally from human nature. Let us take Figure 1 as the 
line of argument from the anthropological foundation toi actual 
foreign policy.
We start with the anthropological foundation. Morgenthau posits 
three basic drives of "all man" (p. 17): the drive to live, to propagate,
8 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations. The Struggle for Power and Peace. 
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48 Part II. Realism from containment to détente
and the drive to dominate. If one aggregates these different drives, 
then must result (at least in a world of scarce resources), the struggle 
for power.
This struggle for power can be done with three different postures:
1. status quo politics (defined by the fact that it does not want to 
change the power relation)
2. imperialist politics (or better: expansionist politics that want to 
change power relations)
3. prestige politics (that is, however, less important, and therefore 
subsumed under the other two)
We meet here the basic dichotomy Carr had already introduced in his 
ideological critique of the harmony of interests. Obviously, order or 
stability are main concepts for the organization of Realist thought.
From this foundation in human nature derives a specific view of 
politics at the domestic level, called national power. This specific view 
finds its origins in the frustrated power drives within societies. The 
state of law is able to control the individual struggle for power, but 
not to eradicate it. It remains unsatisfied and will be projected unto 
the international scene (p.74), i.e. what Morgenthau (and nobody else 
afterwards) calls nationalistic universalism. He thereby means the 
universalization of nationalist drives - as opposed to the primacy and 
isolation of foreign policy form domestic affairs. Morgenthau argues 
that the greater the stability of a society and the sense for security of 
its members, the less nationalism. In other words, he argues for a 
close relation between social disintegration, personal insecurity, and 
the ferocity of modern nationalistic power. This implies, as well, that 
one can start the analysis of International Relations at the national 
level: the projection of individual power struggles on the national 
level means that one can reapply the arguments derived from human 
nature to a international system where exactly this control of the 
struggle for power cannot be coped with by an overarching authority 
comparable to the state at the national level. The basic international 
feature of multiplicity (or what came later to be called anarchy, i.e. 



























































































Classical Realism: Carr, Morgenthau... 49
tinuous struggle for survival, where no guarantee of a higher order 
is available. The reference to human nature increasingly drops out in 
the course of the text. National power and the nations’ struggle for 
power is Morgenthau’s reception in the literature, also partly because 
arguments based on human nature are not exactly easy to sustain.
Power has hence become the central concept of analysis. 
Morgenthau, aware of it, tries to circumscribe the concept. First, he 
starts a favorite game of International Relations scholars, namely to 
describe the important elements of power. He mentions eight elements: 
geography, natural resources, industrial capacity, military prepared­
ness, population, national character, national morale. The list is 
inductively construed. There is no general derivation of it.
Second, he appeals to the readers to be aware of the possible errors 
in evaluating power. There are three possible errors:
1. Power has no absolute character. Therefore, one needs to correlate 
the power of one nation with the power of other nations.
2. Power has no permanent character. This implies the need to corre­
late actual power at one time with possible power of some future 
time.
3. The fallacy of the single factor. There is no one element that is 
decisive in power calculations, explicitly not the military one.
Finally, Morgenthau derives the international system from this 
interplay of national powers and wills in a context of multiplicity of 
sovereign states. The system-level is characterised by the balance o f  
power and normative mechanisms.
The balance o f power (bop) is, in harsh contrast to Idealism, 
considered natural and inevitable. In an analogy to the working of the 
market, the Bop is the natural outgrowth of the power struggle 
(which, in turn, was derived from the drive for domination). Its goal 
is the stability and the preservation of all elements of the system. 
Morgenthau goes at length to explain the articulation of the bop: the 
work of central (and great) powers, buffer states, protectorates, and, 



























































































50 Part II. Realism from containment to détente
unimportant for the big power struggle. He then gives examples of its 
methods, as e.g. "divide and rule", compensation arrangements, arma­
ments, alliances, the role of the "balancer".
The bop is, however, unable to guarantee an efficient conflict manage­
ment. The exact weighing of powers are only possible ex post, that is, 
only after a conflict has shown the correlation of forces. Therefore, 
Morgenthau considers the working of the bop as
- non-existent: there is no proof that the boP has avoided war, but it 
has certainly been a cause of war; and as
- inadequate: The bop presupposes its legitimate acceptance and a 
code of conduct (which in a democratic age, so Morgenthau, is mis­
sing, because of the incompatible and uncompromising forces of natio­
nalistic universalism). Therefore, one needs to integrate normative 
mechanisms for the management of international affairs. If their 
creation fails, the system will always fall back on the brute clash of 
national forces outside a state of law. These struggles will establish 
balance mechanisms, that, in turn, ask for normative mechanisms to 
function, and so on. National Power and the Bop are the fall-backs o f  
any international system. This is the basic Realist stand.
Normative mechanisms are necessary for a stable system, but can­
not be taken for granted. Different levels of mechanisms can be dis­
tinguished:
- at the weakest normative level: Ethics, Mores and Law; then
- world public opinion; eventually
- international law. International law is conceived in the law-positi- 
vist and contractarian tradition: derived from actual practices, power 
differentials, and consent of sovereign states.9
9 His treatment of sovereignty is typical in this regard. He defines it as ’legal 
authority within a delimited territory.’ Sovereignty presupposes ius necessarium, i.e. 
a frame where sovereignty as such is recognized (traditionally to be said to apply 
since 1648). Otherwise, all international law derives from sovereigns (p.244). Yet, it 
is not to be confounded with freedom from legal restraint, freedom from regulation, 
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4.4. Realist Theory and Practice in World Politics after World 
War II
Diplomacy of high quality will bring the ends and means of foreign policy 
into harmony with the available resources of national power. (105)
This exact calculation is the national interest. It must presuppose the 
objective forces (national power, the Bop and also the normative 
mechanisms) that constrain the options open to national politics. As 
for Carr, the general aim of international politics is to allow the 
smooth peaceful change, to manage or limit an ever possible conflict.
1. The domestic level
Morgenthau says that the democratic selection and responsibility of 
government officials has destroyed international morality as an effec­
tive system of restraint.
The basic, and recurrent, idea in Realist writings, is that in order for 
an international system of the Balance of power to work, such a sys­
tem needs a code of conduct, the acceptance of a limited interest and 
limited aims. This code of conduct is said to have existed during the 
Concert of Europe, the golden age of balance of power politics.
Whereas for Idealism the democratization of politics was the prere­
quisite for the avoidance of war, it is this very democratization, with 
its attack on the raison d’Etat, the independence of foreign policy for­
mulations, that Morgenthau sees as leading to the unlimited and irre­
concilable clash of power struggles today: nationalistic universalism.
2. The Balance o f power
With the moral and intellectual consensus destroyed, the balance of 
power works very precariously today:
- it is inflexible (because bipolar)
- there is no "balancer"



























































































52 Part II. Realism from containment to détente
3. Normative mechanisms
While the democratic selection and responsibility of government officials des­
troyed international morality as an effective system of restraint, nationalism 
destroyed the international society itself within which that morality had 
operated, (p.189)
4. How to achieve peaceful change ?
Disarmament is no solution, if the underlying problem, namely the 
individual and national strive for power is not settled. Collective 
security is a good means only if perfect conditions prevail. In fact, 
they do not. In such cases, and opposed to the Idealists, it not only 
fails to avoid war, but, on top of that, has all the disadvantages o f an 
alliance policy: it compels more countries into the process o f war, coun­
tries, that otherwise would have remained outside. There is no 
possibility to limit the conflict.
4.5. Conclusion
The historical context of Munich and appeasement gave Realism, as 
opposed to the Idealist approaches prevailing in the inter-war period, 
an enormous persuasive force. Carr’s undermining of the basic prin­
ciples of Idealism (Utopianism) and Morgenthau’s establishment of a 
coherent approach to the analysis of world politics looked much more 
suitable in the general catastrophe of nazism and world war.
The reason why I got at length presenting these two authors is the 
possibility to present fundamental Realist ideas that are the most 
recurrent references of main future debates10 - and also in order to 
give a first set of basic criteria to analyse world politics and its actual 
application.
In Morgenthau we have already present the three levels on which 
usually the causes for conflict (war) are found: the individual level
10 See for empirical analyses of Morgenthau’s (and Realism’s) hegemonic place in 
thought and teaching: John Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics: A Critique-, and 




























































































Classical Realism: Carr, Morgenthau... 53
(human nature), the domestic level (the nature of the political re­
gimes) and the international level (anarchy).11 This debate has not 
finished yet. Morgenthau stresses those concepts that will be the 
basic tools for analysis in the years to come, as e.g. power, raison 
d’Etat, national interest, code of conduct, balance of power, anar- 
chy/sovereignty. The world-view is pragmatic, but not cynical. The 
values underlying it are derived from consequentialist thinking. 
Weber’s ethic of responsibility comes close to it. The main aim 
consisted in the avoidance of great war through the management and 
limitation of conflicts by a working balance of power supplemented by 
international law. Conflicts, however, will always arise. Their abo­
lition is impossible. For the Realists, foreign policy implies choices 
that nobody wants to take. Diplomats do not play for fun. On the 
stage of world politics with a risk that brute forces clash unfettered, 
diplomats enter a play of tragedy. This is the statesman’s fate. Realist 
policy is not the external projection of a military or even reactionary 
ideology; it is the constant adjustment to a cynical reality. Realpolitik 
is not a choice that can be avoided, it is necessity.
11 This famous triad has been formally introduced into IR literature by Kenneth 




























































































The evolution of Realism’s central concepts
5.1. Introduction: Morgenthau’s Six Principles of Realism
Let us take as a starting point Morgenthau’s famous six principles of 
Realism (that appeared in later editions of his textbook) which did not 
only define the paradigm for the science, but helped enormously to 
constitute or demarcate International Relations as an established and 
emancipated "science":
1. "Theory consists in ascertaining facts and giving them meaning 
through reason ... Political realism believes that politics like society 
in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in 
human nature."
2. "The concept of interest defined in terms of power" is considered 
the key concept of political theory which permits to demarcate the 
political sphere from other spheres of social action, and to make intel­
ligible political behaviour. Power is treated like an instinct in Man.
3. The "National interest" defined in terms of power becomes the 
guide to a rational foreign policy formulation.
Power is defined as a concept of domination: "The concept of power 
covers all social relations that serve [the goal of domination], from 
physical violence (force, strength) to psychological phenomenon, 
through which a will can dominate another." Morgenthau uses the 



























































































The evolution o f central concepts o f Realism 55
The description is generally couched in a means-goals framework. The 
prescription derives from it linking National Interest to zweckratio- 
nalem Handeln (Weber’s instrumental rationality) and to the tradi­
tional concept of raison d’Etat as formulated by Friedrich Meinecke, 
an historian Morgenthau admired and whose definition he accepted 
as being analogous to his own:
The ’reason’ of a state thus consists in realizing itself and its environment 
and to derive from this understanding the maxims for action... Due to the 
singularity of the state and its environment, the choice of the ways to the 
end is limited. Strctly speaking, only one way to the end has to be regar­
ded, namely the best possible one in the actual situation. For every state 
in every situation, there exists one ideal logic of action, one ideal raison 
d’Etat. This to recognize is the insistent attempt of the acting statesman 
and the reflecting historian.12
Kindermann has elaborated a description of Morgenthau’s objective 
notion of interest which is explicitly accepted by the latter:
Seen objectively, i.e. as a reality independent of reflection, the National 
Interest can be understood as the essence of possible behaviour whose rea­
lization in a concrete historical situation maximizes particularly the exis­
tential (interests) of a state (security, power, wealth).13
There exists, therefore, always a best rational choice, independently 
of whether the actor is aware of the options or not.
In this context we have to integrate another central concept of 
Morgenthau’s which is a "natural and inevitable outgrowth of the 
struggle for power": the "Balance of Power also described as "a 
universal instrument of foreign policy used in all times by all nations 
who wanted to preserve their independence".14
4. Morgenthau follows Weber’s distinction between ethic of respon­
sibility ("Verantwortungsethik") and ethic of ultimate ends ("Gesin- 
nungsethik") refusing the latter’s application to politics.
12 See Gottfried-Karl Kindermann, "Zum Selbstverstandnis des neorealistischen 
Ansatzes" in his edited Grundziige der Weltpolitik, p.20 (my translation).
13 ibid.



























































































56 Part II. Realism from containment to détente
5. Starting from the power-oriented interest of the state, Morgen- 
thau refuses to equate possible normative elements in the foreign 
policy of some states with universal ethical rules and obligations.
6. Realism is seen as a constitutive factor to demarcate politics 
(and in following: IR) from other social sciences. To make out of the 
concept of power the key concept of politics is a reduction which is 
consciously done and legitimised by a kind of "scientific division of 
labour.”
Let us now examine the main debates around central concepts 
of Realism as it evolved during the 60’s.
This will be:
1. The debate around the derivation of international relations: the 
choice for anarchy and the security dilemma
2. The so-called "second debate"15 about its status as a science: 
"Objective laws", power, the BoP, and the "National Interest"
5.2. The advance of the Third Image: The security dilemma
An important debate arose around the foundation of IR discourse. As 
Kenneth Waltz has succinctly summarised, there are three ways to 
explain war and peace: one by pointing to the human nature (the first 
image), one by starting from the particular domestic regimes (the 
second image), and one deriving the behavior of states from their 
specific environment, namely anarchy (the third image).
In every image there are optimists and pessimists, or in other words 
Idealists and Realists. The specific Idealist discourse that Carr casti­
gated, e.g., was of an optimist second image. Morgenthau is certainly 
using a pessimist first image. Herz, Waltz and subsequently the 
mainstream of International Relations will use the third image as a 
basic explanation: the security dilemma in international anarchy.



























































































The evolution o f central concepts o f Realism 57
1. The security dilemma as a foundation
The anthropological foundation has suffered from severe criticism. 
Not only the obvious uneasiness of behaviouralists to deal with such 
a "metaphysical term" as the power-instinct. But it is mainly the 
search for specificity of IR as a discipline that made the anchoring of 
Realism at the anthropological level little convincing.
The main reason is a tension between, on the one hand, the asser­
tion that politics has to be demarcated from other social sciences 
through the concept of power and, on the other hand, the statement 
that political action in the international realm is of a different kind 
than in the domestic realm. If politics is always power politics, than 
we do not need a discipline of international relations to study the in­
ternational society. Generally, the tension was resolved by abando­
ning the anthropological foundation of political action in power. Poli­
tical scientists found their own way to demarcate the discipline from 
other social sciences, while scholars in International Relations sought 
for alternative explanations, that would capture the main features of 
the international realm and preserve a distinction from domestic poli­
tics.
One solution that permitted to derive the feature of international 
"power politics” differently was the so-called "security dilemma."16 
The basic idea is that "power politics" is not the result of the mean 
human nature which in an endless strive for power subordinates any 
moral or other consideration to this goal, but that it is the unfortu­
nate, yet logical, consequence of the relation between actors without 
an overarching authority that could settle conflicts or judge issues. 
The survival of the state can in this realm of anarchy only be guaran­
teed by an effort of self-help, of egoistical usage of the contextual 
opportunities to build up defence and by a ceaseless awareness of the
16 The concept is derived in the 50s from another highly important writer in the 
Realist tradition. See J.H. Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the security 
dilemma", World Politics, vol.2. Later Kenneth Waltz strongly criticised the first 
image (anthropological) foundation of IR, preferring also an approach close to the 
here quoted one. See his Man, State, and War. More recently, Robert Jervis uses it 



























































































58 Part II. Realism from containment to détente
other’s efforts. The system of self-help engenders a spiral of competi­
tion, aimed at making each actor more secure. Yet, an anarchical sys­
tem composed by security seeking actors produces over-all insecurity: 
this is the dilemma.17
This concept proved compelling at first sight for providing IR again 
with a specific realm of stufy (paradigmatic function). Moreover, it 
seemingly accounted for the unavoidable nature of war and peacetime 
competition. Yet, very early two main Realist writers have introduced 
refinements of this model of anarchy. They were driven by the idea 
that not all international relations could be easily subsumed under 
the state o f nature (i.e. of war). Thus, Raymond Aron and Henry 
Kissinger introduced the existence of two distinct forms of interna­
tional relations under anarchy.18
Kissinger makes the distinction between a legitimate and a revolu­
tionary international order. His approach limits the use of the concept 
of "power politics" to the analysis of a revolutionary international or­
der. Thereby, another kind of international relations, that seemed not 
meaningfully to be apprehended through pure power politics, namely 
the legitimate order, can be accounted for within the Realist ap­
proach. For example, contemporary German-French relations cannot 
be entirely grasped by referring to a framework that was developed 
to describe the superpower-conflict during the Cold War ("power 
politics") and the German-French relations before World War I and 
World War II.
Stability, then, has commonly resulted not from a quest for peace, but from 
a generally accepted legitimacy. "Legitimacy" as here used should not be 
confused with justice. It means no more than an international agreement 
about the nature of workable arrangements and about the permissible
17 In today’s writings a variation of the theme is couched in game-theoretical 
terms: such as for instance the prisoner’s dilemma.
18 These are taken as examples. Actually, the differentiation of the security 
dilemma is a recurrent theme. One could take as other prominent classical examples 
Arnold Wolfers’ continuum of power politics and indifference in his Discord and Col­
laboration. Essays on International Politics (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hop­




























































































The evolution o f central concepts o f Realism 59
aims and methods of foreign policy...A legitimate order does not make 
conflicts impossible, but it limits their scope. Wars may occur, but they will 
be fought in the name o f  the existing structure and the peace which follows 
will be justified as a better expression of the "legitimate", general consen­
sus. Diplomacy in the classic sense, the adjustment of differences through 
negotiation, is possible only in "legitimate" international orders.
Whenever there exists a power which considers the international order 
or the manner of legitimizing it oppressive, relations between it and other 
powers will be revolutionary. In such cases, it is not the adjustment of 
differences within a given system which will be at issue, but the system 
itself... To be sure, the motivation of the revolutionary power may well be 
defensive; it may well be sincere in its protestations of feeling threatened. 
But the distinguishing feature of a revolutionary power is not that it feels 
threatened - such feeling is inherent in the nature of international 
relations based on sovereign states - but that nothing can reassure it. Only 
absolute security - the neutralization of the opponent - is considered a 
sufficient guarantee, and thus the desire of one power for absolute security 
means absolute insecurity for all the others.
Diplomacy, the art of restraining the exercise of power, cannot function 
in such an environment...And because in revolutionary situations the 
contending systems are less concerned with the adjustment of differences 
than with the subversion of loyalties, diplomacy is replaced either by war 
or by an armaments race.19
Within "the nature of international relations based on sovereign 
states" (without overarching authority), the feeling of insecurity and 
threat is considered inherent. Yet, only some specific orders display 
the features of the US-Soviet Union relations in the heyday of the 
Cold War, or Napoleon’s European policy or the German sentiment 
in the inter-war period. Others, as the Concert of Europe in the 19th 
century and the relations within the Common Market today are in 
Aron’s words a "compromis historique entre l’état de nature et le règne 
de La loi.''20
Aron himself makes a similar distinction between what he calls 
"système homogène” and "système hétérogène":
J’appelle systèmes homogènes ceux dans lesquels les Etats appartiennent 
au même type, obéissent à la même conception de la politique. J’appelle 
hétérogènes, au contraire, les systèmes dans lesquels les Etats sont orga-
19 Henry A. Kissinger, A World. Restored (New York: Gollancz, 1957) p.1-3.



























































































60 Part II. Realism from containment to détente
nisés selon des principes autres et se réclament de valeurs contradic­
toires.21
The distinction is similar, yet not identic.
Whereas Kissinger seems more to appeal to an international code 
of conduct which could be distinctive from the national rules of legiti­
macy, Aron seems to imply a direct link between domestic and inter­
national policies. For Kissinger, different social systems can agree to 
settle their interstate relations following other rules than the domes­
tic ones. This carries the public/private distinction of liberal domestic 
policies to the international realm. In this distinction, everyone is 
allowed to pursue her own faith in the private realm (and where 
everyone is protected against the intrusion of the public realm: consti­
tutional rights here equates national sovereignty), but must refrain 
from the attempt to impose it on the collectivity.
Aron, on the other hand, assumes that there is a certain link 
between, on the one hand, the organization within the states that 
form an international system, and, on the other hand, the nature of 
relations between those states. In other words, the domestic organiza­
tion in part determines the nature of the international system.22 Yet, 
only in part. As he himself notes, the heterogeneous principles of 
legitimacy before 1917 did not hinder the European powers to mode­
rate their foreign policy aims: the destruction of another regime was 
never on the agenda.23
Since Kissinger applies his definition to a regime which happened 
to be also domestically a revolutionary regime (France from 1789 to 
1815), and plays down Talleyrand’s skills by pointing to the regime 
change at home as the more important explanation for the readmis­
sion of France to the Congress (and the European Concert), both seem 
to imply the heterogeneous definition of legitimacy at the domestic 
level as a prerequisite for the "revolutionary" international order.
21 ibid., p.108.
22 In Waltz’s terminology, this would make out of Aron a pessimist "second 
image" writer.



























































































The evolution o f central concepts o f  Realism 61
Finally, this domestic derivation is not even a necessary one: 
Kissinger quotes Versailles as an example of an international system 
which has bees resented as oppressive by one of the actors (therefore 
revolutionary), even if the Republic of Weimar was following similar 
lines of domestic organisation as the other states - with the exception 
of its sovereignty, curtailed in the Peace - a "Diktat". And Aron 
describes as "perhaps the most frightening heterogeneity" the one 
which "develops out of a basic community."24
The domestic system gives therefore only an indication of the 
resulting international order: unreconcilable contradictory values, as 
they are pursued at the international level, seem to be the more 
important ingredient for a "revolutionary" or "heterogeneous" order. 
The distinction is, however, necessary to differentiate the internation­
al realm in subsystemic relations where the "security dilemma" 
applies fully and where it applies much less.
Thus, no anthropological foundation is needed any more. Yet, the 
debate about the origins of war still lingers on: human nature, the 
nature of the political regime (remember Wilson’s "New Diplomacy") 
or international anarchy.
2. Anarchy
Traditionally, the international realm is compared with a Hobbesian 
state of nature. This has provoked very much debate regarding the 
accurateness of the description. What all writers stress, is the diffe­
rence between the realm of law and the realm of... Yet, how exactly 
the international realm has to be described is a matter of dispute. 
Traditional Realism would describe it as a Hobbesian "state of 
war”.25
Yet, already in 1966, Hedley Bull makes a departure from this 
very specific Hobbesian Realist approach without leaving entirely the 
Realist terrain when he defines his research-programme for Interna­
24 ibid., p.112.
25 See also Stanley Hoffmann’s contribution (in Aron’s tradition) to the theory of 



























































































62 Part II. Realism from containment to détente
tional Relations: the study o f order in world politics. In this respect, 
Bull strictly follows the Realist tradition and the tradition in interna­
tional law where he comes from. His departure consists in a redefini­
tion of this external/internal difference. He rejects openly what he 
considers to be the base of the reasoning o f Realpolitik: the state of 
nature in the international realm.26 Analyzing Hobbes’ account of the 
state of nature’s characteristics, Bull rejects this conceptualization: 
neither the non-existence of legal and moral rule, nor the absence of 
trade, industry (old sense), navigation, nor, finally, the state of war 
appear to characterize convincingly the international realm - even if 
the latter is still conceived as different from the domestic sphere. Bull 
prefers Locke’s account of the state of nature. He remains within the 
Realist paradigm in another sense as well: rules, institutions as far 
as they exist are the result of a contract, reflecting divergent interests 
and powers. Except that the general context of the contract is not a 
Hobbesian one. But then, which one?
Bull defines the international realm as a "society" (later he calls 
his major work "The Anarchical Society"27), i.e. a venture among 
sovereign states to regulate conflict and cooperation without overar­
ching government. In this sense, war is not seen as an expression of 
the disfunction of the international "society", but is an integral part 
of the ordering principles of this special kind of society. He argues for 
a comparison with anthropological studies on "primitive” societies. 
Yet, he develops certain characteristics which plead for the unique­
ness of the international society.
This special conception of a "society" is named the "Grotian 
tradition".28 Bull distinguishes within this tradition between Grotius 
and Oppenheim. Whereas Grotius derives the law, i.e.the rules, out 
of the natural law tradition and hesitates to limit them to the inter­
26 Hedley Bull, "Society and Anarchy in International Relations", in H. Butterfield 
& M. Wight, eds., Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory o f International 
Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966).
27 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society (London: Macmillan, 1977).
28 Hedley Bull, "The Grotian Conception of International Society", in H. 



























































































The evolution of central concepts o f Realism 63
national sphere (he pleads for intervention), Oppenheim registers 
more the actual agreement of the contracting parties (the states). 
Whereas Grotius pleads for intervention for the "right" cause (ius ad 
helium) which can create a logical and moral tension if the victory 
necessitates means of warfare traditionally not justifiable (ius belli), 
Oppenheim remains cautious about the first and endorses strongly 
the latter. Here, Bull remains "realist":
The view of pluralists [i.e. Oppenheim] is not to be dismissed as a mere 
rationalization of state practice; it is a conception of international society 
founded upon the observation of the actual area of agreement between 
states and informed by a sense of the limitations which in this situation 
rules may be usefully made rules of law. (...). But it may still be held that 
the method, [Oppenheim] employed of gauging the role of international 
society in relation to the actual area of agreement between states is 
superior to one which sets up the law over and against the facts.29
By presupposing a society, i.e. a larger area of agreement which is 
possible by the specific characteristics of the international realm, Bull 
tries to integrate idealist and realist thought: a substantial role of 
norms (the liberal or idealist part) and their derivation from power 
(the realist part).
Bull makes explicit the distinctiveness of his "anarchy" compared 
with the Hobbesian state of nature:30
1. The international realm is characterised by economic interdepen­
dence.
2. States are less vulnerable than individuals.
3. Equal vulnerability of every man to every other makes anarchy 
intolerable. Too great discrepancy in power moves anarchy to hierar­
chy. Yet the international system is characterised by great and small 
powers. This inequality is supposed to have a cooperative and stabili­
sing impact on state behaviour.31
4. States are more self-sufficient than individuals.
29 ibid., p.71/72 and 73.
30 See Hedley Bull, "Anarchy and Society..."
31 See also Kenneth Waltz, "International Structure, National Force and the 
Balance of World Power" (1967), reprinted in James A. Rosenau, ed., International 
Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory (New York: Free Press, 



























































































64 Part II. Realism from containment to détente
Hence, "anarchy" remains undoubtedly a central feature of the 
Realist approach. Yet, since it is the basic explanatory tool, the 
lacking preciseness of its content, the ambiguity of the relations it 
should covers shade a twilight on the capacity to demarcate interna­
tional relations, or in other words, not to subsume it under a special 
category of hierarchy. This debate around formal anarchy and sub­
stantial rule is one of the strongest debates today (see also chapters 
11, 13.5., 16).
5.3. The ’second debate’
The first great debate of IR is the inter-war and immediately post-war 
debate between Realism an Idealism. The 1960’s display a new debate 
about the scientific status of the discipline. Generally scholars in IR 
came form international law, and international or diplomatic history. 
With the heyday of the behavioral revolution within political science 
(and its ascendant star: positivism in its deductive-nomological style), 
however, traditional IR came under severe attack. Not considered ex­
plicit enough on its assumptions, not stringent enough about its hypo­
thesis, traditional IR was after all nothing more, so the argument 
runs, than either purely descriptive history or (moralistic) normative 
theory.
This had to change. The dispute that resulted was called the Bull- 
Kaplan debate, for its chief protagonists or also the traditionalism vs. 
scientism debate. This tension is, however, already present in 
Morgenthau, who in the first editions of his textbook already talks 
about objective laws and does eventually integrate the search for 
theses laws into his principles of Political Realism.
In the following, the traditional writers will get more space, 
because, first, they tried by contradicting the positivist claims of their 
opponents to expand and refine the central concepts of Realism. And 
second, because Neo-Realism in the 70’s and 80’s resurrects the scien­



























































































The evolution o f central concepts o f  Realism 65
The two central concepts for the elaboration of a positivist IR will 
be discussed: the balance of power as the objective constraint (Macro­
level) and the National Interest as the objective best rational (Micro- 
level) for foreign policy.
1. The Balance o f Power
The critique of the Balance of power concept is now legendary. Yet, 
in spite of sometimes piercing criticism, it seems to be a kind of 
canonical law, that every Realist writer uses in one sense or another. 
Morgenthau quotes four different meanings - and adds a fifth one: 
"(1) as a policy aimed at a certain state of affairs
(2) as an actual state of affairs
(3) as an approximately equal distribution of power
(4) as any distribution of power"32
The fifth one is what Ernst Haas describes as an analytical concept 
claiming to be a universal law33 and Inis L. Claude as Balance of 
Power "as-a-system”, a kind of self-regulatory mechanism.34 
Both these critics find four categories for the usage of the Balance of 
Power concept:
1. a descriptive category: a situation (see Morgenthau 2-4)
2. a prescriptive category: a policy (see Morgenthau 1)
3. an analytical category: a system (Morgenthau 5)
4. an ideological category: symbol and propaganda
Our discussion will focus on the analytical and prescriptive 
category in Morgenthau’s approach. Since the Balance of Power is 
considered the universal law o f Realist International Relations, it 
gives us another insight to what extent the concept of power can be 
seen as a central and scientifically applicable concept.
Let us start with the analytical concept which, at least logically, 
should precede it as a prescriptive category.
32 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations (I9603), p.167, fn.l.
33 Ernst Haas, "The Balance of Power: Prescription, Concept or Propaganda ?" 
World Politics vol.V, 1953, p.467.



























































































66 Part II. Realism from containment to détente
Morgenthau uses it in the following way
The aspiration for power on the part of several nations, each trying either 
to maintain or overthrow the status quo, leads of necessity to a constel­
lation which is called the balance of power and to policies that aim at 
preserving it. We say ’of necessity* advisedly. For here again we are 
confronted with the basic misconception., that men have a choice between 
power politics and its necessary outgrowth, the balance of power, on the 
one hand and a different, better kind of international relations on the 
other ... It will be shown... that the international balance of power is only 
a particular manifestation of a general social principle to which all 
societies composed of a number of autonomous units owe the autonomy of 
their component parts; that the balance of power and policies aiming at its 
preservation are not only inevitable but are an essentially stabilizing factor 
in a society of sovereign nations; and that the instability of the inter­
national balance of power is due not to the faultiness of the principle, but 
to the particular conditions under which the principle must operate in a 
society of sovereign states.35
Morgenthau describes the balance of power as "a universal instru­
ment of foreign policy used at all times by all nations who wanted to 
preserve their independence.”36 What kind of balance of power is 
inevitable?
Leaving aside the truism that "any configuration of power distribu­
tion" is necessary, Morgenthau claims to use the term in the meaning 
of equilibrium. This is patently false. The British "Balance of Power" 
Policy in the 19lh century has aptly been described as "Balance for the 
Continent and Power for Britain". It was British neutrality which 
could step in to deter a continental challenger by the tipping of the 
balance strongly to the defender’s side. Only when Germany perceived 
herself strong enough to equate or even overtake her opponents-plus- 
Britain, did the balancing policy not work any more. A stalemate 
situation with an arbiter interested in the status quo is a better 
description for this epoch than "equilibrium".
Balance of Power cannot mean a policy directed towards equilibri­
um, either. Since the struggle for power is not limited at any given 
point, every power seeks superiority, not equilibrium.




























































































The evolution o f central concepts o f Realism 67
Finally, it does not mean that balance o f power is the necessary 
international system for the management o f peace and war, because 
Morgenthau himself quotes other techniques (international law, 
diplomacy...).
In Claude’s analysis, Morgenthau cannot prove any necessity of 
the balance of power.37 He concludes that it is essentially a redun­
dancy in his theory o f international relations. States fail to do what 
the Balance of Power would require. The Balance of Power does not 
necessarily adjust from one equilibrium to another equilibrium. What 
Morgenthau wants to say, is that, if states want to preserve their 
independence in a world of power struggle, of state of war, they must 
be as strong as their ubiquitous challengers. For Morgenthau, then, 
the raison d’état imposes that the nation should be as strong as 
possible. But this is obviously only an iron law, if in any case where 
one country was not as strong as its possible challengers, there was 
invasion and annihilation of the nation, which will always, in turn, 
provoke countermeasures by the remaining powers to equilibrate the 
upset balance. Since the measurement of force is always easier a post­
eriori, it seems impossible to validate this "law". We see instead a 
permanently changing attempt to balance power by power accumula­
tion and power struggle. This can become then a description some­
what "synonymous with the state-system itself."38
The whole weight of the argument shifts to the characterisation of 
the international realm. Only if its indeed an endless competitive 
power struggle, i.e. a state of war, we would expect the balance of 
power to work. Morgenthau, however, himself admits that the balance 
is only one of the possible means of foreign policy. And as we have 
seen in the foregoing discussions, the power struggle has been de­
linked from its anthropological roots, and has been either circumscri­
37 Inis L. Claude jr., Power and International Relations, p.25-37. See for a short 
restatement and actualisation: Inis L. Claude jr., "The balance of power revisited." 
Review o f International Studies, vol.15, 1989, pp.77-85.
38 Martin Wight, Power Politics, edited by Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraadt 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1946/79), p.179. This particular chapter on the balance 
of power is an intermediary draft of the late 50’s to his better known analysis "The 



























































































68 Part II. Realism from containment to détente
bed to "revolutionary" (Kissinger) or "heterogeneous" (Aron) systems, 
or simply dismissed and replaced by a Lockian state of nature, i.e. an 
"anarchical society" (Bull).
Yet, even after this onslaught, the concept of the Balance of Power 
is repeatedly used as a central concept in International Relations.
2. "Objective laws" and "National Interest"
The analogy with the neo-classical market-model is the basic thrust 
of the scientist critique. Applied to IR, the market and its equilibrium 
correspond to the balance of power and the strive for utility maximi­
sation corresponds to the national interest expressed in terms of 
power. In an anarchical context, without central sanction mechanism, 
the impulse to survive pushes actors to maximize power at least as 
an intermediate goal. Therefore, power becomes comparable to money 
in neoclassical theory. The aggregation of the individual strives for 
power results is an international competitive order which, as market 
prices in the economy, decide the external constraints on national 
actions. The National Interest is the utility maximization in this con­
text: it corresponds to the Pareto optimum in neo-classical economics.
Aron argues forcefully against such an approach where the 
national interest would replace utility in an economic function.39 The 
national interest defined in terms of power cannot be equated with an 
economic utility defined in terms of money. Aron does not deny the 
centrality of the concept of power in IR. But for two reasons the con­
cept of power is unable to provide the necessary analogy with money 
and therefore the analogy between utility and national interest.
39 Raymond Aron, Paix et guerre entre les nations, p.28/29: "Certains théoriciens 
ont voulu trouver, pour les relations internationales, l’équivalent de la fin rationelle 
du sport ou de l’économie. Un seul but, la victoire, s’écrie le général naïf, oubliant 
que la victoire militaire donne toujours des satisfactions d’amour-propre, mais non 
toujours des bénéfices politiques. Un seul impératif, l’intérêt national, proclame so­
lennellement un théoricien, à peine moins naïf que le général, comme s’il suffisait 
d’accrocher l’adjectif national au concept d’intérêt pour rendre celui-ci univoque ..., 
faute d’objectif univoque de la conduite diplomatique, l’analyse rationelle des 



























































































The evolution o f central concepts o f Realism 69
First, he considers as too vague and ambiguous an end to base a 
rational choice theory (means lends relation) on it.
If power is treated as the ultimate goal (the national interest), 
thereby rationalising the account of the diplomatic-strategic beha­
viour (this is Aron’s term), then Aron asks: which power ? 
"Power-as-resource" (i.e. the potential capacities) does not seem very 
rational. Why would the extension and the accumulation of in the 
future usable resources be the guide for foreign policy behaviour ? To 
what extent is the extension of the territory and its population a 
threat for the virtue and the coherence of the national community? 
Why would it be always preferable?
"Power-as-force" (i.e. of actually mobilised resources) is, for Aron, 
obviously a bad candidate as a rationale for a-temporal foreign policy. 
The accumulation of resources has always been judged with regard 
to the external threat. Aron underlines the dialectics of accumulation 
where more security can disrupt a process which finally leads to less 
security.
"Power-as-effective coercive capacity" cannot always be seen as an 
end, but surely also as a means to attain other ends. Aron cites peace, 
glory, influence on humanity, pride to diffuse an ideal (idée).
Aron develops a triad of "eternal" foreign policy goals: power 
(puissance), security and glory/ideals. He quotes examples where it 
seems impossible to reduce the foreign policy behaviour to one of the 
three, and he refuses to see either in power or in security a rational 
choice behaviour which all homini diplomatici should share. In view 
of the plurality of "eternal” foreign policy goals which can be sub­
ordinated rationally to more contingent and various historical goals, 
the "national interest" cannot be "rationally" defined, even if one 
leaves aside the ambiguity of concepts of collective interest. There is 
no unambiguous objective to be followed.
Second, power is not as fungible40 as money. It is true, that also 
economists cannot exactly know all the particular preferences of the
40 The term fungible refers to the idea of a moveable good that can be freely 
placed and replaced by another of the same class. It connotates universal applicabili­



























































































70 Part II. Realism from containment to détente
economic actors. Yet, they are able to reduce the multitude of prefe­
rences to one utility function, because of money, the universal stan­
dard of value and universal means for the acquisition of goods. Power 
is not as liquid as money and the use of particular powers (say, an 
atomic bomb) for the control of a specific outcome (say, inducing 
another state to sign a convention on environmental matters) is far 
from obvious.
Therefore, Aron concludes that
1. The number of powers and the search for equilibrium in the vague 
sense of a search not to be dependent on others41, are insufficient to 
elaborate a model, that could predict the outcomes of particular 
international events or allow for a kind of eternal advice*2
2. The possible theorisation is, therefore, limited to a framework of 
analysis that justifies the focus and selection of certain variables 
considered significant and to apprehend or understand particular 
historical constellations of world politics.43 There is no theory of 
international relations comparable to positivist (deductive-nomologi- 
cal) neo-classical economics.
Si la conduite diplomatique n’est jamais déterminé par le seul rapport de 
forces, si la puissance n’est pas l’enjeu de la diplomatie comme l’utilité 
celle de l’économie, alors la conclusion est légitime qu’il n’y  a pas de théorie 
générale des relations internationales, comparable à la théorie générale de 
l’économie. La théorie que nous sommes en train d’esquisser tend à 
analyser le sens de la conduite diplomatique, à dégager les notions 
fondamentales, à préciser les variables qu’il faut passer en revue pour
41 Raymond Aron Paix et guerre entre les nations, p.140, 154: "Le maintien d’un 
système donné a pour condition la sauvegarde des acteurs principaux, mais chacun 
de ceux-ci n’est pas rationellement obligé à mettre le maintien du système au dessus 
de tel de ses intérêts propres...La seule règle universelle et formelle est celle de 
l’équilibre au sens vague que lui donnait David Hume: chaque acteur (j’ajouterai 
principal) s’efforce de ne pas être à la merci des autres.”
42 ibid., p.154: "La combinaison de la ’volonté de ne pas être à la merci’ et d’une 
configuration typique permet d’esquisser des modèles de systèmes. Mais les modèles, 
caractérisés par les deux seuls traits - volonté d’équilibre et configuration du rapport 
des forces - restent à trop d’ égards indéterminés pour qu’on en puisse dégager les 
lois de fonctionnement et d’évolution."
43 ibid., p.140: "Il n’est possible ni de prévoir les événements diplomatiques à 
partir de l’analyse d’un système typique ni de dicter aux princes une conduite en 
fonction du type de système. Le modèle de l’équilibre pluripolaire aide à comprendre 



























































































The evolution o f central concepts o f  Realism 71
comprendre une constellation. Mais elle ne suggère pas une ’diplomatie 
étemelle’, elle ne prétend pas à la reconstruction d’un système clos.44
5.4. Conclusion
Three points should be just shortly restated.
First, it is important to see that the initial anthropological 
foundation has been dropped for the derivation from the security 
dilemma. The debate which of the three images should account for 
the emergence of conflict and war has been reduced to two, or more 
precisely, to the exact articulation of the systemic and the unit 
dynamics.
Second, the systemic level has been widely analysed following a 
continuum from (to take Bull’s concepts) anarchy to society. The 
problem if anarchy is at all a useful concept has not yet been 
resolved: formal anarchy, yet substantial rule seems to characterise 
contemporary international relations.
Third, this evolution of central Realist concepts took place in what 
is generally called the second debate between ’traditionalists’ and 
’scientists’ and which had provoked some ’traditionalists’ made their 
conceptual and methodological framework more explicit (this is 
especially the case for Bull and Aron). Yet, the debate subsists today 





























































































Marxist Theories of International Relations: 
The Soviet Approach
This chapter breaks with the view of the Realist West. It has been 
initially conceived for a comparison of Western Realism with the lea­
ding theory of that part of the world where Realism was not predo­
minant, namely the Soviet theory of international relations. It is only 
during the preparation that a further comparison appeared increas­
ingly plausible: the extent to which superpowers adjust analytical 
tools to their global interests. Thus, there appear to be in Realist 
thought corollaries for major concepts in Soviet theory. Overstretch­
ing the point, one could say that Soviet theories of imperialism be­
come de facto a kind of Soviet Realism. Hence this chapter will first 
introduce classic marxist thought on imperialism. Whereas Soviet 
theories are discussed here, marxist thought outside the Soviet grid 
will be presented in chapter 13.
6.1. Classical Imperialism
1. The concept of imperialism
Marxist theories of International Relations are above all theories of 
imperialism. Yet this concept requires some preliminary remarks 



























































































Imperialism and the Soviet approach to IR 73
1. In order to avoid confusion with other Western concepts of 
political imperialism45 or sociological imperialism (Schumpeter), the 
concept is sometimes used as economic imperialism. Yet, this 
expression can be confusing. On the one hand, for Marxism, imperial­
ism is always economic, the expression tautological. On the other, it 
has sometimes come to signify a historical period where imperialism 
was pursued primarily by economic means and not military or 
political ones. This is the case in the after-war debate around neo­
colonialism and informal rule. Economic can therefore refer both to 
the causes, and to the means of imperialism.
2. There exist different periods of thought on the subject of 
imperialism:
a) Classical imperialism which focuses on intra-"bourgeois" state 
relations: the view from the core
b) Imperialism in a "World System" which developed as a response to 
the issue of underdevelopment despite of decolonization: the view 
from the periphery
3. The basic tenet is equal, namely, imperialism results from the 
inherent contradictions of capitalism which requires its expansion. 
The different approaches display, however, a considerable variety for 
the exact location of the contradiction and the causality they imply: 
For Marx and Lenin, both contradiction and causality are deduced 
from the mode of production of domestic societies. For some non-mar- 
xists, it is the drive for market power, inherent to capitalism, or the 
class conflict over distribution (Hilferding) that cause expansion. Fi­
nally, international and not domestic reasons are more recently given:
- Emmanuel’s unequal exchange (international sphere of exchange)46
- the internationalization of production (closer to the original Marx)47
45 See e.g. Benjamin J. Cohen, The Question of Imperialism: The Political 
Economy o f Dominance and Dependence (London et al.: Macmillan, 1973).
46 Arghiri Emmanuel, Unequal Exchange: A Study o f the Imperialism o f Trade 
(New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972).




























































































74 Part II. Realism from containment to détente
4. Finally, the development of imperialist theories took place in (at 
least) two very different ideological settings. The background of 19th 
Century imperialism and of World War I, neocolonialism, and 
ideological underpinning of communist regimes gives quite different 
inputs to theory formulation.
2. Marx’ legacy
Marx did not develop a far-fetched theory of imperialism or of inter­
national relations. There are some ideas about the need for foreign 
markets as a reaction to the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. But 
the Third World is not very widely treated, and if, then in general as 
a kind of mirror image of the first stages of historical materialism. 
Marx shared the view of the progressive impact of capitalism with the 
major liberal thinkers. Yet, he saw it only as a first step. Up to the 
industrial revolution, capitalism’s external relations were mediated 
through merchant capitals and did not necessarily transform other so­
cieties drawn into the world market. Once industrial capital has ta­
ken charge, capitalist conquest could play a progressive (though bru­
tal) role initiating industrialization. It is a question of dogmatic de­
bate, if every social formation has to go through a capitalist phase be­
fore reaching socialism. Yet, imperialism can have a positive function 
for socialism. It speeds up the development and demise of capitalism.
The most important legacy of Marx’ ideas can be found at the pa­
radigmatic level. In view of the fact, that the basic (economic) forces 
of change do not know any borders, Marx redirects the attention to 
the transnational nature of international relations.48 This is reflect­
ed in the difficulties to catch the phenomenon of nationalism as a 
basic factor of change in the context of international relations.



























































































Imperialism and the Soviet approach to IR 75
3. Classical Imperialism: Hilferding, Luxemburg, Lenin
The historical context of classical imperialism was a particular period 
of international capitalist development: the pre-war period before 
1914.
The characteristics, that Marxist or closely related thinkers, took 
up to incorporate into the ("concrete") historical analysis49 of capital­
ism were
- extreme rapid growth (in the core countries)
- features of monopoly capitalism, such as cartels, trusts, and the 
rising importance of large banks
- a return of tariffs
- a tremendous colonial expansion
- a change in the very nature of the bourgeois class, that increasingly 
collaborated with an ever more important state.
The classical theories which emerged can be analysed as exemplifying 
this theoretical adaptation process. The orthodox Marxist approach 
begins with an analysis of the mode of production, capitalism (in one 
country). It then moves towards the historical actor (the class), the 
derived superstructure (politics, and in particular, the capitalist 
state), the expansion of the state(s) which eventually leads to the out­
break of war (See figure 2).
Let us take up the different links of the argumentation, first the 
link from class to state and the central concept o f monopoly.
Certainly, Marxists do not need the concept of monopoly for lin­
king classes to the state. Since the state (the whole political sphere) 
is part of the dependent superstructure of the society, it is seen as re­
presenting the interests of the ruling class (in our case, the "bour­
geois” class). Nevertheless, the concept of monopoly specifies this link 
in a particular historical period of capitalism. Hilferding retraced the
49 This wording is extensively used by Varga for describing the empirical check 
of the general laws of Marxism. See Yevgeny S. Varga, Politico-Economic Problems 
o f Capitalism (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1968. Transl. from Ocherki po 
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Figure 2 Classical Theories of Imperialism (Hilferding, Luxemburg, Lenin)
path of concentration, cartelisation to the merger of financial and in­
dustrial capital into "finance capital." The industrial economies are, 
thus, not dominated by a large bourgeois class, but by its elite, a 
small monolithic group. The state acts in their interest - which can 
sometimes be against the interests of other bourgeois strata (but ob­
jectively never against the interests of the bourgeoisie and capitalism 
as such). Hilferding analysed in detail how states are pushed to pro­
tectionist policies and to expansion in order to sustain the process of 
monopolization - against foreign monopolies, but also against small 
national producers and consumers. The concomitant development of 
monopolies (or more precisely: oligopolisation) and increased state 
intervention are considered by Lenin as the basic features of state- 
monopoly capitalism or, in other words, imperialism as the highest 
stage of capitalism. These theses are followed generally. The thinkers 
differ on the reasons given for state expansion.
The next link in the chain is the treatment of the causes o f 
expansion I colonialism. Since the state is not an autonomous actor, 
but a means of the ruling class and only a surface phenomenon of 
capitalism, expansion/colonialism is approached from the interest of 




























































































Imperialism and the Soviet approach to IR 77
Hilferding bases his explanation on the domestic "finance capital" 
whose attempts of cartelization will eventually overcome the anarchy 
of capitalist production (markets) and economic crises, yet not the 
contradiction between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Imperialist 
expansion is explained in terms of the needs of monopoly capitalists:
- new areas of raw material exploitation
- export markets for the output of monopoly capitalists
- profitable markets for capitalist investment
In other words, expansion occurs for financial and commercial needs. 
Imperialism becomes here the internationalisation of a tamed domes­
tic intra-bourgeois competition. Finance capital requires a strong state 
that will help it in its foreign expansion (neo-mercantilist policies for 
the worldwide competitive struggle for dominance of markets). In 
order to mobilize enough domestic resources for imperialism, the state 
needs an own ideology which is provided by the impact of internatio­
nal competition, the "ideology of imperialism": a mixture of racism, 
nationalism, and militarism.
Luxemburg derives the need for expansion from the inherent 
underconsumptionist feature of capitalism. In a capitalist society, 
capital accumulation creates a productive capacity larger than con­
sumption: competition and the need for economies of scale generate 
overproduction. At the same time, the natural tendency of the income 
distribution is disadvantageous to wage-earners. And since capitalists 
have a higher propensity to save, the economy of a mature capitalist 
society displays an inherent tendency towards oversaving, i.e. an 
insufficient effective demand. Overproduction and oversaving cause 
underconsumption, or the impossibility for capitalists to realize their 
surplus (exchanging goods vs. money on the market). For Luxemburg, 
mature capitalist societies need therefore pre-capitalist societies for 
the realization of the surplus: commercial needs explain expansion.
The coercive element of imperialism (colonialism) and the role of 
the state, is accounted for by recurring to Marx’ theory of value. Pre­
capitalist societies must exchange labour-intensive (thus more value- 
including) goods against capital-intensive ones. Force is needed to let 



























































































78 Part II. Realism, from containment to détente
Finally, among the classical thinkers, Luxemburg is the only who 
had thought about the impact of imperialism on pre-capitalist socie­
ties, the destruction of the "natural economy", the appropriation of 
the means of production, and the "prolétarisation", i.e. expansion of 
wage-labour. However, her view is on this subject limited to the 
foreign impact and
excludes any consideration of internal forces and contradiction within the
pre-capitalist mode of production.50
The final link is the explanation of war. Writing in 1916, Lenin ex­
panded the antagonistic view of inter-state relations that Hilferding 
and Bukharin had proposed before, to the phenomenon of war. Lenin 
was not an underconsumptionist. Some scholars sustain that he failed 
to analyse the exact cause of imperialism51. He argued as if he did 
not question Marx' tendency for the rate of profit to fall as the prima­
ry cause of imperialism.52 "Suraboundance of capital" and the "law 
of uneven development" were the central points of his argument.
Because of the uneven development of different branches and coun­
tries, capital is driven from the most developed ones (and where the 
rate of profit is the lowest) to those where the profit is highest. Capi­
tal export becomes the most important feature of capitalist imperia­
lism. Not commercial, but financial needs lead to an international 
competition between monopolies on a world scale, a re-division of the 
world among the most powerful countries and, finally, war. War even­
tually must break out because Kautzky’s thesis of ultra-imperialism 
(the alliance of capitalism for joint exploitation) is not viable in the 
long run: the law of uneven development invites the fastest growing 
state-monopoly to reverse the alliance.
In this theory, where an international phenomenon, war, is of fun­
damental importance, the conception of the state approximates that
50 Charles A. Barone, Marxist Thought on Imperialism: Survey and Critique 
(London et al.: Macmillan, 1985), p.34.
51 ibid., p.53.
52 See James O’Connor, "The Meaning of Economic Imperialism." In R. Rhodes, 



























































































Imperialism and the Soviet approach to IR 79
of an actor and requires perhaps the most monolithic or black box 
concept of the state: monopoly and state become nearly identical.
6.2. Soviet approaches to International Relations
Before presenting Soviet approaches to IR, two of its particularities 
should be mentioned.
First, they IR display a disproportionate close link between the 
theory and practice of Soviet foreign policy. Based on the objective 
laws of Marxism, the theory is supposed to interpret the past, to 
guide present decisions, and to forecast the future. Yet, if foreign 
policy behavior fails or the international system does not display the 
expected features, theory adjusted. In a world of truth, theory and 
practice must be in perfect harmony. Second, even though Soviet 
analysts spent a considerable amount of time in refuting "Western" 
approaches, the actual outlook of main concepts resembles conspicu­
ously what has come to be called systemic Realism. Is this the result 
of a common concern with superpower-politics? Or the mirror-image 
of a country exposed to the calamities of international Realpolitik?63
1. International anarchy: Correlation o f forces vs. Balance o f power
A Soviet analyst gives the following definition o f the correlation o f 
forces (cofj. It is the relation
among the totality of economic, political, legal, diplomatic and military 
contacts and interrelationships among peoples, among states and state 
systems, and among the main social, economic and political forces and 
organizations functioning in the world.
These relations constitute 53
53 Since I am not a Soviet specialist and do not read Russian, the following 
section relies heavily on secondary literature - as presented by Western writers. It 
is therefore highly probable that the Realist analogies at the end reflect not only 



























































































80 Part II. Realism from containment to détente
the objective circumstances in which both world politics as a whole and the
foreign policy of individual states are developing.54
The cof thereby integrates class forces, material and moral forces and 
give it the central explanatory role for foreign policy analysis (micro­
level) and international politics (macro-level). It takes into account 
every possible national, transnational, subnational actor or force (im­
plying non-intentional or non-conscious action by actors or natural 
forces).
The cof is conceived in rather dynamic terms. The cof can change 
at all times either by objective forces (international factors) or 
subjective forces (internal political constraints on use of force). The 
subjective element is introduced in order to distinguish the potential 
forces form the actually used ones - and thereby to save the explana­
tory value of the Cof approach. Avoiding the pitfalls (or internal 
inconsistency) of having a subjective element in a theory supposed to 
be entirely objective, this subjective element is, in turn, sometimes 
derived from recurring to objective forces.
The change o f the cof was a major topic in the explanation of the 
after World War II international environment. The objective forces of 
change often quoted are: the rise of Soviet Union military power, of 
Japanese and W-European economic power, and the development of 
national liberation movements. These objective forces were said to 
have shifted the cof to the detriment of U.S. (imperialist) interests. 
Linked to the subjective unwillingness to use force during and after 
the Vietnam war, the decline of U.S. power was more important than 
the actual rise of Soviet Union power for the new correlation of forces. 
This change was then used to explain for instance the US acceptance 
of detente (imposed through Soviet Union atomic parity, European 
pressure), and the US debacle in Vietnam.
54 Quoted in Allen Lynch, The Soviet study o f international relations (Cambridge 



























































































Imperialism and the Soviet approach to IR 81
The cof is conceived to consciously avoid some of the shortcomings 
of the balance of power (bop) concept. The bop approach is supposed
- to increase the propensity to use force (whereas the correlation of 
force invites to consider other aspects of power than the military one);
- to reinforce the ideology of the status quo (whereas the cof implies 
change);
- to contribute to the confusion of foreign policies that are qualitative­
ly different: imperialist and anti-imperialist policies.
A comparison of both approaches reveal, however, many similari­
ties.55 To start with, there is a zero-sum view of power. In both, this 
zero-sum conception of power is not necessary. Yet, in fact, by 
reducing the central balance to two powers and the Cof to two main 
forces, those of imperialism and those opposing it, a zero-sum 
argument can easily follow.
With regard to the range of components of what has to be consid­
ered power, both theories provide rather exhaustive lists. The 
military or single factor fallacy56 is, at least theoretically, avoided.
Both are also well aware of the historicity of power components. 
For Lenin power without historical process was useless (against the 
tide of the time).57
Finally, both concepts are absolutely central for respectively 
Realism and Soviet theories of imperialism. The bop and the cof are 
the objective forces to delimit the range of possible outcomes in 
international politics and the possible rational behavior of states.
As far as the differences are concerned, not all of them are real, 
and not only alleged differences. Both theories assume that there is 
a tendency towards an equilibrium and a status quo: a certain homeo­
static equilibrium is conceived as the independent variable which ex­
plains foreign policy behavior and international politics. In so far as 
the bop is often used in the context of military power, and since the 
use of military power (war) is the very thing to be avoided, bop can
55 See also Margot Light, The Soviet theory o f international relations (Brighton: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1988), pp.286ff.
56 See Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, pp.H6f.



























































































82 Part II. Realism from containment to détente
imply a conservative bias - if it is used as a legitimation of foreign 
policy behavior. Yet, this also seems applicable to the use of the cof 
as an argument for a specific Soviet Union intervention or defence.
It is also more a question of conviction if there is indeed a qualita­
tive difference between imperialist and anti-imperialist forces. In so 
far, as a shift in the balance is considered positive, the two positions 
resemble mirror images. In "imperialist" circles as well, there exists 
the view that a balance tip to the right side might justify politics that 
otherwise would be considered "expansionist" and detrimental to the 
international order (i.e. as implying war).
Then only the integration o f the class actor is indeed a theoretical 
difference with respect to the definition of those forces that one needs 
to take into account. A non-Marxist derivation of relevant actors at 
the level of social groups will not share the same explanations. With 
respect to the actual function of this actor within the explanation, 
both face the same opportunities and problems. The integration of the 
class actor can allow an explanation where states attributes do not 
change, and yet the Cof does. It allows to see change where the focus 
on the state would not see it. In this respect, the integration of the 
class actor into Soviet theory resembles the integration of transnatio­
nal actors into Bop theory, or the integration of market forces in more 
recent IPE. Now, all these approaches have a considerable difficulty 
in actually measuring or just accounting for the effects and, above all, 
in integrating these different forces into a coherent approach showing 
the interplay of international and transnational relations. The Soviet 
Union might, as Lenin did, point to the centrality of international 
class relations. In fact, the Cof theory increasingly emphasised the 
relations between states at the expense of its initial focus on classes. 
These traditionally derived inter-state phenomena, often called sub­
jective, seem to acquire a more autonomous, or at least a dialectical 
status. As we will see in the following discussion of the concept of 
peaceful coexistence the integration of these two levels of analysis is 



























































































Imperialism and the Soviet approach to IR 83
2. Transnational vs. Inter-state relations: Peaceful Coexistence and
Containment
Peaceful coexistence is a policy that is based on a duality of coopera­
tion and confrontation. Even though the reasons for war are to be 
found in imperialism, an at least temporary stalemate can be 
achieved.58 The therefore at least tactical cooperative aspect is based 
on the following features:
- decoupling international competition from the military sphere and 
redirect it to the economic and ideological sphere;
- the reciprocal acceptance of the principal of non-interference (respect 
of international law);
- the existence of common goals (in particular, the avoidance of 
mutual nuclear destruction).
Obviously, the international confrontation between imperialist and 
anti-imperialist forces is not forgotten. The Soviet Union must help 
the latter forces to prevail. In other words, peaceful coexistence should 
provide a peaceful environment for consolidating (international) socia­
lism and for changing the existing political and social status quo.59
Unfortunately, the double twist of this policy became in its Soviet 
realisation contradictory in two important arenas of international 
politics. There is, one the one hand, the Third World. In order to 
avoid the clash between inter-state coexistence and trans- or inter­
national anti-imperialism in the Third World, Brejnev had posited 
that peaceful coexistence does not apply to national liberation move­
ments. Yet, it is exactly the expansion of the Soviet Union in the 
Third World (and the implicit shift in the bop) which will trigger U.S. 
reaction and an attempt to link this Soviet foreign behavior to other 
levels of Soviet-U.S. relations (See Kissinger, chapter 5). In addition, 
peaceful coexistence does only exactly conform to the principle of non­
58 The reasons for this stalemate have changed over time. Lenin believed that it 
was in the economic interest (and necessity) for capitalism to cohabit peacefully with 
socialism. After World War II, this changed to the central role now played by the 
new correlation of forces that stop imperialism to start war.
59 This is exactly the mix of antagonistic and cooperative politics, that contain­



























































































84 Part II. Realism from containment to détente
interference, if one does not want to exclude those countries from this 
basic right that are not linked to a system of states (alliances). On the 
other hand, the Soviet Union faces the problem of the domestic class 
struggle in the West: the help for anti-imperialist forces manifestly 
clashes here with the principle of non-interference. Here the Soviet 
Union lets the inter-state principle prevail. Between security and 
proletarian internationalism (international class-relations), the 
Soviet Union chooses the first.
But is peaceful coexistence then anything else than a mirror image 
of containment policy?
At the psychological level, both presuppose the driving force for 
war in the other (expansionism). At the foreign policy level, both 
conceive politics in terms of limiting conflicts, not of roll-back 
(Dulles). Hence, they generally accept the respective spheres of 
influence (and de facto the Brejnev and Monroe doctrines), and only 
occasionally, if the risk is limited, interfere in them. The hope to 
change (win) is not forgotten, but uphold in delay: if there is to be a 
decline of one superpower, then it should come under no directly 
military strains (excluding arms production and transfers) and, if 
possible, from within: the ’impossible war and improbable peace’ 
(Aron) pushes to invest in domestic changes (US) or in sustaining the 
objective forces that will dissolve capitalism (Soviet Union).60 
Thereby, diplomacy retains a central role in finding out the exact link 
between containment and an acceptable interference for change. 
Foreign policy, so the golden rule (Pierre Hassner), consists not in 
imposing issues, but in peacefully changing the policy priorities of the 
adversary to one own’s interests.
3. Intra-socialist relations and "embedded liberalism"
Intra-socialist relations are characterised by the ambiguous status of 
a sovereign and socialist country. On the one hand, socialist countries



























































































Imperialism and the Soviet approach to IR 85
are denied a national profile. It is a version of the domino theory 
which underscores the danger of the "weak link of socialism". On the 
other hand, the very basis of intra-socialist relations is said to be the 
respect of (state, not national) sovereignty.
Soviet theories’ proposed solutions are, however, only re-proposing 
this ambiguity as different puzzles. Soviet theory makes an analytical 
distinction between the laws of socialism as a socio-economic system 
(within one country) and the laws of socialism as a system of inter­
national relations. Yet, it seems to be the case that intra-socialist do 
not form a unique system, but rather correspond to a specific subsys­
tem of international relations.61 This applies, because state (and 
national) divisions based on sovereign juridical status significantly 
inform the context of international relations even between socialist 
states, and because it is recognized that the socialist character of a 
country does not automatically entail a socialist character o f interna­
tional relations (China!).62
One Soviet writer goes so far to compare intra-socialist relations 
in this particular historical context to capitalist relations between 
socialist states, each state is seen as the private property of its 
respective nation.63
Thereby, the Soviet theory’s ideal solution, namely the harmonious 
combination of the state interest of (socialist) member countries with 
the common interest of the socialist commonwealth reminds very 
much the solution of intra-capitalist economic (and political?) 
relations along the lines of what John Ruggie has called embedded 
liberalism. Here the necessary Keynesian politics (that imply a limit 
to international exposure) should not exceed a certain threshold in 
order to avoid the breakdown of the international economic and
61 See Allen Lynch, The Soviet Study of International Relations, pp. 121-124.
62 This recognition is of greatest importance. Not only for arguing against Waltz 
that Leninist inspired approaches must not necessarily be reductionist. It is because 
the very concept of the state changes and allows for the discipline of international 
relations to exist: since the state does not whither away before international (and not 
only the sums of national) socialism is created, inter-state relations are for along time 




























































































86 Part II. Realism from containment to détente
financial system ("beggar-thy-neighbour"), as it was the case during 
the inter-war period. The organisation of international economic 
relations put up for it (Bretton Woods, Gatt) was supposed to 
maximize the advantages and constraints of an open international 
liberalism with the domestic sovereignty of its members.64 In both 
cases, the compromise fails, whenever the tension between both 
principles becomes too strong - for the leader of the respective system. 
The explicit reference in the East is the Brejnev doctrine, where the 
most powerful partner decided that the common (and automatically 
Soviet) interests should prevail. The "exorbitant privileges" of the US 
(and the fall of Bretton-Woods) also indicates that the most powerful 
partner might upset the compromise when the domestic costs of 
adjustment exceed the international (and for superpowers compara­
tively low) cost of breaking up.65
Realism in its U.S. or Soviet version has difficulties to analyse 
relations with their alliances.
4. Spheres o f influence and the Third World
The orthodox treatment o f socialist-Third world relations is based on 
clear cut responsibility of capitalism for underdevelopment. North- 
South divide, politics of "equidistance" and "non-alignment" are ana­
thema for Soviet theory, because they imply an equal treatment of 
imperialist and anti-imperialist forces. Third World countries do, 
however, not need to pursue a capitalist phase before reaching socia­
lism. Analysing the practices that occurred during early Soviet decolo­
nisation of the peripheral areas of the Tsarist Empire, Lenin already 
argued that decolonisation to socialism is possible, if helped by socia­
list and already industrialized countries.
Yet, the implementation meets several difficulties. The first is 
what one could call the problem of the intermediate strata. How to
64 For this argument, see chapter 14.
65 See especially David Calleo and Susan Strange, "Money and World Politics", 
in Susan Strange, ed., Paths to International Political Economy (London et al.: 



























































































Imperialism and the Soviet approach to IR 87
deal with countries that have escaped imperialism, ought to be consi­
dered on your side, but do not share your ideology? How to find the 
progressive class ally in those countries, where the working class does 
hardly exist?66 Theoretical solution: One defines an intermediate 
strata of revolutionary democrats which could develop a class con­
sciousness independent of class origins (flat contradiction of Marx?): 
petty bourgeoisie led by intellectuals and, most importantly, the mili­
tary. This is an apt justification for practically sustaining Third 
World regimes that have nothing to do with socialism. It resembles 
very much the different strategies employed by Western countries to 
legitimate their support for regimes that followed a so-called third 
way between "totalitarian" dictatorship and Western democracy (e.g. 
military regimes).
This approach has been more and more criticised (from left and 
right), because some puzzles remain unresolved, as e.g. the explana­
tion of religious revolutions67, war between two socialist countries 
(e.g. Kampuchea and Vietnam), and war between two underdeveloped 
countries (Iran vs. Iraq). Criticisms and a re-invigouration of 
imperialist theories that are not too much compromised by being 
formulated in the country of one of the superpowers will be dealt with 
in a later lecture on IPE as a critique of realism.
6.3. Conclusion
1. "Socialism within one country" and the identification of the 
international socialist with the Soviet survival have produced an 
ambiguous theory where traditional inter-state relations are super­
posed with transnational relations (which are the system’s dynamic).
66 For a Marxist criticism of the Leninist confusion of Third World national 
bourgeois forces with anti-imperialist forces, see Bill Warren, Imperialism: Pioneer 
o f Capitalism (London: New Left Books, 1980).
67 If one does not take the explanation that the Iranian case was a socialist 
revolution that lost against a counter-revolution - and then to explain why it lost 




























































































88 Part II. Realism from containment to détente
2. The close link between theory and practice has resulted in a 
continuous readjustment of Soviet theory to make it finally nearly 
indistinguishable from systemic Realist approaches. The practice of 
a kind of Superpower - Realpolitik (as an intermediate stage perhaps, 
for whatever future socialist development) has pushed Soviet theory 
in the direction of just another version of Realism. If neither the 
domestic regime change, nor Third-World anti-imperialism create new 
socialist relations, the international system in its totality is capitalist 
and can be analysed accordingly. This would imply the equal 
treatment of the US and the Soviet Union, a treatment that Soviet 
Union theory persistently refuses. Yet, the dislocation of domestic 
socialist evolution and socialism at the international level creates a 
space, the international realm, for which other laws than the socialist 
apply. As already seen, these seem to be quite similar to the Realist 
ones: force, correlation of forces, spheres of influence in a bipolar zero- 
sum competition with antagonistic and cooperative elements, where 
diplomacy should take over military relations.
3. It shares with realism all pitfalls concerning the exact definition 
of central concepts, the difficult integration of transnational factors, 
and the status quo outlook with regard to a new international 





























































































East-West Conflict: U.S. National Security Policy 
from Containment to Détente
After three theoretical chapters, the following two will attempt to 
introduce both into the use of theories and concepts in actual analysis 
(chapter 8), and into the history of their development (chapter 7). 
Here, the internal evolution of Realist thought is interrelated with its 
external environment.
The policy-concept of containment is the main subject of this chap­
ter. Yet, it is rather ambiguously used.
On the one hand, it designates the official U.S. foreign policy 
approach of the Cold War (after 1948). Therefore, it has a specific con­
tent and historical context. On the other hand, containment is part 
of every U.S. East-West policy since 1947.
In the following analysis, both aspects will be tackled in four steps:
1. the historical analysis o f the genesis of containment which is 
couched in the larger historiographical debate around the Origins o f  
the Cold War. Unable to settle this dispute, I should rather try to see 
how on the level of foreign policy formulation the years 1944-1947 
have been perceived.
2. the theoretical analysis o f the content o f containment. Here the 




























































































90 Part II. Realism from containment to détente
3. the political analysis o f its application will be analysed, inclu­
ding the Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine and the Vietnam War.
4. the reformulation o f containment in detente will be touched here 
the theoretical approach and actual politics of Henry A. Kissinger 
that are analysed in detail in chapter 9.
7.1. The origins of containment: the "Riga axioms" prevail
In the Forties, two strategic conceptions light each other in the U.S. 
administration, what Daniel Yergin has called the 'Yalta axioms" and 
the "Riga axioms".88 It is only between 1944 and 1947 that eventual­
ly the latter prevail.
1. The "Yalta axioms"
President Roosevelt is often presented as a modem Wilsonian. During 
the war, his foreign policy came under strong attack either from 
traditional isolationists (Senator Taft) or from those that wanted to 
be tougher against the Soviet Union. Roosevelt got a distinct 
reputation for having an Idealist penchant. There are some reason to 
this.
Roosevelt’s general conception o f world politics has certainly the 
same anti-isolationist tendency as Wilson’s. He perceived that the US 
that with a possible hegemon on either its transatlantic or transpacif­
ic front (Germany and/or Japan) was a security threat of the US, and 
that therefore it had to go to war. On top of it, Roosevelt was convin­
ced that the non-entanglement policy after WWI (League of Nations), 
and the attempted complete disengagement of World affairs (with the 
notable exception of the financial sphere !) constituted a major reason 
for the failure of the collective security system.
Roosevelt’s perception of the USSR was largely pragmatic. 
Although Roosevelt was explicit about the dictatorship in the USSR, 68
68 Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins o f the Cold War and the National 



























































































East-West Conflict: From Containment to Détente 91
this did not imply for him that the Soviet Union should be treated as 
an outsider in the international system. First, and this is a Realist 
argument: since the Soviet Union is the largest power in Europe, no 
international system can exist without it. The attempt to isolate (as 
e.g. in Versailles) will make this country a "revolutionary" one, to use 
Kissinger’s words. Second, Roosevelt did not conceive of the Soviet 
Union as necessarily expansionist and ill-disposed because of its 
ideology. Totalitarian regime could very well be pragmatic and 
defensive in foreign affairs. The hostile Soviet policy was interpreted 
as a reaction to allied anti-Soviet acts since 1917: the allied interven­
tion at the end of WWI, the installation of a "cordon sanitaire” (buffer 
zone), Western policy isolating diplomatically the Soviets in the 
1930’s, the refusal to accept an alliance against Hitler before 1941, 
and finally the conference in Munich which, without the Soviets 
allowed Hitler to draw near the Soviet border.
U.S. foreign policy had, therefore, to demonstrate its goodwill and 
its acceptance of the international weight of the USSR. In other 
words, the Soviet Union should be treated as a traditional great 
power, less directed by ideological aims, than by pragmatic consider­
ations of the national interest. "One could make business" with it. The 
Soviet Union apt for cooperation. Roosevelt wants to offer on the one 
hand the Soviet Union’s participation in the new international order 
and a recognition of its spheres of influence for the creation of 
common trust and therefore Soviet cooperation on the international 
level and moderation in its spheres of influence.
2. The "Riga axioms"
Daniel Yergin named them after the Soviet Service installed in Riga 
in the Twenties when the US had not yet recognized the USSR 
officially and therefore had no diplomatic relations. In Riga, as 
Kennan describes it as a kind of emigrant Saint-Petersburg, a small 
group of Sovietologues attached to the U.S. Embassy was responsible 



























































































92 Part II. Realism from containment to détente
most prominent figures were Loy Henderson, Charles Bohlen, and 
especially George F. Kennan.
Their perception of the actual Soviet policy was quite different from 
the one discussed above:
1. The totalitarian character of the domestic regime was reflected 
also in foreign affairs. Thus, the USSR was expansionist and 
profoundly anti-democratic.
2. The ideology, far from being only a propagandistic make-up for 
traditional power-politics, is the coherent reference of Soviet foreign 
policy.
3. Diplomacy is only a subordinated means for this end - it is 
emphatically not comparable with pragmatic bargain and not 
trustable.
3. The three phases o f the prevailing o f the Riga-axioms
The climax of Roosevelt’s diplomacy is Yalta. During this conference, 
Roosevelt got the Soviet Union to accept the United Nations (with 
Veto principle of the Security Council, though), to join in the war 
against Japan, and to sign the "Declaration of the Free Europe”, bar­
gained on a recognition of spheres of influence. But quickly, the ambi­
guities of Roosevelt’s policy came to the forefront. Since he tried to 
avoid the fate of Wilson’s policy, he mobilised domestically a consen­
sus for his foreign policy around subjects he knew would work: the 
moralistic tone so typical for U.S. politics. It was the Atlantic Charter 
with a vision of a "one-world" without spheres of influence and with­
out blocs and alliances and the universal opening of markets ("Open- 
door policy") that rallied the U.S. population behind his foreign inter­
vention ("Save the world - and nothing less - for democracy", as 
Kennan sarcastically noted in his diaries). This created a contradic­
tion between a ’domestic’ (idealist) and a ’foreign’ (realist) foreign 
policy.69 Yet, even if he had a more realistic conception of Soviet 
politics, the expectancies that he had created in the population were
69 Wilfried Loth, Die Teilung der Welt, Geschichte des Kalten Krieges 1941-1955 



























































































East-West Conflict: From Containment to Détente 93
rather quickly disappointed - and he died before he could in some way 
resolve this ambiguity. Since the U.S. have shown good will, the 
Soviet policy in Eastern Europe gives right to the principles of Riga.
The first phase could be called the phase of non-appeasement. 
The climax of Yalta is quickly followed by an anti-climax: on the one 
hand, Soviet politics, especially in Poland, on the other hand, the 
endless postponing of the second front70, and the abrupt cut of the 
lend-lease agreement (by Truman after Roosevelt’s death, the 
12.4.45)71. Truman, the new President, a newcomer in international 
matters, was not able to fill the conceptual and political void left over 
from Roosevelt. Taking Roosevelt’s declarations literally, He could not 
but feel disappointed and even cheated by Soviet behaviour. The prin­
ciples o f Riga, more and more defended by the State Department 
gained influence in the whole administration. Only two persons still 
believe in Roosevelt’s foreign policy: Byrnes, the Secretary of State, 
and Hopkins, personal adviser to Roosevelt and now to Truman. Yet, 
Byrnes must renounce to a compromise during the first Foreign Mini­
ster Conference in London (11.9.-2.10.1945) for not being treated as 
a politician o f appeasement. And Hopkins after having finished a 
journey to Moscow dies in January 1946.
A this point, one could speak of a second phase of the introduction 
of containment policy, the uniformisation of the perception o f the 
Soviet Union (Feb.46 - Feb.47).
In February 1946, the State Department asks the U.S Embassy in 
Moscow to analyse the rather aggressive statement by Stalin from the
70 John Spanier, American Foreign Policy since World War II (New York, 1980"), 
p,16f: "From the Marxist viewpoint, the Allies were doing exactly what they should 
be doing - namely postponing the second front until the Soviet Union and Germany 
had exhausted each other. Then the two Western powers could land in France, 
march bloodlessly into Germany, and dictate the peace to both, Germany and 
Russia...destroy both their two major ideological opponents at one and the same 
time." This could actually also be a Realist viewpoint.
71 This is probably a big diplomatic mistake. By cutting unilaterally this help, 
Truman gives a possible bargaining chip away. There is no quid-pro-quo - and if, as 
it seems to be, the economic carrot could have been used against the USSR at least 
to a certain extent, it is rather unfortunate to have given it away against nothing. 
See George C. Herring jr., Aid to Russia, 1941-1946: Strategy, Diplomacy, the Origins 



























































































94 Part II. Realism from containment to détente
9.2.46. The answer is the famous long telegramme (8000 words) de 
George F. Kennan from the 22.2.46. Here, Russia and the Soviet 
Union are analysed as expansionist powers - within and outside their 
territories. By linking the Soviet behavior neither to a traditional big 
power behavior (Roosevelt), nor to a new kind of totalitarian foreign 
policy, but to the imperialist tradition of the Tsars, Kennan filled the 
conceptual void in the U.S. administration.
The historical record gave him, at least in the eyes of U.S. politi­
cians, right: the crisis in Iran (Feb./March 46) and the crisis of 
Turkey (August 46), where Stalin asks for a change of the Montreux 
Treaty regulating the access of the Dardanelles. Now, the Soviet 
Union appears as overtly imperialist. And since the Republicans win 
the election to the House of Representatives and to the Senate in 
Nov.46, the pressure for a policy change is very strong.
The new policy, formulated in the third phase, is containment. 
The 21.2.47, Great Britain declares not being able to guarantee the 
security of Turkey and Greece, where a civil war was raging. The 
United Kingdom thereby declares its retreat from being a superpow­
er. Only the US could represent their interests in Europe. The world 
had become bipolar. The Greek resistance, seen as a new vague of 
communist expansionism72, were integrated into the general Euro­
pean context. Afraid of the effects the "fall" of Greece and Turkey 
could have for the still "free" Europe (the domino theory), the U.S. 
engaged themselves in the protection of anti-communist regimes. The 
12.3.47, in a famous speech, Truman sets up a guarantee for all anti­
communist forces: in the international struggle between the free 
world and totalitarian communism, the U.S. are obliged to help those 
threatened in their freedom. The Truman Doctrine meant that the US 
took their responsibility in a bipolar world.
In July 1947, a high official of the State Department published 
under the name of Mr. X  an article in Foreign Affairs, entitled "The
72 Even though historiographies of the cold war are by now saying that Stalin did 
actually not encourage them. See also John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the 
Origins o f  the Cold War (New York, 1972); Daniel Yergin, The Shattered Peace; and 



























































































East-West Conflict: From Containment to Détente 95
Sources of Soviet Conduct". It quickly became the official version of 
the new policy against the Soviet Union, based on the long tele­
gramme’s perception of the USSR and applied with the Truman 
Doctrine. It was Kennan:
In these circumstances, it is clear that the main element of any U.S. policy 
toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long term, patient but firm and 
vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies73... a policy of firm 
containment, designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counter­
force at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the 
interests of a peaceful and stable world.
7.2. Containment. The politica l conception of G. F. Kennan
George F. Kennan bases his conception on a specific analysis o f Soviet 
foreign policy, on its traditions, its ideology, its ends, and means.
The tradition o f foreign relations is not limited to the period after 
the Bolshevik revolution. Kennan expanded and looked backwards to 
a more geopolitical logic. For him, Russia and now the Soviet Union 
has been a country of open lands exposed to the multiple invasion of 
always hostile neighbours. This has created a perception of a traditio­
nally hostile foreign world, and a instinctive feeling of acute insecuri­
ty-
Therefore, the Soviet ideology is considered of less importance for 
the explanation of actual foreign Soviet behaviour. The Marxist/Leni- 
nist dogma is a factor of legitimation for the political system and for 
its expansion within the country. This ideology does, however, not pre­
clude a composed perception of its international relations. The USSR 
is profoundly pragmatic. This entails that the ideology can be adapted 
to the strategic and political needs. In a certain sense, the ideology 
depends on the international situation - and not vice versa. Kennan 
reports a course work for the linguistic perfection of Russian at the 
Soviet group in Riga, where they were asked to compose a newspaper
73 George F. Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct”, in his American Diplomacy 
1900-1950 (The University of Chicago Press: 1951. Reprinted from Foreign Affairs, 



























































































96 Part II. Realism from containment to détente
article in which the introduction of capitalism in the Soviet Union 
would be presented as the highest achievement of socialism.
This has also a certain effect on the elaboration of foreign policy 
aims. The main aim was, so Kennan, indeed expansionism. Yet, this 
expansionism was considered in the Tsarist imperialist tradition and 
to be understood as the attempt to create security zones and spheres 
of influence that depend politically on the USSR. Brief, the USSR 
tries to install political (and non military) hegemonies at its borders, 
not a World socialist revolution.
Finally, Soviet foreign policy uses instruments (means) at two le­
vels: the official and the inofficial level (Komintem, Kominform). 
Everything is good if it improves the relative correlation of forces:
- a domestic policy based on strength (rise of military, policy, and 
heavy industry)
- the extension of external borders of the USSR whenever possible
- every opportunity to weaken the enemy: exacerbation of the 
domestic and intra-capitalist struggles; help of all the progressive 
(that means anti-imperialist) forces.
The aim is a political hegemony. Annexations are considered gene­
rally costly and less controllable. It is fundamental for Kennan to 
note that "the Kremlin is basically flexible in its reaction to political 
realities.”74
...its political action is a fluid stream which moves constantly, wherever it 
is permitted to move... toward a given goal... [but] there is no trace of any 
feeling that goal must be reached at any given time... [The Soviet diploma­
cy] is more sensitive to contrary force, more ready to yield on individual 
sectors of the diplomatic front when that force is felt to be too strong, and 
thus more rational in the logic and rhetoric of power.75
Thereby, Kennan has given a Realist account of what appears to him 
as a Realist policy. Soviet foreign policy is perceived as a form of 
power politics, flexible, patient and pragmatic with untouchable 
spheres of influence. It is a policy that does not follow any ethical 
consideration, does not know the recognition of international law, at
74 ibid.



























































































East-West Conflict: From Containment to Détente 97
least in the Western sense, but which decides only in due analysis of 
its interest and the actual correlation of forces.
How should the United States react to it? Kennan develops two 
basic themes of U.S. foreign policy with the Soviet Union: contain­
ment and change.
The first is derived from the peculiar position of the US in the 
postwar system. On the one hand, only the US were able to contain 
the Soviet Union. On the other hand, one should be aware of its limi­
ted means. The result is a particularistic approach, where only five 
regions of the globe were judged of vital interest for the U.S. national 
security: US, GB, Germany, Japan, the USSR. The USSR should re­
main isolated. Furthermore, since the USSR were expansionist for 
traditional imperialist motives and not for its (socialist) ideology, and 
since the national security policy is defined in terms of the balance of 
power, the U.S. policy should be anti-Soviet and not anti-commu­
nist.76 Finally
it is a sine qua non of successful dealing with Russia that the foreign 
government in question should remain at all times cool and collected and 
that its demands on Russian policy should be put forward in such a 
manner as to leave the way open for a compliance not too detrimental to 
Russian prestige.77
Keeping these conditions of a successful U.S. foreign policy in mind, 
the actual policy should be conceived in a dynamic of three steps78.
First, the containment of the political Soviet expansionism through 
the reestablishment of the confidence of those countries that are 
concerned by the Soviet expansionism. As means, one could attempt
76 See G.F. Kennan, in: PPS 23, "Review of Current Trends, U.S. Foreign Policy", 
February 24, 1948. FRUS 1948, I, 526-527, as quoted by John Lewis Gaddis, "The 
Strategy of Containment", in his Thomas H. Etzold, eds., Containment: Documents 
on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950 (New York, 1978), pp.25-37. For a 
different position which stresses the universalist and military aspects of Kennan’s 
approach, see C. Ben Wright, "Mr X. and Containment", Slavic Review, vol.35, 1976, 
pp.1-32.
77 George F. Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct", op.cit., p.119.




























































































98 Part II. Realism from containment to détente
to financially and economically strengthen these potential allies and 
to reduce the possibilities of Soviet influence through the exploitation 
of intra-socialist splits and anti-soviet nationalisms.
Second, the creation of a stable and multipolar balance of power.
it is clearly unwise for us to continue the attempt to carry alone or largely 
singlehanded, the opposition to Soviet expansion. It is urgently necessary 
for us to restore something of the balance of power in Europe and Asia by 
strengthening local forces of independence and by getting them to assume 
part of our burden... the present ’bi-polarity’ will, in the long run, be 
beyond our resources.79
Third, the long-term change of the Soviet perceptions of international 
relations. Containment is a means to this ultimate end.
the US has in its power to increase enormously the strains under which 
Soviet policy must operate, to force upon the Kremlin a far greater degree 
of moderation and circumscription than it has had to observe in recent 
years, and in this way to promote tendencies which must eventually find 
their outlet in either the breakup or the gradual mellowing of Soviet 
power. For no mystical, Messianic movement ... can face frustration 
indefinitely without eventually adjusting itself in one way or another to 
the logic of that state of affairs.80
This last statement encloses some of the basic tensions of this 
approach. It can mean a form of détente policy waiting for the other 
system to adapt to a non expansionist policy and related to the hope 
that the internal (at that time Stalinist) system would gradually 
change. It can also be understood in the sense of forcing the Soviet 
system from the outside to collapse. Containment with a long-term 
vision has ever since been oscillating between 
- A  Cold War posture where open conflict was only avoided, because 
it became impossible with nuclear weapons and competition therefore 
replaced at all other levels (as e.g. arms race, economic welfare and 
so on)
79 George F. Kennan, in: PPS 13, "Résumé of World Situation", Nov.6, 1947, 
FRUS 1947,1, pp.772-777.
80 Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct", p. 127/28. See also his hopes for 
internal reform that will overcome dictatorship and expansion: "America and the 
Russian Future”, in his American Diplomacy, 1900-1950 (reprinted from Foreign 



























































































East-West Conflict: From Containment to Détente 99
- A Détente posture where one expected from this vigilant (and not 
utopian) containment a long-term learning process of convergence.81 
Some historical examples will illustrate this thrift.
7.3. The application of containment
The direct outcome of Kennan’s approach was the Marshall Plan. The 
5.5.47, a Policy Planning Staff within the State Department was set 
up and ordered to elaborate a financial and economic aid programme 
for Europe. Director of this committee was George F. Kennan. His 
aim was to diminish he impact of the after World War II economic 
distress which made Europe prone to fall into communist and totali­
tarian regimes and to profit the USSR. By tying aid to a political col­
laboration (OECE - OECD), Kennan attempted to start if not a unifi­
cation process, so at least a concertation policy among European 
countries. This had to be seen for the future multipolar balance of 
power in Europe. That is, in response to a political, and not military, 
Soviet threat, the Marshall plan attempted to use financial and 
political aid for political goals.
Quite differently conceived was the well known declaration that 
became the Western declaration of the Cold War in March 1947, the 
Truman Doctrine.82
I believe it must be the policy of the US to support free peoples who are
resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities and by outside
pressures.
Kennan was shocked when he heard about the speech that Truman 
had delivered. He opposed to the universalist character. As Wilson 
before, in an Idealist manner, Truman in a "power politics" manner 
gave a blank check to every possible movement in the World that 
claims to be anti-communist. He further criticised the anti-communist
81 The breakdown of the Soviet satellite system (and the USSR) after 1989 can 
be seen as a long-term effect of détente, but actually provoked by the Reaganite arms 
race. Both sides of containment, the aggressive and the defensive, are usually blend.



























































































100 Part II. Realism, from containment to détente
and not anti-Soviet outlook of the policy, and the military aspect of 
the doctrine against a specific political threat. Therefore, the Truman 
doctrine and the policy labelled containment made out of the first 
means of U.S. National Security Policy, containment, its only aim. 
Moreover, by alluding to the anti-communist character, it supported 
strongly the manicheic character of U.S. foreign policy - till its 
perversion of the struggle between the good and the evil, characteris­
tic of the different strategies of roll-back or liberation. In other words, 
Kennan criticised the Truman doctrine for letting exactly that ambi­
guity happen that we have already encountered in the discussion of 
Soviet foreign policy (Chapter 6), namely, the one between a Realist 
inter-state relation of moderation and containment and a (ideological) 
transnational struggle for the demise of the enemy. Only if one subor­
dinates the second to the first, then foreign policy works prudently, 
realistically. The aim should be peaceful change, not coercive change.
Therefore the Vietnam war can be seen as the final collapse o f  
Cold-War Containment,83 But before coming to the political (or even 
conceptual) and military failures, a short word about the fundamental 
characteristics o f U.S. foreign policy from 1947-1968.
The starting point is the basic bipolarity of the post-war World. 
Bipolarity invites to think in zero-sum game terms. By having tied 
U.S. foreign policy to the dichotomy between liberty and totalitaria­
nism (Truman), the U.S. policy is linked to this balance. The U.S. 
become the world-policemen to guarantee "freedom". As a logical re­
sult, the U.S. are held responsible for managing the border between 
the two blocs. This meant in policy terms global deterrence, the pacto- 
mania of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, and eventually also 
the imbrication in whatever conflict at the borders, i.e. frontier war.
Thus, the U.S. find themselves trapped: for assuring a credible 
deterrence, they need to honour all their commitments. The failure to 
honour a commitment in one area might be seen by the rival as an 
indication that another commitment might not be honoured and



























































































East-West Conflict: From Containment to Détente 101
induce him to test the defender’s will. All commitments, whether 
eagerly sought or reluctantly accepted, become a matter from which 
it is perceived virtually impossible to withdraw without dangerous 
consequences. The fall of one frontier could be the beginning of the 
fall of a whole region {domino-theory). Furthermore, by being tied to 
the world balance of power, the U.S. cannot allow a too visible com­
promise or defeat, because the perception of power, its credibility is 
as important in a non-war situation as its actual state. So, in order 
to control the psychological factor power, which also Kennan repea­
tedly stressed, the U.S. found themselves in the universal obligation 
to maintain the status quo.
Vietnam was may be the most famous example of this less and less 
Kennan-like containment approach. Eugene Rostow, Presidential 
adviser once said:
In Indochina the North Vietnamese Government has broken the first and 
most basic rule of Peaceful Coexistence: that the frontiers of the two 
systems not be altered by military action... Yet, what North Vietnam, with 
Chinese backing, is attempting in Indochina - to conquer a country that 
the U.S. has agreed to protect - is the precise analogue of the Korean war 
of 1950-1953, or of the Soviet Union’s early postwar probes against Greece, 
Turkey, and Iran.
Three conceptual (or political) failures of Vietnam can account for the 
U.S. disaster, the superpower losing against a relatively small scale 
liberation movement. First, there is the idea that the defense of South 
East Asia was crucial to the maintenance of world order. It was 
linked to the incapacity to make a distinction between vital and peri­
pheral interests. U.S. credibility was actually more shaken by the turn 
the commitment took: not important enough to engage early with 
massive forces and too important to disengage once committed. 
Second, the Vietnam war suffered from the status quo approach to 
containment. A policy of stability which identifies instability and 
communism is at last obliged, by the very logic of this interpretation, 
to contain in the name of anticommunism all manifestation of popular 
dissatisfaction and all reformism. So, the dictatorship becomes a last, 



























































































102 Part II. Realism from containment to détente
stability.84 Third and lastly, there was no awareness of limited, 
resources, or to put it differently, of the mismatch between aims and 
means of foreign policy. Commitments in one sphere could further­
more distract resources from other obligation, see Johnson’s "Great 
Society".
Finally, the military failures should also be shortly mentioned. 
Broadly speaking, it is the in-adaptation of the doctrine of flexible 
response to a guerilla war. Flexible response was conceived as a 
doctrine of calibration, i.e. a counterinsurgency concept to:
- orient Saigon’ military and security forces increasingly toward 
counterguerilla tactics; and to
- identify the population with the Vietnamese government’s struggle 
against communism (economic, political reform program).
It consisted in the progressive mounting in scope and intensity of 
military pressures against North Vietnam for the purpose of convinc­
ing North Vietnam, that it is in their own interest to cease aid the 
Vietcong and to respect the security of the Soviet Union. In other 
words, it amounted to an action strong enough to end the existing 
deteriorating situation but not so violent as to knit the North 
Vietnamese people closer together, to provoke Chinese intervention, 
arouse world public opinion, or preclude opportunities for an eventual 
negotiated settlement: keep for Hanoi a carrot for desisting as well as 
a stick of continued pressure.
It failed because the initiative passed to the other side: to proclaim 
that one intends to do only what is necessary to counter aggression 
and no more is, after all, to yield control over one’s action to those 
undertaking the aggression. Instead of vaccinating South Vietnam, 
North Vietnam could by this step for step approach adapt itself. It 
misunderstood the guerilla tactic. The guerilla tactic consists in 
capturing the power of the government from within and to do so by 
eroding the morale of the army and by undermining popular confi­
dence in the government. It is often a hit-and-run tactic engaging




























































































East-West Conflict: From Containment to Détente 103
only those smaller and weaker governmental forces, they can defeat. 
"Fight if you can win, march if you can’t" (Mao) Eventually, it will try 
to exploit popular grievances. Guerrillas gain the support of the 
peasantry because they successfully represent themselves as the libe­
rators from colonialism or foreign rule, native despotic government, 
economic deprivation or social injustice. The U.S. counterguerilla 
tactic was de facto, however, mainly military ("search and destroy").
Vietnam is the failure of a foreign policy of the status quo, a policy 
of the "world policeman" which became, "in the long run, beyond our 
resources." (Kennan)
7.4. Conclusion: Détente as a consequence of the Vietnam War
This is certainly not the only way to explain the shift to a détente 
policy. Yet, it should not be underestimated. The Vietnam war had an 
impressive impact on U.S. strategic and domestic power.
On the strategic level, it put a stop to the U.S. hegemony in the 
Pacific. The winning of the Chinese guerilla tactics meant that it 
could be also successfully applied elsewhere. The U.S. strategy 
changed: it reintroduced the distinction between vital and peripheral 
interest in order to have more flexibility not to be engaged in all fron­
tier challenges. It opened up to a vision of world politics, not only in 
terms of a constant sum game.
On the domestic political level, and may be most importantly, 
there has been a break of the bipartisan consensus in international 
affairs. This became visible in the Carter administration which tried 
to combine so different personalities as Vance (Secretary of State) and 
Brzezinski (Director of the National Security Council and principal 
adviser to the President). In the aftermath of the U.S. commitment 
in Vietnam, domestic affairs became more important and there was 
a clear attempt to curb Presidential power in foreign affairs (War 
Power Act).
On the international political level, the U.S. became more and 
more seen by the World Opinion as an imperialist and anti-democrat­



























































































104 Part II. Realism from containment to détente
diplomatic offensive versus the Third World, India, e.g.). And the 
U.S., in turn, tried to reestablish a certain legitimacy through Car­
ter’s Human Rights Policy. One can agree with the Soviet interpreta­
tion that the Vietnam war changed the correlation of forces and 
induced the U.S. to a more collaborative stand.
This does however not mean that the new détente policy was 
actually that different from the concept of containment. It certainly 
derives from a prudent version, like e.g. the original Kennan one. 
Just to give two examples (Kissinger’s détente will be analysed in 
more detail in chapter 9).
First, it is certainly more aware of the limitation of means available - 
and asks then for a particularistic policy, the régionalisation of 
conflicts: the Nixon or Guam-Doctrine of July 1969:
First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments.
Second, we shall provide a shield if nuclear power threatens the freedom 
of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital 
to our security.
Third, in cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish 
military or economic assistance when requested in accordance with our 
treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened 
to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its 
defense.85
Second, it analyses clearly the threat as a Soviet and not that much 
Communist threat.86 This opened the U.S.-Soviet Union and China 
triangle, i.e. it became possible to deal with the communists against 
the communists.
Yet, just to points already to a basic difference to Kennan: it lays 
exactly in the integration of a permanent negotiation into the 
containment process.
85 Quoted in John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies o f Containment. A Critical Appraisal 
o f Postwar American National Security Policy (Oxford University Press, 1982), p.298.
86 The border case being the Third World countries where communist or related 
regimes appeared and the U.S. did not hesitate to intervene; or also the enormous 
pressure on Italy where the Communist Party was on the edge of becoming the 
major political force in the 70’s not to let Communists into any national government; 





























































































Foreign Policy Decision-Making: 
Crisis Management
Introduction
This chapter is centred around three main points:
1. Its purpose is to highlight a second way to approach the analysis 
of foreign policy. The last lecture was concerned with the elaboration 
of the general security policy and its implementation. Now, we are 
more interested in the way to analyse specific situations and what 
actually occurred. We dealt before with the political analysis of diplo­
matic history, so is this the so-called approach of foreign policy deci­
sion-making.
2. By focusing on a particular event, a crisis, in the East-West 
relations at their turning point, it wants to complement the different 
stages of US-SU relations already introduced by the lecture on con­
tainment with its stress on the origins and the end of the Cold War.
3. The decision-making approach is one of the features of what has 
come to be called the crisis o f Realism. Its focus on the governmental 
bargaining supplements the Realist explanation we have encountered 
so far. But it also contradicts at least to ascertain extern the assump­
tion of rationality implicit in Realism. Not only is the Cuban Missile 
Crisis a turning point in historical East-West relations, but it also a 



























































































106 Part II. Realism from containment to détente
Before embarking on it, some preliminary remarks. First, foreign 
policy analysis is one of the two big sub-fields of international rela­
tions: the micro-approach, whereas the analysis of the international 
system would correspond to the macro approach.87 Decision-making 
is thereby one of the possible approaches to foreign policy analysis. It 
is generally emphasised because the decisional phase is considered 
the central stage of the political decision-making process (pre- 
decisional, decisional, post-decisional).
Following John Steinbrunner88, there are four general approaches 
to decision-making: the analytical approach, the cybernetical 
approach, the game-theoretical approach (intra-governmental game), 
the cognitive approach (impact of perception and cognitive process­
ing). These four approaches are interlinked in three ways.
First, they are four models of continuously restricting focus: Model 
1 shows the general context of a decision, model 2 the organizational 
routines which produce information, alternatives and actions. Model 
3 focuses within model 2 on the individual leaders and the bargaining 
between them.89 Finally, model 4 focuses on the cognitive processes 
within the mind of the respective leaders.
Second, the four models require a rising complexity of data for the 
operationalisation in actual research.
Third, the four models are suited for a rising complexity of deci­
sion: model 1 for easy straightforward decisional situations; Model 2 
for conflictual, but not urgent decisions; Model 3 for crisis (when 
bureaucratic decision too slow); Model 4 for immediate decision with­
out reasoning to be made by one person ("catastrophe", when crisis 
management too slow). (See Table 1).
The following presentation will closely follow Allison and Stein­
brunner, first by presenting the different explanatory models alto­
gether, and then by explaining them with reference to the historical
87 For a well developed version of this distinction, see P.A. Reynolds, An Introduc­
tion to International Relations (London and New York: Longman, 1980).
88 John D. Steinbrunner jr, The Cybernetic theory o f  decision. (Princeton: 1974).
89 These three models derive from Graham T. Allison, Essence o f Decision. 



























































































Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Crisis Management 107
Table 1 Foreign Policy Analysis Models (Allison/Steinbrunner)
Rational Irrational










analysis of the Cuban missile crisis by answering three questions: 
why did the SU decide to install missiles in Cuba? Why did the U.S. 
decide a blockade? Why did the SU remove the missiles from Cuba?
8.1. The analytic paradigm: the rational actor model
1. The assumptions o f the model
1. The national behavior is explained like a rational choice for 
given aims and under determinate circumstances (alternatives and 
consequences of action are considered known).
2. After a cost-benefit analysis, the national interest (attitude) 
consists in finding the solution that maximises the relative aims, i.e. 
limited value integration. Action is chosen as a calculated solution.
3. Behaviour reflects therefore intention. It is consistent and expli­
cable.
4. The learning process is causal. All those informations are inclu­
ded and processed that make means and goals consistent. This can 
happen either by "bottom-up" expansion including those conceptions 
that are more general than the fixed objective, or by "lateral" expan­
sion including new information from the environment.
5. The decision is considered individual. The actor is the govern­
ment.
6. The less one knows about actual decision-making, the easier one 



























































































108 Part II. Realism from containment to détente
analysis, i.e. to cover the informational lacunae (the uncertainty), one 
adopts a posture to think like the worst possible enemy.90
7. This model has only a limited explanatory value. It can provide 
a summary of general tendencies by identifying the weight that the 
relative strategic gam/loss had in the actual behaviour and by focu­
sing on the aims in question. It has a deterministic and impersonal 
tendency.
8. It is the first step of every analysis. Its explanatory value 
derives from the logical coherence of objective = motif, only one actor, 
and only one act rationally to choose.
The models’ rigor stems from its assumption that action constitutes more 
than simple purposive choice of a unitary agent. What rationality adds to 
the concept of purpose is consistency among goals and objectives relative 
to particular action; consistency is the application of principles in order to 
select the optimal alternative.91
"Rationality refers to consistent, value-maximizing choice with in 
constraints. "92
2. Cuba: the first cut
As a general introduction to the Cuba Crisis, a few dates are neces­
sary to recall. The crisis lasted eleven days, from 16.10.-28.10.62. It 
started with the recognition of Soviet missile sites in Cuba by an U.S. 
intelligence plane U2. The 22.10. the U.S. decided to react by impo­
sing a sea-blockade (called quarantine). The crisis ended on October 
28, 1962 with the Soviet decision to withdraw the missiles.
Now, how will the first model try to explain the installation, the 
blockade and the withdrawal? Following the first model, different 
hypothesis can be deduced for the installation o f missiles in Cuba.
There is, first, the possibility that the Soviet Union looked for a 
bargaining barter for the withdrawal of US missiles in Turkey. Yet, 
there were too many missiles for just a bargain. On top of it, the
90 ibid., p.19.
91 ibid., p.28/29.



























































































Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Crisis Management 109
increase in Soviet nuclear power, particularly for a possible first 
strike, was relatively much more important in Cuba that it had been 
in Turkey.
Second, the decision to install could be considered a provocation to 
induce the U.S to attack Cuba, to isolate them in world opinion, split­
ting NATO, and producing a mirror image for Berlin. Yet, this contra­
dicts the very assumption of the rational actor model. The USSR 
withdrew before attack. Furthermore, the comparison with Berlin 
appears rather weak. A U.S. attack could indeed trigger world opi­
nion against the U.S., but not enough to allow an attack on Berlin go 
non-retaliated. This would mean a major war.
Third, the missiles seemed to have been asked by Castro for the 
defense of Cuba. But, then why did the Soviet Union not install tac­
tical (i.e. short range missiles)? They are easier to hide, but have the 
same defensive effect. Why risking such a high brinkmanship just for 
the defense of Cuba? In other words, the rational actor model asks for 
a check of the relation between ends and means in order to know if 
a hypothesis seems plausible.
Fourth, the Cuba crisis could be seen as a further example of Cold 
War politics: the probe of U.S. intentions (after Cuba I and the Gene­
va meeting between Chruchtchev and Kennedy) for the psychological 
impact on the balance of power (correlation of forces). Yet, why 
IRBM’s (Intermediate Range Ballsitic Missiles)? Why choose Cuba, 
and not Berlin as a probe?93
Finally, it could be for the inexpensive improvement of Soviet 
missile power. "MRBMs [Medium Range Ballistic Missiled] and 
IRBMs based in Cuba would provide a swift, significant, and compa­
ratively inexpensive addition to the Soviet capability to strike the 
United States." (52/53) The time to reach the U.S. would be reduced 
from 30 to 3 minutes. The closeness would allow for a higher 
precision and it would make Chruchtchev’s plan to achieve missile
93 Here, I think Allison goes wrong. One could imagine an incremental change 
where the provocation should be public enough, yet not too important to generate 



























































































110 Part II. Realism from containment to détente
parity more probable. This explains the IRBMs not explained by any 
other hypothesis.
Yet, four main puzzles remain.
1. Why were MRBMs installed before the SAMs were operationalisa- 
ble? Failing in time coordination contradicts planned effort.
2. The omission of camouflage
3. How to rationally expect the missiles not to be seen (U2s)?
4. Why to persist in the face of repeated and explicit U.S. warnings?
Let us then turn to the second question: why did the U.S. opt for 
a blockade (euphemistically called "quarantaine")?
This appears as a straightforward rational choice in a nuclear 
bipolar world, where nuclear war has to be avoided and inaction leads 
to the enemy’s expansion: it was exactly the kind of medium solution 
that allowed for time and crisis management. Since the other option, 
the surgical strike, seemed impossible (only massive one possible, and 
even then 10% of missiles can outlast the attack), the only reasonable 
choice seemed the blockade (which is, after all, a war act!).
Following this model, the Soviet decision to withdraw can be 
explained only with the blockade backed by an ultimatum.
8.2. The cybernetic paradigm: organizational process
1. assumptions
We will start also here with the assumptions of the model.
1. The central point of every cybernetic analysis is the closed feed­
back loop, the homeostatic system, i.e. the conception that a decision 
can be incorporated into a mechanical plan. The mechanism of the 
cybernetical decision works following the principle of recipe. The 
decision-maker has a given repertoire of operations that he imple­
ments sequentially by working on some feedback variables. The re­



























































































Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Crisis Management 111
to one concept. In a certain way, the process, once started, is automa­
tic, and therefore blind for any external influence.
2. In politics, the complexity of problems, thus the abundance of 
information to analyse and decisions to made lead not to an immedi­
ate decision, but to its processing: politics becomes a process.
The first principle of processing is linked to Standard Operational 
Procedures (SOP). Only those informations are retained that have a 
relevance for these already established programmes.94 Decision is 
understood through its negative, i.e. as a processed selection and 
elimination of data.
The second principle of processing could be called fragmentation 
for simplicity. If the decision is considered complex (amount of data, 
amount of aims, conflicting aims, conflicting means...), there is a ten­
sion between the capacity to adapt and the principle of simplicity. 
This is resolved through the multiplication of the decision-makers. 
The decision becomes fragmented in little parts, whose bits are less 
conflictual and aggregate to the final procedural decision. The orga­
nization of modern bureaucracy is a logical outlet of this phenomenon.
The third principle of processing states that internal evolution 
occurs as instrumental learning. The exclusive concentration on pre- 
established feedback channels limits the possible impact of new arri­
ving informations. The evolution only occurs if the SOP had no satis­
factory results and let to its modification.
The fourth and final principle of processing is coordination. If com­
plex organisations, the collective decision-maker, aim at producing 
reasonable decisions, it is necessary that the fragmented activities be 
coordinated at a certain level. Coordination does not mean integra­
tion, but that the established routines should have a certain logical 
coherence. Yet, since the simplicity of the individual decision is
94 Take two examples of a fixed repertory o f  action. On Dec. 7th, 1947 (Pearl 
Harbour) repeated informations about Japanese preparations for an attack were 
always implicitly interpreted as attack from within, that is sabotage. The alert 
measures taken were those ready for this expected action. Therefore, the outside 
attack found the U.S. unprepared. See also the Russian total mobilization which 




























































































112 Part II. Realism, from containment to détente
needed to process the information, the coordination is rather rigid, 
inflexible and strongly structured. Routines hardly change.
3. Allison’s model has specific assumptions. The national behavior 
reflects the independent output of multiple organisations. The govern­
mental leaders can disturb, but not control substantially the behavior 
of those organisations he depends on for his decision and which are 
determined by routines (SOP). These routines determine the choice 
by the selection of available information, the management of a limited 
array of alternatives and possible implementations (the two stages of 
the SOP!): the limit of options.
2. Cuba: a second cut
The organizational or cybernetic model is able to solve some of the 
puzzles of the rational actor model. Let us take the more precise 
installation. There were by Oct. 24:
- 6 field sites of MRBM (with 4 launch positions and reload —» max. 
48, 42 present. 1100 nautical miles.)
- 3 fixed field sites of IRBMs with reload —» max.24. 2200 nautical 
miles.
- 42 jetbombers IL-28; 24 SAMs (anti-aircraft missile), 42 MIG 21 
aircrafts, most-modern anti-tank missile SNAPPER + 22000 Soviet 
soldiers and technicians.
These timing and carrying out of the missile installation presents 
numerous puzzles:
1. SAMs that would protect against U2 did only start to work after 
the installation of offensive missiles.
2. There was no radar before the 24th.
3. There was no camouflage.
4. The missile sites looked exactly like the ones the U.S. knew 
through their intelligence from the USSR and were therefore easily 
recognizable.
5. The simultaneous building of MRBMs and IRBM which is strategi­
cally not very convincing. The first is strategically much more impor­



























































































Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Crisis Management 113
6. Why was there a reload? Since the sides were not hardened, they 
were very vulnerable to a U.S. attack and would certainly not persist 
after a U.S. full strike.
7. Why an anti-tank missile?
The cybernetic model is able to answer convincingly many of these 
puzzles. For 3, 4, and 6 the answer is just that there existed SOPs 
that were carefully applied - even if they made no sense for a missile 
installation outside the Soviet Union. For puzzle 5 and-7, similarly, 
these were part of the standard of a Soviet battle regiment. The radar 
(puzzle 2) was also there, but just the (insufficient) standard one. The 
installation of new one not ready before 24th. Number 1 remains still 
inexplicable.
How would the cybernetic model tackle the decision for a blockade? 
The blockade arrived at a time too late to avoid shipments to Cuba, 
yet early enough not to react militarily, because they were still not 
operationalisable. Why were the sites not recognised before? There 
existed different hints from the French Secret Service, Cuban emi­
grants,... Nobody wanted to risk U2s to be shot down over Cuba. And 
after a clear indication that there were missiles, a ten-day delay was 
caused by different bureaucracies that quarrelled about the responsi­
bility for this flight.
The wrong indication that a surgical strike was not possible, and that 
therefore only massive strikes had been prepared is the result of pro­
cedures and opinions in the Navy and the army in general. The army 
had classified the MRBMs as movable and then proceeded on a stan­
dard manner. In this case, 10% of the missiles were considered able 
to resist an attack. It were civilians that resurrected this option by 
showing that movable meant within 5 days.
The cybernetic model will try also to explain some parts of the 
withdrawal that remained unconvincingly handled by the rational 
actor model: Why has the USSR not understood the different signals 
that should deter its installation, not expected to be recognised before 
everything completed, and reacted so panically when the blockade 
was announced with the discovery? It seems that the Soviet ambassa­



























































































114 Part II. Realism from containment to détente
rally speaking the decision to install missiles was made by a small 
group in complete secrecy. But why? With regard to the unprepared 
reactions to the blockade, it remains unanswered. Within 36 hours, 
the British Intelligence knew that the U.S. knew, and by Saturday 
the 20th, two journalists (Alfred Friendly and James Reston) knew it, 
as well. The Soviet Union must have known (this is a post hoc ergo 
propter argument). The model cannot give any further answer.
8.3. The game-theoretical model
For the game-theoretical model, decision are an outcome of intra- 
governmental play, the overlap of which constitutes international 
relations.
1. Assumptions
1. Governmental action is seen as an agglomeration or collage of 
relatively independent decisions.
2. The analysis starts from the positioning of players that define 
what players may or must do: perceptions, propensities, and priorities 
stemming from position are sufficient to allow analyst to make reli­
able prediction (filtered through cognitive map of person).
3. The analysis focuses on the interplay of rational actors. It is a 
strategic approach. The decision is the resultant of respective bargai­
ning power: bargaining advantages, skill and will to use them and 
other players’ perception of it.
4. Its explanatory power is achieved by displaying the game: the 
action-channel, the positions, the players, their preferences, the bar­
gain.
In other words, it captures the interplay and conflict between 
different leaders
Observers of organizational output are primarily attuned to persistence in 
established patterns, details of operation that follow from standard opera­



























































































Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Crisis Management 115
contexts, slips between semi-independent organizations, and complications 
stemming from leaders’ attempts to force organizations to act contrary to 
existing goals...Nevertheless, the political leaders who sit atop government 
organizations do make major decisions about which organizations shall 
play out what programmes out where.
2. Cuba: the third cut
Since no informations are available about the internal political strug­
gle within the Soviet elite, this third model can only shed light unto 
the second question, linked to the U.S. decision for a blockade. Its 
thesis is that
A series of overlapping bargaining games determined both the date of the 
discovery of the Soviet missiles and the impact of the discovery on the 
administration. An explanation of the politics of the discovery is conse­
quently a considerable piece of the explanation of the U.S. blockade.
The main decision-maker was the President. The model will look at 
how the interplay of forces was articulated around him. The Presi­
dent’s choice had to be done in a highly critical domestic context: the 
Bay of Pigs (Cuba 1), the by-elections where the "do-nothing"- politics 
should be exploited by the Republicans (Goldwater), the uncertainty 
about his pragmatic and not too anti-communist policy. On top of it, 
Chruchtchev had bed to him by repeatedly assuring that no missiles 
or other offensive weapons would be deployed in Cuba. Kennedy 
seemed convinced of a strong reaction.
Allison can reconstruct that those of his advisors in the Executive 
Committee that he had most confidence in, i.e. his brother and Mini­
ster of Justice Robert Kennedy, the Minister of Defence, Me Namara 
and his personal adviser Sorensen had all opted for a non-military 
solution. For the others, the blockade would just postpone the inter­
vention, giving the SU the time to make their missiles operationali- 
sable and thereby reduce the credibility of an air-strike threat 




























































































116 Part II. Realism from containment to detente
The rapid abandonment of the nonmilitary path resulted less form the 
balance of arguments than from the intra-govemmental balance of 
power.95
When on Wednesday, the blockade was not working (no reaction from 
the USSR), the massive invasion was ordered. Yet, 1.30 p.m. a Soviet 
proposal reached the White House through the Chief of the KGB in 
Washington: withdrawal (under UN supervision) for Cuban guaran­
tee. 6 p.m. secret letter from Chruchtchev arrived: same deal. 
Saturday, 10 a.m. new official letter. New Deal: Cuba against Turkey. 
1 U2 shot down by SAM. Reaction should have been the attack of a 
SAM site. But following the softer line of his favorite advisors, 
Kennedy decided for waiting and answering to the first and not the 
second letter. The Soviet Union accepted.
8.4. Cognitive process
The basic idea and starting point of this model is the recognition of 
a mental capacity to impose a structure on data that would remain 
otherwise diffused and that this capacity is a fundamental force in 
the decision procedure. One could call this the ordering principle of 
mind.
1. Assumptions
There are two main assumptions. First, the assumption of the uncon­
scious process, i.e. a part of the decision is made without any con­
scious direction. Second, there exist regularities in the cognitive 
operations which determine the decision-making procedure. This pro­
cedures do not concern the content, but the structure of thought; in 
other words, the way to interconnect thoughts and the way how infor­
mation is managed with regard to already held beliefs. These diffe­
rent procedures are the memory, which is structured by general con­




























































































Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Crisis Management 117
stability and attempts to tie memory and new informations together 
to form a coherent whole.
2. Application to political decision-making
Cognitive approaches are most useful in crisis situations or more 
generally situations of high complexity.
The dimension of complexity is the point of demarcation between the
different models of decision, there where the decisions are most distin­
guished. (Steinbrunner)
There are different conditions of complexity:
The first is the condition of incompatibility, i.e. two or more values, 
vital objectives are touched by the decision and there exists a dilem­
ma between the realisation of both. The second is the condition of un­
certainty, that is, the imperfect correspondence between the informa­
tion and the environment. It applies to all situations where probabili­
ties have to be included into the decision. Finally, the condition of dis­
persion, i.e. decision-making power is dispersed on an number of indi­
vidual actors and organisational units. Therefore, crisis and crisis 
management can be seen as an operationalization of complexity.
In situations of high complexity, the cognitive mechanisms tend to: 
eliminate exclusive choices by disconnecting the alternatives and pur­
suing them separately and to impose clear-cut, categorical, and not 
probabilistic judgements. When applied to Allison’s third model, new 
data have to be taken into account.
Allison’s model presupposes the decision to result from a intra­
national game where political leaders bargain with their respective 
preferences, authority and influence at hand for the decision’s for­
mulation and final application. The resultant is therefore a compro­
mise more or less complex. The image is that of a force vector.
For the theory of the cognitive process, politics, i.e. decision-making 
will be different. There is no rational argument implied. Moreover, 
personal interests prevail for public interests. Finally, the common 
search for a compromise is rendered difficult by the cognitive aspects 



























































































118 Part II. Realism from containment to détente
of the feedback processes that create a rigidity with few common 
points and with a greater independence. Thus, the decision-making 
will be less coherent, than if it had happened as mutual adjustments 
between analytical (rational) players.
8.5. Conclusion: why studying crises?
There are, following the initial distinction between macro and micro- 
IR, two concepts of crisis. The macro concept is concerned with the 
analysis of international relations seen from the international system. 
It means crisis in interstate relations, linking state interaction to 
governmental politics (as a part of domestic politics), In other words, 
it is classical Realism applied to a concept: crisis.96 97
The crisis in international relations is a process of interaction which 
operates at superior levels of perceived intensity than the ordinary flow of 
events. It is caracterised by: the interruption of the ordinary flow of 
politics, the limitation of time at disposal, the increased perception of a 
recourse to violence and by the significant implications for the stability of 
a system (or relational structures) in international relations.
The micro concept, however, refers to the analysis of international 
relations as seen from the view of one of its actors. The focus is on the 
decision-making process in which international situation (crisis) 
works just as an input in this process. Crisis means therefore both 
international crisis and foreign policy crisis f 7
Even though generally close to a more scientific approach of inter­
national relations, crisis management has known a split in two tradi­
tions, one more strictly analytical and one in which crisis is under­
stood more as a historical phenomenon (even if the analysis then fol­
lows more behavioural patterns).
96 This is the approach of McClelland, Glenn Snyder, and Oran Young in C.F. 
Herrmann, ed., International Crisis: Insights from Behavioural Research (London: 
Collier-Macmillan and New York: Free Press, 1972).
97 See for this distinction and for a good introduction to crisis management: Phil 




























































































Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Crisis Management 119
The analytical approach is represented for example by Spanier and 
Charles Herrmann. Their definition of the crisis focuses on its specific 
elements
a) the perception of an important threat for the security of at least a 
part of the challenged state (Spanier) or against vital interests of the 
decisional unit (the government) [survival of the unit] (Herrmann);
b) aspect of surprise, of non-anticipation of the threat;
c) the perception of the actors to have only a limited time-frame for 
decision;
d) the possibility of war (Spanier and Williams).
Yet, this has been contested. So do Snyder/Diesing and also 
Michael Brecher88 not believe in the universality of the aspect of 
limited time for a crisis: e.g. the Berlin crisis went on for two years. 
Brecher (and eventually also Herrmann) exclude the aspect o f sur­
prise: being himself specialised on the Middle East, Brecher quotes 
the closure of the straits of Tiran by Nasser in 1967 which was expec­
ted both by Israel and the United States. Williams and Young, by em­
phasising the systemic aspect imply that one o f the two superpowers 
must be involved (linking everything to the central bipolar balance).
The historical approach conceives crisis and crisis management as 
a typical phenomenon o f the post-war nuclear stalemate. At first, crisis 
is seen as an intermediate situation between war and peace (Brecher, 
Snyder/Diesing, Lebow).
Nearly all wars have been preceded by a crisis, although obviously not all 
crises end in war. The crisis is a sort hybrid, neither peace, nor war, but 
which contains elements of both including the potential to change peace 
into war.
This opens up for a cross-historical comparative study of crisis (Stan­
ford project of conflict and integration, directed by Robert North, 
Princeton project for 1914). But Williams distinguishes crises even 
with regard to the means form their solution: the nuclear arms. War 
is not anymore a reasonable instrument of politics, not anymore a le- 98
98 Michael Brecher, Decisions in Crisis: Israel ’67 and "73 (London and Berkeley: 



























































































120 Part II. Realism, from containment to détente
gitimate objective when the two superpowers or more generally nu­
clear arms are involved. Thus, decision-makers are obliged to stop the 
conflict (crisis) before the dangerous stadium. Pre-war crises (till 
1950, Korea, because nuclear weapons were not yet perceived as qua­
litatively different) contained all the elements - except the nuclear 
one. Therefore, in this understanding, the cross-historical comparison 
are historically limited to the superpowers’ crisis after World War II.
And this also explains the close relationship between the thought 
o f classical realism (and a Realist version o f Soviet approaches o f 
peaceful coexistence) and the concept o f crisis, reflected especially in 
the basic ambiguity of crisis management. On the one hand, the 
common aim of all decision-makers involved is the peaceful solution 
of confrontation. The success of crisis management depends on the 
capacity to avoid a war. The war is the pathological state to termi­
nate. The common interest in avoiding war prevails. The crisis is the 
common enemy. Yet, in the same time, crisis management is an exer­
cise of winning, or, in other words, Clausewitz reversed: politics is war 
with other means. Here, crisis appears as zero-sum game, where the 
other is the enemy.
Again, we have this tense mix of bilateral competition and coopera­
tion for the common and particular interest, that we met already in 
containment, peaceful coexistence, and détente. It is therefore not ob­
vious and should be shortly discussed now, if Allison’s models mean 
really a departure from Realism as he claims in his critique of the 
rational actor model. In a sense, Allison answers this question him­
self. He accepts a limited explanatory power to Realism (as a rational 
actor approach) and its usefulness, when data are not available and 
one has to argue and think in terms of a black box. The different 
models are not contradictory, but supplementary.
True, the ’scientific’ turn whereby international anarchy, the 
rational calculation of ends and means in a system of self help (i.e. 
the National Interest) might be the minimum for a foreign policy 
elaboration, but certainly not for its analysis. Thus, the different 
models might not be supplementary. Supplementary models presup­



























































































Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Crisis Management 121
and so on, i.e. that explanations excluded by the rational actor model 
would not turn out being still possible ones by looking to the other 
models. Yet, this is a possibility. Model 2 and 3, as much as Stein- 
brunner’s cognitive approach open the possibility for irrational beha­
viour, i.e. that means and ends are not matching. The rational actor 
model can only include this by pointing to the dependent nature of 
this reasoning. It is by positing an ideal of rationality that unexpected 
(irrational) behaviour appears as puzzle to be analysed with supple­
mentary means. Therefore, it could be argued, it is not contradictory.
This argument is partly right. Yet, as far as this rational foreign 
policy is concerned, it is not obvious that a deviation from the so- 
called National Interest will always be sanctioned by the internatio­
nal system. The assumption of a self-help system is that the not- 
following of the best track (rational policy) will result in being pu­
nished for it - in the extreme case by annihilation. Now, having posi­
ted the possible irrationality of more than one actor, new possibilities 
of a rational, i.e. for the survival best combinaison of policies arise. 
This is actually handled by Realism as we have seen in chapter 5, 
where differentiations of the international system have been intro­
duced by writers like Aron, Kissinger, and Wolfers. Yet, this specific 
solution is to point to a different international system to which a 
different rationality applies. It is the opinion of this author, that one 
should actually take an approach like Kennan’s more seriously: trying 
to establish specific national foreign policy traditions that are 
idiosyncratic enough to allow for different rationalities to be applied 
for the explanation of international behaviour." In this context, 
rationality still holds9 100 - but not towards different ahistorical 
international anarchical systems, but towards national policy 
traditions. It is thereby an interesting research programme to see
99 For a modern research programme taking traditions more seriously, see e.g. 
foreign policy analysis as national discourse analysis by Ole Waever, "Three 
Competing Europes: German, French, Russian.” International Affairs, vol.66, no.3, 
July 1990, pp.477-494.
100 In a sense there must be a rationality assumption somewhere in the 



























































































122 Part II. Realism from containment to détente
how Realism has imbued these traditions to such an extent as to 
appear as a kind of universal rationality.101
Thus, foreign policy analysis in its integration of governmental and 
domestic politics, taken to his most historical roots is certainly a 
major criticism of whatever simple more scientific Realism. But it has 
also the seeds to make the even loose conception of Realism explode, 
where not the explanation of a specific outcome, but just its range is 
given: the sole reference to the international structure might actually 
hide possible explanations. The systemic and the unit view are not 
always two phases of one and the same analysis, but two competing 
explanations.102
101 This is part of the Ashley/Walker research programme. See especially Richard 
K. Ashley, "The Geopolitics of Geopolitical Space: Toward a Critical Social Theory of 
International Politics." Alternatives, vol.XII, no.4, pp.403-434.
102 Argued from a slightly different viewpoint, this is also one o f the implications 
of J. David Singer’s famous "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International 
Relations." In Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba, eds., The International System: 


















































































































































































































































































The purpose of this interlude is twofold.
On the one hand, it wants to draw and to develop on those 
features we had already encountered before, that let arise anomalies 
for the Realist explanation. On this theoretical level, the big puzzles,
i.e. the exact role and meaning of the balance of power or bureaucra­
tic decision-making will be assessed in order to set the ground on 
which the theoretical discussion from 1970-1990 occurred. The very 
way of conceiving of international affairs, and also of defining accor­
dingly the academic discipline had to be redone and is still in a pro­
cess o f redoing. Realism has lost its hegemonic grid, not all its appeal. 
It has certainly not been replaced by a new all-convincing world-view, 
or a new core of the discipline. Neo-Realism, International Political 
Economy, and Critical Theory are new challengers for this core and 
will be introduced in the third part of the lecture series.
On the other, this theoretical disarray coincided with a kind of 
East-West relations that are profoundly the most Realist, i.e.pragma- 
tic and non-ideological, American policy ever applied, Kissinger’s 
détente. Moreover, it displays besides some traditional features of 
containment, also some new elements of world politics, as e.g. the 
integration of political and economic foreign policy. Hence, multipola­
rity and the rise of the South as an independent actor became 
features of the official doctrine.
This interlude can therefore be seen as a joint, a hinge between 
the old Cold War Realism and East-West politics and a new world 
rule even more encompassing. When the defenders of peaceful coexis­
tence and containment appealed to the violence reducing impact of 
these policies, because they turned attention and action away from 
the strictly military field, they paid sometimes only lip-service to the 
real competition which is going on in future world politics that will 
be characterized by:
- intense economic competition between Japan, Europe, the U.S., and 
the MNC’s (in changing alliances), from which other countries can 
only hope to profit indirectly (as in the military bipolar balance 
before)
- ideological, ecological and military competition by the central powers 
to defend their status through exclusion (e.g., a mexicanisation of the 






















































































































































































The Policy of Détente: Kissinger and 
the end of the focus on security
9.1. Kissinger’s general approach
We have in chapter 5 already presented Kissinger’s general approach 
with his distinction of a legitimate and revolutionary international 
system. The Soviet Union, as the U.S.’ main contender is analysed as 
a potentially revolutionary power - but not necessarily so. The main 
point of Kissinger’s détente policy is therefore close to Kennan’s 
original project: containment where necessary and inducement to 
change and making the Soviet Union herself interested in becoming 
a legitimate power.
He opposes the extreme and traditional moralism of American fo­
reign policy, that is either isolationist ("we do not dirt our hands in 
the marasma of foreign policy"), or messianic ("we save the world by 
teaching everyone else to be as we are"). He tries to establish a 
foreign policy not influenced by this wrong analogy of domestic morals 
and politics to the international ground.1 Keeping to the Realist prag­
matism, he attacks the Republicans, because they traditionally con­
found foreign policy with the working of a policeman; and the demo-
1 See for example his introduction to The White House Years. Boston: Little 




























































































128 Interlude: Détente and the Crisis o f Realism
crats for confounding foreign policy with pedagogy. Not communism 
as an ideology, but superpower capabilities and the hostility of Soviet 
Union should be considered the reason for the present conflictual 
relations.
Therefore foreign policy has to start from a careful and sober 
analysis of the existing international system, of the U.S. power and 
possible aims. Kissinger analyses the international system as a multi­
dimensional one, i.e. power is to be distinguished in its specific areas. 
This means especially the resurgence of the economic international 
system and of the possible integrated use of economic power in foreign 
policy. In this conception, power ceases to be a zero-sum concept, 
meaning that the loss of power in one field can be upset in another. 
Obviously such a conception had a certain attractiveness for a U.S. 
heavily embarking (and losing) in Vietnam.
This analysis links up with Kissinger’s awareness of the limited 
resources for the U.S., the recognition of U.S. limited means. The 
general aim is the maintenance of a balance of power that is poten­
tially multipolar.2 If one splits up the world in a political/military 
and an economic balance of power, the U.S. thought playing on two 
triangles: a USSR-U.S.-China military triangle and a U.S.-Europe- 
Japan economic triangle. The U.S. would play the central role be­
cause it would link up both balances of power. Linking up or linkage 
becomes the central concept of Kissinger’s foreign policy of détente.
9.2. The policy of détente
Kissinger wants to use a stabilised balance of power system to induce 
the Soviet Union to be come part in an international legitimate order
2 Japan, but especially Europe as new poles are handled in a particular and 
recurrent scheme, i.e. they are welcome for a burden sharing, but unwelcome for 
power sharing. This is mirrored in Europe for the role of the U.S.: welcome as the 
provider of security and permitting diplomatically the Europeans to play the 
"progressive Western part”; unwelcome, because of the confusion of American with 



























































































The policy of Détente 129
which has nothing to do (at least, in the first place) with justice, but 
with
international agreement about the nature of workable agreements and
about the permissible aims and methods of foreign policy.3
For the means employed, Kissinger concentrates on one of the two 
triangles, the central military tripolar balance which is supposed to 
rule international order and is therefore also the locus o f change o f 
exactly that order. The alliance and the Third World remain subordi­
nated to this central locus of international politics.
Central becomes the politics of linkage. It consists in a universali- 
sing approach to politics trying to intermingle different policy areas 
in order to get leavy for diplomatic advance on different fronts. In 
fact, it implies two slightly contradictory elements. First, it attempts 
to integrate the Soviet economy into that of the Western international 
system to such an extent that the USSR would have few motives for 
upsetting the international status quo (Kissinger’s anti-Versailles 
trauma). Second, It tries to induce Soviet political cooperation by 
extending economic concessions only as a reward of good behavior.
For this rather complicated and flexible foreign policy to work, 
Kissinger tries to insulate (in the typical Realist manner of the pri­
macy of foreign policy) foreign policy from two main ’negative influen­
ces’. First, he must try to reduce external commitments that overbur­
den the U.S. capabilities. In this context can be seen the disengage­
ment from Vietnam and especially the Guam (or Nixon-) Doctrine4, 
and also the shift to more "officious" aid, than military interventions 
(see Chile). Both turns are still acknowledged in present U.S. foreign 
policy. Second, Kissinger has definitely tried to insulate foreign policy 
from internal (bureaucratic) constraints. To a certain extent, there­
fore, his first position as National Security Adviser (with a ’weaker’ 
Secretary of State for facade) was more congenial to his conception 
than being himself Secretary of State and exposed to domestic
3 Henry A. Kissinger, A World Restored (London: Gallancz, 1957), p.l.



























































































130 Interlude: Détente and the Crisis o f Realism
criticisms and control. To be noted is also his system of back-channel, 
i.e. the running of parallel sets of negotiation on the same issue: one 
public by subordinates, one secret by Kissinger (see China).
In brief, Kissinger’s détente can be seen as a containment policy o f 
negotiable linkage. The USSR as a potential revolutionary power 
should be entangled in a complex relationship in order to let the U.S. 
pursue a moderate foreign policy: containment, but not only with the 
stick, but with the carrot. The economic and financial (and political) 
help was made dependent on the international behavior of the USSR. 
Détente is a sequentialised flexible mix o f linkaged confrontation and 
collaboration:'
9.3. Problems of linkage
1. U.S. dependence on the Soviet Union for the maintenance of 
stability in the Third World
We had already noticed in chapter 6, that the Third World was the 
region where the principle of peaceful coexistence did not apply, 
Kissinger, aware of this tension, tried to link up economic and 
political bargains on the central balance between the United States 
and Soviet Union with Soviet behaviour in the Third World. Some­
times, it worked:
- Moscow agreed in 1970 not to build a submarine base in Cuba
- Syria withdrew from Jordan
- Pressure on Moscow helped to avoid India’s invasion of West- 
Pakistan in 1971
Yet, generally it did not for the simple overestimation o f Soviet will 
and possibilities and o f the central balance in general, to influence 
world politics. The primary example being Vietnam where it was not 5
5 For convincing critiques of Kissinger’s policy, see John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies 
o f Containment, chapter 10; and Stanley Hoffmann, Primacy or World Order: Ameri­



























































































The policy o f Détente 131
sure at all if the Soviet Union could actually do very much to stop the 
Vietcong.
2. U.S. dependence on domestic politics for the control o f linkage
instruments
Let us start with the "economic carrots". The ongoing back-and-forth 
of the Soviet admission to the most-favored nation clause was finally 
lost as bargaining chip, because linked to Russian emigration policy 
(Jackson-amendment). Another example is the obviously strong bar­
gaining chip of grain sales. Yet, in Kissinger’s times they were not 
even negotiable, because of the strong reaction by farmers and Dept, 
of Commerce.6
Then take the flexibility of the "military sticks" or what is left 
after the War Power Act that requires the Congress’ consent for any 
military involvement of more than 60 days.
The basic flaw lays in a may be unfortunate, but real overestima­
tion o f the possibility to isolate foreign from domestic politics. 
Kissinger has been extremely sarcastic about the Jackson amend­
ment. It is one of his key examples for bad foreign policy.7 But it is 
also somewhat unrealistic to base a foreign policy on a utopian capa­
city to isolate foreign means from domestic interests and lobbies - 
especially in the U.S.
3. Complete misconceiving o f North-South relations
Instead of coping Third World issues as not automatically part of a 
zero-sum calculation, Kissinger did not take multipolarity as meaning 
a more inert and independent Third World where short term strategic 
losses meant long-term gains for the USSR. Here, traditional 
bipolarity was uphold. In other words, Kissinger treated the Third 
World as an appanage of the central triangular balance and was by
6 Carter succeeded to decide a grain embargo against the USSR (after the 
invasion of Afghanistan). But it was sabotaged in its implementation.



























































































132 Interlude: Détente and the Crisis o f Realism
this logic forced back in the contradictions of traditional Cold War 
policies.8
The U.S. supported the White governments in Southern Africa at 
a time, when Angola and Mozambique decolonized, and South Africa 
and Rhodesia were under internal strain. It helped Pakistan in the 
crisis of 1971, even though it repressed violently the Bangla-Desh up­
heaval, in order to please China (against India). It allowed unlimited 
arms sale for Iran. Yet, not only did the shah not avoid oil price rai­
sing, but his modernisation policy put the Iran under a societal strain 
that Kissinger, at least in his writings9 was well aware of. American 
foreign policy followed the traditional modernizing approach and 
failed.
Take also the Middle East crisis, where the Yom Kippur war of 1973 
caught U.S. unprepared.10 Then, the civil war during and after 
independence in Angola 1975, where the U.S supported two fractions 
which were, in turn, supported by Zaire and South Africa - not 
exactly popular in Angola or elsewhere in Africa at that time. Then 
finally the CIA engagement in Chile 1973!
4. Mishandling of the relations within the alliance
This is the result of linkage politics which ties every political change 
to the central balance and implicitly to the politics of the central 
actors. Flexibility abroad meant discipline within the alliance. But the 
carrots and sticks that might be useful for an opponent power are not 
easily used against allies. In the Cyprus crisis 1974, the U.S. did not 
succeed in stopping the Greek intervention (replacing Macarios) and 
had to accept the biggest strain on its military alliance since its
8 For a discussion, see the remarks on the implementation of containment in 
chapter 7.
9 See his American Foreign Policy for the discussion that economic development 
does not necessarily imply political development and stability. For a wider discussion 
of theories of political development, see chapter 15.
10 Yet, Mohammed Sid-Ahmed argues that Kissinger wanted the war to break out 
in order to use his leverage for a more stable Middle Eastern settlement. Ex post 



























































































The policy o f  Détente 133
existence. Another and perhaps the most influential decision was 
undoubtedly to break up Bretton Woods. The allies were not consult­
ed, the ex-post agreement was not held. Another example is that 
Japan was not even informed about the Chinese-American rapproche­
ment (before Kissinger’s first trip to China in 7/1971). The U.S. 
intervened also heavily in Mediterranean politics with its excessively 
strong reaction against Eurocommunism (especially after the Portu­
guese Revolution 1974) for Spain, Portugal and Italy. Finally, and, 
last but not least, Kissinger’s initiative that turned into a joke of 1973 
as a European Year (making the nice distinction particularly 
appreciated by the Europeans that the U.S as a superpower had 
world interests, whereas Europe had only particular ones.)
As the Soviet Union’s approach of peaceful coexistence and the Cof 
does not give a clue how to handle intra-socialist relations, Realism 
seems unfortunately tied to a strong balance of power politics. It can 
explain why alliances arise, but more difficulty how they work.
9.4. Conclusion
1. Detente as a conclusion o f containment policy
Kissinger came very near in implementing the original outlook of con­
tainment policy, as envisaged by its architect George F. Kennan. The 
de-ideologicalisation of international affairs, the central concept of 
containment implemented through a mix of cooperative and conflic- 
tual postures, the attempt to integrate and thereby to moderate the 
Soviet Union, without giving in... are all features of the original 
enterprise - cleaned of their typically exceptionalist overtones they 
acquired during the Cold War area. Because Kennan and Kissinger 
tried to avoid the two typical poles of American foreign policy, the 
oscillation between moral integrity and isolationism and moral res­
ponsibility and intervention, they might indeed be called Realist 



























































































134 Interlude: Détente and the Crisis o f Realism
2. Détente as the breakdown o f a traditional diplomacy in a new 
international order
Kissinger tried to integrate the economic sphere into the high politics 
level. Yet, economic foreign policy making, the integration of trans­
national economic actors, even though not excluded by the strategic 
thought was rarely implemented. Although Kissinger alluded to the 
multipolarity and the increasing elusiveness of power, he still 
believed in the great power management capability for the interna­
tional order. The state has, however, lost power and the aggregation 
of states does not constitute the international system anymore (if it 
ever did). A central balance cannot rule international relations and 
the military dependence of the allies does not automatically entail 
superpower’s authority. External relations cannot be isolated from 
domestic politics as the primacy of foreign policy requires. Interna­
tional relations and politics have become more complicated that the 
Realist model assumed. Linkage is already there, and not to be intro­
duced by conscious policy-making. Détente is simultaneously the per­
fection of superpower-diplomacy in the 20th Century and the symbol 
for its decline. It just matters less. We need a new paradigm for the 




























































































International Relations in a disarray: 
the Inter-Paradigm Debate
The general context of the research in the 60’s and 70’s was Détente. 
In a certain sense Allison’s research was a rationalisation of the need 
for superpower partnership, strongly felt after the Cuban crisis. 
Keohane & Nye’s "interdependence literature" reflects the new 
emphasis on economics of the U.S. administration. From 1969 the 
Nixon-Kissinger team embarked in international politics, with the 
consciousness of US military limitations in general (Vietnam) and 
relative to the USSR (SALT) hence deciding to link military issues to 
economic carrots as to "tame Soviet expansion". Kissinger’s détente 
policy was intended as a mixture of co-operative and confrontative 
elements aiming at containment by different means. "Issue areas" 
and "linkages" were, at least declared elements of day-to-day U.S. for­
eign policy. In 1979, with the events of Afghanistan and Iran, the 
world entered the "second cold war" and Waltz published his "Theory 
of International Politics”. Before embarking on these different refor­
mulations and criticisms of Realism that started in the 70s, let us 
first summarize the state of the art at that time of Realism in crisis. 
The main aim is to show the increasing widening of the picture that 




























































































136 Interlude: Détente and the Crisis o f  Realism
10.1. The widening of the field: a new conception of IR
The starting point of this approach is the idea of the realist paradigm 
in a crisis11. During the long years of legitimated "puzzle-solving", 
realism was confronted with a number of problems:
- the different level of analysis (Singer),
- the fiction of a monolithic state (Marxist and pluralist critiques),
- the discussion of the concept of rationality and the question of 
perception (the works of e.g. Deutsch, Allison, Jervis in the USA, 
Grosser in France and Senghaas in Germany).
Yet only in the aftermath of the behaviouralist revolution, did 
these problems become anomalies. There has been a great deal 
written about the illusion of a "traditionalist- behaviouralist" debate, 
or the Bull-Kaplan debate. Since behaviouralism criticised the 
normative bias of the traditionalist, more historical ("heuristic") 
methodology, the dispute was not primarily about content, but about 
methods. One can be a Realist and a Behaviouralist at the same time, 
as John Vasquez cogently argues12. Behaviouralism and its positivist 
assumptions came, in turn under severe attack by more radical 
scholars. This resulted in, for instance, the so-called "Positivis- 
musstreit" in the German sociology between the Frankfurt school and 
Popper.
Nevertheless, behaviouralism planted the seed which eventually 
weakened the dominance of realism, because it destroyed the 
distinctiveness o f International Relations. IR became part of "political" 
(thus social) "science", domestic and international politics being the 
same matter, but in different fields. The legitimated boundaries of IR- 
study were softened, the anomalies became legitimate research. The 
focus on the domestic system made it possible to analyse transnation-
11 See e.g. Hayward R. Alker & Thomas J. Biersteker, "The Dialectics of World 
Order: Notes for a future archeologist of international savoir faire." International 
Studies Quarterly, vol.28, 1984; Michael Banks, "The Evolution of International 
Relations”; K.J. Holsti, The Dividing Discipline. Hegemony and Diversity in Interna­
tional Theory (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1985).



























































































International Relations in a disarray 137
al actors and bureaucratic decision-making, for instance. Interdepen­
dence became the new fashion. Economics, the market, attracted 
general attention. The "Political Economy of..." was a standard title 
of graduate papers in the 70’s. Hence, even though most of the 
scholars were still realists, they tackled new puzzles, using concepts 
coming from other disciplines. The just quoted concepts which usually 
are seen as part o f the pluralist paradigm developed in conformity 
with routine. There was no "gestalt-switch".
The internal history13 will now account for the description of the 
enlargement of the mainstream IR researcher’s world-view and the 
general view that emerged in the late 1970’s. Two contributions will 
be briefly discussed: Foreign policy analysis and linkage theories.
In foreign policy analysis, Allison’s work can be seen as a violent 
critique of at least one assumption of realism: rationality. The 
traditional realist approach, Allison’s first model, is however not en­
tirely dismissed. It is the recognized first step of any analysis of 
foreign policy behaviour: under the structural constraints and the 
given objective aim of each state to survive, each state will attempt 
to find the optimal means-goals solution. The government is the uni­
que actor and treated as a black box. If no more information is 
available the analysis must stop here. Otherwise it must include 
model 2 and 3. These three models are superposed according to the 
increasing complexity of the decision; from the easy rational one, to 
the bureaucratic and finally the crisis management.13 4
Kenneth Waltz is justified in asserting that Allison is as state- 
centred as the realists, without providing a more satisfactory view of 
the state/society than the classical thinkers do. Since IR for Waltz is 
on the structural level only the first model is within IR theory, the 
others are foreign policy analysis approaches. Realists generally, and 
also Allison, respond to the attack of the rationality assumption by 
using the concept of "bounded rationality" or by arguing the assump­
13 See chapter 3 for the concepts used in this chapter.



























































































138 Interlude: Détente and the Crisis o f Realism
tion as being unnecessary.15 The critique of this move has already 
been carried out at the end of chapter 8.
But the other part of the literature, which had a boom in the 
1960’s and 1970’s, requires some more consideration: linkage approa­
ches, i.e. the interaction at different levels of the external and 
internal realms of world politics (most prominently defended by 
James Rosenau). By neither denying nor exaggerating the importance 
of national boundaries, this framework highlightened transnationa­
lism and foreign policy through the societal context of other nations. 
Boundaries became the organizing point for a world of flows, passing 
by borders, by states, by actors. Actors are functionally defined as 
structures able to influence flows16. They operate in an international 
environment which includes the domestic realms of other states. 
Merle’s view is rather typical. After a long discussion of the inap­
propriateness of a state-centric view, IR is defined by a systemic 
theory; IR is an international system ("closed", i.e. no longer allowing 
the export of conflicts) and without a central authority. This is the 
fundamental cause for the "dysfunctioning" of the notoriously conflic- 
tual system. This is also the Realists’ fundamental assumption. Hence 
we are still within Waltz’ logical priority (of the international 
structure), considering states as the organizing principle of IR theory.
Nevertheless the world view has become a kind of global net (see 
Figure 3), with new "puzzles". Insights concerning linking points were 
added by the increasing work on perceptions, which is simultaneously 
an outgrowth of cybernetics and of decision-making approaches on the 
micro-international level (domestic) as on the macro level (perceptions 
in bargaining processes, highlightened especially during crisis). The 
approximate world view of mainstream IR can be described by 
Figure 3.
15 See Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony. Cooperation and Discord in the World 
Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) for the first and 
Kenneth Waltz, "Response to my critics", for the second position.




























































































International Relations in a disarray 139
Figure 3 The global net. The choice of an input-output model à la Easton should 
stress the impact of the behavioural revolution on the mapping of the internation­



























































































140 Interlude: Détente and the Crisis o f Realism
10.2. The Inter-Paradigm Debate
In this context, it is not too surprising that scholars thought to have 
found in Kuhn’s history of science an adequate description of their 
situation. Kuhn speaks of "paradigm-debate" in times of crises. These 
crises have five characteristics: the proliferation of competing 
articulations (theories), the willingness to try out anything, the 
expression of explicit discontent, the recourse to philosophy, and 
finally the debate about fundamentals.
This description seemed to match the state of the art of IR at the 
beginning of the 70s. In Ir and also in IPE, three competing para­
digms are said to exist: Realism, pluralism, and structuralism.
For K.J.Holsti the "sufficient, and probably necessary, criteria to 
distinguish between genuine paradigms in our field"* 17 and the speci­
fic principle of the triptych can be summarized as follows (See 
Table 2).
Table 2. Holsti’s Divided Discipline.
P A R A D IG M S
CR ITE R IA
C L A S S IC A L
TR AD ITIO N
G L O B A L
S O C IE T Y
N E O M A R ­
X IS M
(1) c a u s e s  o f  w a r  a n d  c o n d it io n s  o f  
p e a c e  /s o c i e t y /o r d e r ;  "a n  e sse n tia l 
s u b s id ia r y  p r o b le m  is  th e  n a tu re  o f  
p o w e r "  (p .9 )
= ce n tra l 
p ro b lé m a tiq u e
c o n d it io n s  
fo r  g lo b a l  
c o m m u n ity
in e q u a l i ty /
e x p lo ita ­
t io n
(2) th e  e s s e n t ia l  a c to r s  a n d /o r  
u n its  o f  a n a ly s is
d ip lo m a tic -  
m ilita iy  b e h a ­
v io r  o f  s ta te s
w e b  o f  
t r a n s b o r d e r  
in te ra ct io n s
c la s s /
s o c ia l
g r o u p s
(3) im a g e s  o f  th e  
w o r ld /s y s t e m /s o c ie t y  o f  s ta te s
a n a rc h y w o r ld  s o c ie ty  
in  a  g lo b a l 
e c o n o m y
c o r e  -  p e r i­
p h e ry
The reversal of criteria (1) with the answer given by the classical 
paradigm is not due to an easier presentation as a figure. It is done 
by Holsti himself. When he presents the criteria, he presents the



























































































International Relations in a disarray 141
realist problématique which he must obviously repeat once he 
analyzes the "Classical tradition" (p.9/10). Holsti is, of course, a 
Realist.
This threefold view of IR/IPE is, however, not limited to traditional 
realists. Michael Banks, disciple of John Burton’s "World Society" 
approach, establishes a similar triptych18 (See Table 3).
Table 3. Michael Banks’ three paradigms.
P A R A D IG M S
C R IT E R IA
REALISM PLURALISM ST R U C T U R A L IS M
B a s ic  im a g e "B illia rd -b a ll" " co b w e b " " m u lt i-h e a d e d  o c t o p u s "
A c to r s s ta te s s ta te s  &  o th e rs c la s s e s
D y n a m ic s fo rce c o m p le x  so c ia l 
m o v e m e n ts
e c o n o m ic s
D e p e n d e n t
v a r ia b le s
e x p la in  w h a t  
s ta te s  d o
e x p la in  a ll m a jor  
w o rld  e v e n ts
e x p la in  in e q u a lity  a n d  
p ov erty
S c o p e  o f  th e  
s tu d y  o f  IR
In tersta te
re la tio n s
re la tio n s  b e tw e e n  all 
a c t o r s  &  m a rk e t  &  
n a t io n a lism
IR = s u r fa c e  p h e n o m e ­
n a  o f  th e  to ta lity  o f  
s o c ia l  r e la tio n s  a n d  
m o d e s  o f  p r o d u c t io n
He gives different names and includes regime analysis out of the 
"interdependence" tradition within the "Global Society" which he calls 
"pluralism".19
Out of this apparent irreducibility of values, Holsti and Banks 
derive far reaching conclusions about the possible evolution of IR. 
Since values are inherent in human sciences the quest for a paradig 
can only remain elusive. The debate is not between but within schools 
of thought. Holsti spends the non-descriptive part of his book on the 
feeble chances to integrate them into one core-discipline. Interestingly
18 Michael Banks, "The Inter-Paradigm Debate", in International Relations: A 
Handbook o f Current Theory, edited by M.Light & A.J.R.Groom (London: Frances 
Pinter, 1985).
19 Holsti (The Dividing Discipline, p.3) is probably right that Keohane & Nye 
"wanted basically to add the possible influence of non-state actors to more traditional 



























































































142 Interlude: Détente and the Crisis o f Realism
this is nearly always a charge against attempts to synthesise marx­
ism and Realism. Banks, on his side, tries to establish the impression 
that these schools are there for good, in order to avoid a kind of 
"hoover'-effect, where Realism would swallow everything valuable 
stemming from other paradigms.20
Obviously, the Kuhnian concept of paradigm in its sense of Welt­
anschauung becomes very interesting here. Kuhn argues that para­
digms have a logic of their own. One paradigm cannot "judge" the 
other (See herefore chapter 3). The logical outcome of this reasoning 
is that paradigms, so it were, are incommensurable. If this concept 
were right, it would provide an extraordinary "protective belt" for any 
school of thought. If in the beginning it was therefore useful for the 
challengers of Realism to avoid being swept away, over time it be­
came a welcomed barrier against any critique and a good legitimation 
for scientific routine. "Don’t criticise me, we speak different languag­
es.” Unfortunately, I think that scholars in IR had succumbed to this 
marvelous invitation and thereby hopelessly trivialised Kuhn’s impor­
tant insights.21
Take Holsti. He conceptualizes paradigms rightly with a criterion 
for "images of the world". Yet he is sincere enough to admit in a 
footnote that
There are numerous definitions of paradigms, but for our purpose the 
notion of their function is most important. They are basically selecting 
devices which imposes some sort of order and coherence on an infinite 
universe of facts and data which, by themselves, have no meaning...I 
realize that this use of the term paradigm is somewhat narrower than the 
meaning developed by Thomas Kuhn... To him, paradigms are rooted not 
just in rationally analyzable differences, but in trans-rational perceptions, 
or gestalts.22
20 He calls this in "The evolution of international relations", p.18, "Realism-plus- 
grafted-on-components."
21 See also Stephen Krasner, "Toward Understanding in International Relations." 
International Studies Quarterly, 1985, vol.29, pp. 137-144, where Kuhn’s theses are 
used (and not really discussed) against a more statistical oriented IR.



























































































International Relations in a disarray 143
This use of paradigm is interchangeable with the traditional use of 
"theory" in International Relations. If Holsti makes a typology of theo­
ries the number is, however, rather limited.
I do not need, therefore, to show that the paradigms are indeed 
incommensurable. Holsti cannot claim it, since this concept is expli­
citly linked to a holistic theory of meaning inherent in Kuhn’s concept 
of paradigm, which is exactly the one Holsti excludes.
Nevertheless, Holsti’s analysis remains important because he leads 
us to the "real" reason why these three approaches are - and I prefer 
this word - incompatible. First, he presents us "factual reasons", the 
"rationally analyzable differences" for an impossible synthesis bet­
ween Realism and marxism. He thereby returns to his criteria: not 
only are classical writers interested in war/peace/order and Neo- 
marxists in exploitation and inequality, but they also differ concern­
ing the units of analysis and the key actors.
Recent research suggests that this is a distorting presentation, or 
better, a slightly outdated presentation of ideal-types. First, in a 
literature which is considered part of the structuralist/neo-marxist 
"paradigm", the state is reintroduced as an autonomous actor and as 
a unit of analysis.23 As Halliday rightly points out, the fact that a 
common concept is used, does not imply that it is used in the same 
way.24 On the other hand, many of these writers are acknowledged 
"Weberians" - as are many Realists. It seems that a more profound 
difference lies within the "classical tradition" between those who 
disaggregate the state and thereby often using sociological approaches
23 See e.g. Peter Evans, Dependent Development. The Alliance o f Multinational, 
State and local capital in Brazil (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979); Theda 
Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions. A comparative analysis o f France, Russia and 
China (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press); James Caporaso & 
W.L.Hollist, "International Political Economy research: What is it and where do we 
turn for concepts ?" In W.Ladd Hollist & Lamond Tullis, eds., The International 
Political Economy (Boulder: Westview, 1985), pp.27-49.




























































































144 Interlude: Détente and the Crisis o f  Realism
(Aron, e.g.) and "systemic" or "structural" Realists a la Waltz for 
whom the state is a black box.25
With regard to the core interests, Holsti himself admits that
Obviously the traditional paradigm has to be expanded to account for and 
measure the influence of new types of core objectives of states. Many have 
noted recently that traditional power-territorial issues have been supple­
mented by welfare goals.26
Robert Gilpin has been one of those pointing to the relation between 
wealth and power and who Holsti so nicely includes in the "Classical 
paradigm". Gilpin does, however, define this relation between power 
and wealth following some Neo-Marxist writers. His synthesis is, as 
we will later see, sometimes as far from classical Realism (from 
Morgenthau, not from E.H.Carr) as from some Neo-Marxist writers 
(Cardoso, e.g.).
This is no plea for a perfect possible synthesis between these two 
frameworks of analysis. Recent research in IPE does only suggest 
that the points of encounter are more numerous than Realists and 
perhaps some marxists are likely to admit. Yet, Holsti shows in some 
parts of his book, why these frameworks might indeed be incompati­
ble and why he has so much difficulties to include IPE. With regard 
to Gilpin, Holsti states in another footnote that he "serves as an 
important antidote to the field of International Political Economy 
which appears to have no normative core".27 In another place he is 
even more explicit. He introduces values instead of gestalts to claim 
the synthesis of paradigms impossible:
The debates which have been summarised in this volume have a largely 
hidden dimension of value preferences...The real difficulty... is that the 
value premises of the paradigms are often incompatible.28
25 By the way, Holsti usually refers to Hedley Bull or Raymond Aron. Kenneth 
Waltz’ exclusion of foreign policy analysis from IR earns him what is only slightly 
more than a note.
26 Holsti op.cit., p.140




























































































International Relations in a disarray 145
Finally he asks about the desirability "of a synthesis between world 
views which have diametrically opposed normative claims and 
ideals."29These are not exactly the "rationally analyzable differences" 
he started out to show us, but at last this point is more valid.
The cohesion of our triptychs reposes then on a rationalisation of 
the three main political ideologies: conservatism, liberalismfin its 
USAmerican sense) and socialism. This also explains the puzzle, why 
Banks mixed Keohane & Nye with his own World Society Paradigm: 
the people are "liberals" not conservative realists.
In a world where these ideologies are shifting, are reinterpreted 
and reconstructed as today, it might be permitted, however, to 
investigate where the possible normative incompatibility starts to 
inhibit common approaches. Using three different ideologies as a 
point of departure is an important reminder of the possible existence 
of incompatibilities, but it requires to be explored. Contrary to Holsti, 
I find it very desirable to reflect on possible "rapprochements".
The basic problématique becomes then the question to what extent 
different variables are inherently and exclusively linked to one 
ideology and to what extent fruitful cross-fertilization is possible. The 
typology should not be understood as incommensurable paradigms, 
but as competing schools of thought as they happen to influence the 
academic discourse from around 1970 onwards. They represent 
different influences to which international thought has been exposed.
Therefore, it seems preferable to understand the three competing 
schools as an indication of the fragmentation of international studies 
in the specific period of the Seventies and Eighties. In other words, 
incommensurable paradigms are not the last word that guide now 
and ever our understanding, but their perception corresponds to a 
historical stage of the discussion in International Relations. As such 
it exemplifies a typical move of paradigms in a crisis: the discipline 
starts to argue about its foundations, its epistemology. It is the 




























































































146 Interlude: Détente and the Crisis o f Realism
"international" unknown that will characterise the debate from 1970 
onwards.
10.3. Conclusion
The turning point of the post-war history and theory of international 
relations is the climax and dismay of the traditional super-power 
policy that seemed so nicely to describe and encompass international 
diplomacy, détente.
With the decreased importance of nuclear power, with an economic 
sphere that more and more escapes from state control, and finally 
with the impossibility to insulate foreign from domestic policy, 
containment and the whole East-West focus of post-war international 
relations are not obsolete, but reduced to a more modest dimension. It 
corresponds to the acknowledgement that the rule of the international 
system is not entirely done by single state-powers (if it ever was). 
New actors, and indeed, processes (like markets) acquire the status 
of state-independent dynamics within the international system. Both 



















































































































































































































































































The next period will be characterised by the different reaction to 
the crisis of Realism, with
- a resurrection of an even more limited Realism, called Neo-Realism 
(and also incidentally by Reaganite politics) that quickly integrates 
ideas from International Political Economy into Realist theory 
formulation;
- a more and more extended critique within the more structuralist 
inclined writers of International Political Economy and with the more 
theoretically working scholars out of the critical or post-structuralist 
tradition.
Both reactions are part of a theoretical struggle to redefine the 
core and the boundaries of the discipline, of how International 
Relations/International Political Economy could be defined.1
1 Already the juxtaposition of these two concepts veils a debate, if there are two 
different disciplines, respectively the political and economic analysis of international 
relations, or two competing approaches to analyse basically the same. My personal 
contention is the latter. In so far as IPE opts for a wider definition of the core and 






















































































































































































The Neorealist research programme
Introduction
This chapter wants to show how scholars from within the Realist 
paradigm reacted to the crisis. Two main attempts (and three 
theoretical approaches) can be distinguished:
- Neorealism (sometimes called Structural Realism), which has its 
chief advocate in Kenneth Waltz and in regime theory
- Parts of what has come to be called in the 70’s the discipline of 
International Political Economy, namely the so-called Hegemonic Sta­
bility Theory.
The distinction between the three categories consists in the strategy 
applied to save Realism.2
Neorealism is a version of the scientific Realism (Kaplan), based 
on a deductive approach, which, however, does not claim to be able 
to explain international outcomes anymore. It restricts the field of 
analysis to the systemic level and reduces the explanatory range to 
the constraints of possible actions and outcomes. In a sense, it is not 
very much more than a stringent reformulation of traditional Realism 
based on a systemic approach.
2 This must not always be a conscious attempt, but the result of a revision of 



























































































152 Part III. Responses to the Crisis o f Realism
Regime theory and Hegemonic Stability Theory are part of Interna­
tional Political Economy (IPE), i.e. a new field that has been split out 
of International Relations departments. Its main aim is the study of 
the global (unified) economy and its political (fragmented) organiza­
tion. Within IPE, different schools of thought have come up, that are 
often presented as if they were articulated in a comparable manner 
to the Inter-Paradigm Debate-, neo-mercantilism, liberalism, structu­
ralism.3
Since our approach is more historically and sociologically con­
ceived, we will understand the different schools of thought in IPE 
more as a reaction to the impulses given by the theoretical debate 
and its historical/sociological environment. Therefore, the global net 
described at the end of the last lecture is our starting point. The sub­
schools in IR/IPE that try to save Realism by expanding it, can be ap­
prehended as specific puzzles of this global net. In this respect, regime 
theory which is an attempt to integrate idealist and realist thought 
in an overall approach where bureaucratic politics and transnational 
actors are taken into account.4 Hegemonic Stability Theory, on the 
other hand, tries to specify particular incidents of the distribution of 
power on the way the international economic system functions.
In the first case the expansion concerns the widening of the expla­
natory variables to be taken into account (with the price of reducing 
the range of explanation to specific subfields of international 
relations, namely regimes). In the second, a systemic analysis a la 
Waltz is retained, but enlarged to integrate the international 
economic system.
3 See in particular Robert Gilpin’s chapter on the "Three ideologies" in The 
Political Economy o f International Relations (Princeton University Press, 1987).
4 Actually, regime theory is so large an approach as to tackle both traditional IR 
as IPE topics. It can therefore be subsumed either under Neo-Realism or under a 
more liberal IPE school. For Susan Strange, regime and HST just represent not 



























































































The Neorealist research programme 153
11.1. Neorealism: Waltz
1. The scientist third image
Kenneth Waltz defined the defence-line of the old paradigm.5 Over­
whelmed by the growing literature on different international and 
transnational actors and on the differentiation of the "black box" 
which the domestic policy of states for a long time remained, and 
through the introduction of a behavioural foreign-policy analysis into 
the international studies, Waltz reacts by redefining what the subject- 
matter of International "Politics" ought to be: the systemic approach 
to international relations, as opposed to the historicist variant of Rea­
lism and to the approaches based on state-behaviour (this is now "for­
eign-policy analysis) or on anthropological foundations.
"Structural" (or better systemic) Realism looks for objective laws 
based on the security dilemma and the Balance of Power. Since this 
looks very much like a kind of "systemic Morgenthau", the "systemic” 
part must account for the improvement of the, as we have seen, 
seriously insufficient Morgenthau.
Waltz resolves the Realists’ puzzles (which Aron, Bull, Kissinger 
had try to resolve by refinement), by relegating all the difficulties 
with transnational actors, domestic policies and foreign-policy deci­
sion-making to another discipline (political science), hence reducing 
the possible claims of a discipline of International Relations from the 
analysis and prediction of systemic order and state behaviour towards 
the frame of constraints, that the system (the structure) imposes on 
any actor (especially states) in World politics.
Waltz’ structure is defined by three parameters:
1. "according to the principle by which a system is ordered. 
Systems are transformed if one ordering principle replaces another. 
To move from an anarchic to a hierarchic realm is to move from one 
system to another."
2. "by the specification of functions of differentiated units. Hierar­
chic systems change if functions are differently defined and allotted.



























































































154 Part III. Responses to the Crisis o f Realism
For anarchic systems, the criterium of systems change derived from 
the second part of the definition drops out since the system is com­
posed of like-units."
3. "by the distribution of capabilities across units. Changes in this 
distribution are changes of the system whether the system be an 
anarchic or a hierarchic one."6
Since the anarchical character of principle one is historically 
enduring, and since parameter two is circularly defined with regard 
to anarchy (if the system is anarchical, there is no functional diffe­
rentiation), the "distribution of capabilities across units" remains the 
only central defining parameter for the actual international system.7 
Thus, in the reformulation of Realism into "Structural Realism", the 
concept of power recovers the central position it had in Morgenthau’s 
writings, the Balance o f Power becoming the most important determi­
nant o f structural change.
How is it possible, that power recovers that central place for a 
rational choice approach, Aron and other Realist writers had so fer­
vently argued against? The answer is astonishingly easy: By two 
moves. First, by sticking to a purely dispositional concept o f power, in 
the sense of a possession of a power wielder ("capabilities"), which 
exist logically prior to their "Balancing". Second, Kenneth Waltz is 
explicit in assuming the fungibility o f power which Aron and Baldwin 
recognised necessary to elaborate a theory comparable to micro­
economics.
A system theory requires one to define structures partly by the distribution 
of capabilities across units. States, because they are in a self-help system, 
have to use their combined capabilities in order to serve their interests.
The economic, military, and other capabilities of nations cannot be sectored 
and separately weighed,8
Attacked on that ground, he is explicit:
6 Kenneth Waltz (1979/86) in Keohane, ed.: "Neorealism and its critics" , p.96.
7 Kenneth Waltz remains extremely constant in this matter. Already in 1967, he 
refers to structures as the "pattern according to which power is distributed" 
("International Structure, National Force...”, p.312, fn.18).



























































































The Neorealist research programme 155
Obviously, power is not as fungible as money. Not much is. But power is 
much more fungible than Keohane allows. As ever, the distinction between 
strong and weak states is important. The stronger the state, the greater 
the variety of its capabilities. Power may be only slightly fungible for weak 
states, but it is highly so for strong ones.9
The first statement is necessary for the second. Only if one has a vi­
sion of "overall-power", it is possible to define the amount of power 
not only through quantities, but also by the variety of power sources 
(capabilities).
Yet, the argument is self-contradictory. I f  power is so highly 
fungible, that it can be assumed to be used in different scopes, then 
one does not need the uariefy-definition: Economic capabilities can be 
used for producing political, ethical etc. outcomes. If one assumes a 
great variety of capabilities, one implicitly assumes that the strong 
state is strong not because it has various sources of influence, but 
because it possesses many capabilities in various scopes. Even though 
Waltz needs the high fungibility o f capabilities to derive his systemic 
theory, his argumentation is based on high capabilities in different 
scopes.
To conclude on Waltz’ Neorealism. It is an attempt of a utilitarian 
"purified" Morgenthau that restates the central place of the concept 
of power. Thus, our first champion in the struggle for the boundaries 
o f the discipline pleads for a very "reduced" subject-matter, based on 
a central concept with flaws already known.
9 Kenneth Waltz, "A response to my critics." in Robert O. Keohane, ed., 
Neorealism and its critics, p.333, as a rebuttal of Robert O. Keohane’s (1983), 
"Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond", ibid., p.184. Keohane 
draws on an older debate, especially by Aron in his critique of the National Interest 
and the rational choice approach to IR (chapter 5) and explicitly by David A. Baldwin 
(1979), "Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old Tendencies." In 
his Paradoxes o f  Power (New York, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), pp.129-168. 
Keohane and Nye’s distinction between an overall structural model from a issue area 




























































































156 Part III. Responses to the Crisis o f Realism
11.2. Regime theory
Keohane & Nye’s Power and Interdependence, published in 197710, 
but conceived since 1971, would have become the textbook on inter­
national relations, had not the "Second Cold War" made Waltz’ 
International Politics somewhat grimmer outlook apparently more 
convincing. Yet, Keohane & Nye lay the grounds of what today is 
perhaps the booming field in (USAmerican) international relations, 
regime theory.
Their original purpose was to establish a new World Politics Para­
digm, overcome the leading paradigm that was considered too state­
centric.11 If Waltz chooses to restrict International Relations to 
International Politics, Keohane and Nye choose the other direction: 
confronted with what has been described the global net (see preceding 
lecture), they try to synthesise
traditional international politics, the bureaucratic politics approach and 
transnational actors.12
They do that by introducing three basic dichotomies:
- power and interdependence,
- realism and complex interdependence,
- the structural and the International Organization Model.
1. The nature o f the international system: Realism and Complex 
Interdependence
The first couple is located at the level of understanding the nature of 
the international system: Realism and Complex Interdependence.
Realism is characterised by three assumptions: states are the most 
important (and unified, or coherent) actors; force is a legitimate and 
usable means of foreign policy; and there is a hierarchy among issues
10 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence. World 
Politics in Transition (Boston et al.: Little Brown, 1977).
11 See their edited Transnational Relations and World Polities (Cambridge 




























































































The Neorealist research programme 157
("high"-politics vs. "low"-politics). Keohane & Nye do acknowledge this 
being an ideal-type. They confront with another ideal-type of the 
nature of the international system: complex interdependence. This 
type is characterised by the very opposite to Realist conditions:
1. There exist multiple channels connecting societies: interstate 
relations, transgovernmental, and transnational relations (we find 
here the three approaches they already wanted to synthesise in 1972: 
Realism, bureaucratic politics and transnationalism).
2. Military force acquires a minor role. In conditions of Complex 
Interdependence, the usability of force varies between the issue-areas.
3. There is no hierarchy among issues.
Under these conditions International Relations display distinct fea­
tures. Linkage strategies between the different issue-areas which try 
to exploit concessions in other issues (e.g. in "high" politics) become 
possible. The lack of clear hierarchy among multiple issues "leads us 
to expect that the politics of agenda formulation and control will 
become more important."13 Finally, transnational and transgovern­
mental relations will further blur the distinction between domestic 
and international politics, in which International Organizations play 
a role distinct from the balance of power which underlay them.
2. Explaining change: Structural model us. International Organization
Model (IOM)
Keohane & Nye develop out of this different characterization of the 
international realm their third dichotomy which is located at the level 
of explaining change: structural versus International Organization 
Model.
They develop four models to explain change: an "economic process 
explanation" (based on some kind of technological determinism), an 
"overall structural explanation" (Realism a la Waltz), an "issue struc­
ture explanation" (Realism a la Bull, Kissinger, Aron) and finally the 
International Organization Model.



























































































158 Part III. Responses to the Crisis o f  Realism
Since the economic process explanation is considered as being 
always insufficient, the remaining models are restated in two cate­
gories: the Structural Model (Realism) and the International Organi­
zation Model (IOM). Whereas the first explains through shifts in the 
(overall or issue-specific) balance of power, the latter also tries to 
explain linkages from below, as well as transgovernmental and trans­
national relations. The IOM assumes:
that a set of networks, norms, and institutions, once established will be 
difficult either to eradicate or dramatically to rearrange."14 *
Since their definition of a regime is:
networks of rules, norms, and procedures that regularize behaviour and 
control its effects or also
governing arrangements that affect relationships of interdependence.16
we can assume that the IOM applies in a "regime-situation”.
The structural model, on the other hand, is supposed to reign, at 
least, in "non-regime situations”:
where there are no agreed norms and procedures or when the exceptions 
to the rules are more important than the instances of adherence."16
The argument pursued here is that Keohane & Nye are supplement­
ing and not replacing Realism - as the discussion of power has al­
ready shown. To make them the leading figures of a new paradigm 
is conceptually and theoretically unsustainable.
The first to reject this new paradigm, are Keohane & Nye them­
selves (in 1977!) in their repeated caution about the use of the IOM. 
It might be allowed to compare the Realism-Complex Interdependence 
distinction with Aron’s and Kissinger’s distinction between homoge­
neous (legitimate) and heterogeneous (revolutionary) international 
system.































































































The Neorealist research programme 159
1. a greater stability, the governments do not ignore the interests 
that unite them in spite of some national interests which might op­
pose them.
2. a moderation o f violence: the complete victory over, or the 
humiliation of another nation could enhance a revolutionary spirit to 
overcome the international code of conduct on which the homogeneous 
is build: "La crainte de la révolution incite les chefs de guerre soit à 
se résigner à la défaite soit à limiter leurs prétentions."
3. a greater predictability
4. a distinction between political adversary and national enemy: 
interstate hostility does not exclude reconciliation and later treaties. 
As Kissinger notes, only in legitimate systems, can diplomacy fulfil 
its traditional role. Only where a "regime" exists, can negotiation 
overcome simple power politics.
In a homogenous system, the international code of conduct disci­
plines the actors till the moment, where the disruption of the system 
would cause them less harm then the prolongation of the regime 
(order). This system comes to an end if one of the actors feels 
oppressed, and/or translates different domestic value systems to the 
international level and/or develops so much power that she wants to 
change the regime.
After this short recall of Classical Realist writing, I think it 
possible to argue that the relation between homogeneous and hetero­
geneous systems corresponds to the one between "Realism" and "Com­
plex Interdependence" (Cl) and that the traditional writers seem even 
richer in their description. On the other hand, "Complex Interdepen­
dence" tries to adapt and elaborate the "homogeneous” system to 
present "interdependent" World Politics, by integrating transnational 
and transgovernmental relations to a much greater extent, yet 
without leaving the logical priority of Realism over Cl. Their 
establishment of issue-structures within which conventional Realist 
might apply, stresses the lack of fungibility across issue-structures, 
rather than within it. This is an attempt to rescue the central 
explanatory value of the concept of power - by limiting (and defining 



























































































160 Part III. Responses to the Crisis o f Realism
The relation between Realism and Cl is dominantly Realist. Cl 
applies only where the actors stick to the rules and do not try to 
change the regime. Incremental regime change characterised by 
moderation, the non-usability of military forces in all issues and the 
developing of a agenda-setting- and linkage-diplomacy requires con­
sensus on the usefulness of a predictable, stable international order 
(which might be morally repulsive) as at least a second best solution. 
Regimes are at the mercy of its most uncompromising actors.16
If we consider, that foreign policy making often entails a worst 
case thinking (especially if the amount or the quality of information 
is low), then foreign policy makers will generally stick to the "Realist" 
prescription, and only exceptionally to the Cl one.18 9
As much as Raymond Aron acknowledged that the Concert of 
Europe was a "compromis entre l’état de nature et le règne de la 
loi"20, Keohane and Nye consider their approach not a rebuttal of 
Realism, but a supplement to it, which brings the traditional liberal 
(idealist) concern with normed behaviour into the analysis:
We regard the two as necessary complements to one another. This 
approach was analytically justified, in our view, because realism and 
liberalism both have their roots in a utilitarian view of the world... Broadly 
speaking, both realism and liberalism are consistent with the assumption 
that most state behaviour can be interpreted as rational, or at least 
intelligent activity. Realism and liberalism are therefore not two incom-
18 Since this seems to have been largely overlooked (more by non-Realists, 
probably), take especially p. 24 and 57/58, where they explicitly warn against a 
general application of the Complex Interdependence approach. They argue that 
Realism is not always able to analyse accurately international affairs. But neither 
is Complex interdependence. Everything depends on the conditions of the specific 
case under scrutiny.
19 When Robert Keohane applies this twofold approach to what has come to be 
called "Hegemonic Stability Theory", he comes to the result that in some issue-areas 
Realist explanations prevail, and in others Complex Interdependence explanations. 
Realists might attack this particular argument, but generally they agree that power 
politics does not always apply. Yet, Keohane can prove the dominance of the Cl 
model only a posteriori in a historical analysis. See Robert O. Keohane, "The Theory 
of Hegemonic Stability and changes in international economic regimes, 1967-1977", 
in George/Holsti/Siverson, eds., Change in the International System (Boulder, 1980), 
pp. 131-162.



























































































The Neorealist research programme 161
mensurable paradigms with different conceptions o f  the nature o f political 
action?'
3. Regime analysis today
Stephen Krasner has given and elaborated the reference-definition of 
international regimes today
International regimes are defined as principles, norms, rules, and decision­
making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given 
• 22 issue-area.
He describes the "modified Realist" view as a realist view of "tectonic 
plates", where the plate of power and the plate of regime acquire both 
an explanatory status, much like realism and complex interdepen­
dence.
Now within this framework, regimes are still ultimately a function 
o f the distribution o f power between states. In this respect, Krasner 
follows Oppenheim’s and Bull’s line of a positive international law: 
contract/agreement or consensus is the origin of law, thus the balance 
of (military, intellectual, etc.) power of the contracting parties is 
central to its elaboration.21 3 This is the central tenet that distin­
guishes these writers from a real Grotian position. Yet, as in positive 
law, common law introduces a (conservative) element: there is a time- 
lag of adjustment which establishes a certain autonomy of the realm 
of law and an interactive process between (power) base and law. 
Krasner notes that there need not always be congruity between power 
distribution, regimes and related behaviour or outcomes, especially 
because power distributions change much quicker than regimes once 
set up.
This line of argument suggests the importance of periodization and uneven 
rates of change. Causal relationships may vary across periods of regime 
creation, persistence and dissipation...In general the basic principles and 
norms of regimes are very durable and, once a regime is created, ad-
21 Keohane & Nye (1987): "Power and Interdependence Revisited”, p.728/29, 
emphasis added
22 Stephen D. Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes 
as intervening variables." International Organization, vol.36, 1982, p.185.



























































































162 Part III. Responses to the Crisis o f Realism
justment is likely to involve altering rules and decision-making procedures.
But power distributions are more dynamic - they are constantly changing. 
Thus, regimes and power distributions are not likely to change at the same 
rate.24
Therefore, lags and feedbacks between power base and regime (the two 
tectonic plates) are the basic puzzles of this research programme; are 
regimes only intervening or even autonomous variables?
Regime analysis is today’s most fashionable approach in USAmer- 
ican IR and IPE. Yet, ultimately, it boils down to a framework of 
analysis where transnational relations and actors, bureaucratic 
politics and the distribution of power are all taken into account 
without giving to any of these variables a primary explanatory power. 
In this sense, it restates and but does not really resolve the puzzles 
of the global net.
24 Stephen D. Krasner, "Regimes and the limits of Realism: Regimes as 




























































































IPE as an attempt to update Realism: 
Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST)
12.1. Assumptions, theses and schools of HST
1. The definition
The standard definition has been given by Robert 0. Keohane
Hegemonic structures of power, dominated by a single country, are most 
conducive to the development of strong international regimes whose rules 
are relatively precise and well obeyed... The decline of hegemonic 
structures of power can be expected to presage a decline in the strength of 
corresponding international economic regimes.25
This definition underscores, however, what can be considered the 
originality of the approach, namely the concept o f public good and its 
provision by the hegemon.
Therefore, we follow Duncan Snidal
Keohane argues that this is not a central proposition in the theory - 
however to deny it is to deprive the theory of its originality and to ignore 
its logical basis. What is novel in the theory is not the claim that strong 
actors can impose regimes in international politics (which goes back at 
least as far as Thucydides) but the use of the collective action formulation 
and the implication that hegemony is more widely beneficial. Moreover,
25 Robert O. Keohane, "The Theory of Hegemonic Stability and changes in 
international economic regimes, 1967-1977." In Holsti, Siverson & George, eds., 



























































































164 Part III. Responses to the Crisis o f  Realism
once the public goods formulation is invoked to explain the emergence of 
regimes under hegemony, the distributional argument follows as a logical 
conclusion. Indeed, the proposition ... seems central to Keohane’s After 
Hegemony, which poses as a fundamental question how the benefits of 
hegemonic cooperation (which are generalized beyond the hegemonic actor) 
can be maintained after the decline of hegemony.26
The starting point of the analysis are the possible solutions to the 
problem of suboptimal provisions o f specific (public) goods in the inter­
national realm due to anarchy. The basic thesis is that one needs 
hegemony. But even the collective good argument is not exactly very 
new. Take this quote, published first in 1946:
We have seen that the international anarchy is restrained and to some 
extent systematized in practice by two opposing kinds of common interest, 
pulling alternatively to and fro. The first is the common interest of all 
powers in their freedom, of which they are faintly conscious in peace, and 
assert at the eleventh hour in war by an armed coalition against a common 
danger. The second is the kind of common interest represented by 
successive dominant powers. For their predominance has generally 
safeguarded real values, and offered real benefits for other nations, and 
sometimes they have wielded an international ideology as their most 
potent weapon - as the Habsburg powers were the protagonists of the 
Counter-Reformation, as Napoleonic France was the carrier of the French 
Revolution throughout feudal Europe,as Britain in the 19th century was the 
champion of liberalism.27
2. Three theses
1. The emergence of a hegemon is necessary for the provision of an 
international public good. (Hegemony thesis)
2. The necessary existence of free riders (and thus the unequal dis­
tribution of costs for the provision) and/or a loss of legitimacy will 
undermine the relative power position of the hegemon. (Entropy thesis)28
3. A declining hegemonic power presages a declining provision of 
the international public good. (Decline thesis)
26 Duncan Snidai, "The limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory", in International 
Organization, 1985, vol.39, n.4, p.581.
27 Martin Wight, Power Politics, edited by Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books), p.289, italics added.
28 The concept of entropy is extensively used by Kindleberger in "Systems of 
International Economic Organization." In David Calleo, ed., Money and the coming 
World Order (New York: New York University Press for the Lehrmann Institute, 



























































































Hegemonic Stability Theory 165
3. Three schools
The different approaches within HST can be distinguished after the 
particular public good they choose.
1. International liberal economy.29 This is Kindleberger’s original 
approach. Analysing the inter-war economic crisis, he sees the rea­
sons of depression in the lacking leadership in the international 
economic order. Gilpin who follows now more this line of thought, 
disentangles the following functions that a hegemon has to provide 
for an international economic order to work.29 30 31
1. stabilization of monetary and trading relations through
- rediscount mechanism for providing liquidity when international 
crisis
- lender of last resort
- management of international monetary system (here one could
subsume the two further functions added by Kindleberger to his 
initial list, namely the maintenance of a structure of exchange 
rates and the coordination of macroeconomic policies)
- openness of markets for distressed goods
- a steady, if not countercyclical flow of capital
2. redistribution of income through foreign aid
3. regulation of abuses (sanctions)
2. International order / security.31 This is exactly to which Snidal 
alluded before: it is the restatement of the traditional realist 
assumption that power differentials are conducive to more stability, 
than the equality of power. If one recalls, this argument has been 
used by Bull for describing the international realm as different from 
a Hobbesian state of nature and to derive its anarchical society. It is
29 See for this especially the english edition of Charles P. Kindleberger’s The 
World in Depression, 1929 1939 (Berkeley: University of California Press: 1973/1986. 
First published in German), and his "Dominance and Leadership in the International 
Economy", in International Studies Quarterly, 1981, vol.25, pp.242-254.
30 See his The Political Economy o f International Relations, op.cit., p.368.
31 See esp. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics. (New York: 



























































































166 Part III. Responses to the Crisis o f Realism
most concisely put by Waltz: "Extreme equality is associated with 
extreme instability."32
This approach also applies to the security version of hegemonic 
stability theory that Webb and Krasner claim for their own and 
Gilpin’s approach. Even though they accept the collective good argu­
ment, they put greater weight on the implication of international 
economic interactions for state power and national security. They 
distinguish themselves from Kindleberger and Keohane, by pointing 
to the fact that no generally beneficial effect is to be expected from the 
hegemon’s provision of the public good. In other words, it denies the 
existence of a common interest in international economic liberalization 
and stability.33
But then, indeed, this version is nothing new compared to tradi­
tional Realism. And Snidal’s critique is nicely echoed by Gilpin
the nature of international relations has not changed over the millen­
nia...One must suspect that if somehow Thukydides were placed in our 
midst, he would ... have little trouble in understanding the power struggle 
in our age.34
3. International regimes.35 Keohane refuses to be put into this school 
of thought. This is to a certain extent right. He does not subscribe to 
thesis 3: he argues that a declining hegemonic power puts strains on 
the provision of an international public good, but that cooperation is 
able to upset the decline.
In Krasner’s and Keohane’s framework, regimes are in the last re­
sort still a function of the distribution of power and relation between 
states. Thus, both opt for regimes as intervening variables.36
32 Kenneth Waltz, "International Structure, National Force and the Balance of 
World Power", reprinted in International Politics and Foreign Policy: A Reader in 
Research and Theory, edited by James Rosenau (New York, Free Press: 1967/1969), 
p.312.
33 For this argument, see Michael Webb and Stephen Krasner, "Hegemonic 
Stability Theory. An empirical assessment", in Review o f International Studies, 1989, 
vol.15, n.2.
34 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics. (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1981), p.184.
36 See in particular Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony (Princeton UP: 1984).



























































































Hegemonic Stability Theory 167
Applied to HST, Keohane therefore argues that for
the creation of international regime, hegemony often plays an important 
role, even a crucial one (49)
but that
[t]he importance of transaction costs and uncertainty means that regimes 
are easier to maintain than they are to create. (100)
His work is trying out under what conditions, Realist (what he sub­
sumes under a crude version of HST) and Liberal/Institutionalist ac­
counts on cooperation are more convincing and pleads theoretically 
for a synthesis of realism and liberalism and politically for the pos­
sibility of multilateral regime management.37
12.2. Theoretical Critique
The theoretical critique will proceed in accordance to the above 
characterisation of Hegemonic Stability Theory, i.e. first the central 
concept of a public good and the different possible and necessary 
qualifications to the three theses.
1. The concept of public good
In economic theory of collective action, a public good is defined by two 
characteristics: jointness and non-exclusion.
37 In his "Hierarchy versus inertial cooperation", International Organization, 
vol.40, no.4, 1986, pp. 141-147, Kindleberger points, in a highly pretentious review 
of Keohane’s After Hegemony, to this conditionals - as a critique of Keohane. He fails 
to recognise that Keohane is making a different argument: whereas Kindleberger 
makes a policy-related argument that in the face of a declining hegemon, nobody will 
be likely to fulfil his functions and that therefore our world is doomed to instability 
for an excess ofpowerlessness, Keohane wants to argue that cooperation (and not the 
provision of an international liberal order) is possible without a hegemon. His 
approach clearly acknowledges that he cannot make predictions (which is what 
Kindleberger is asking him for), but only post hoc arguments. That Keohane 



























































































168 Part III. Responses to the Crisis o f Realism
By jointness is meant that different actors consume simultaneously 
the same unit as a good. As long as the provision of the international 
public good is seen in the antinomy of anarchy and order, then, 
indeed, order is a good that can be jointly consumed.
Yet, when questions of the type of order, i.e. distributional ques­
tions, are concerned, then it is less sure that the good is actually the 
same.
Not all situations of joint benefit involve jointness and not all instances of
cooperation involve the provision of public goods.38
Non-exclusion is defined by the inability o f states to prevent non­
contributors from benefiting from the public good (so-called free ri­
ders). Now obviously, complete exclusion is not possible. Very often 
discriminations can be made and/or sometimes contributions can be 
enforced. The free-rider problem is real, but a relative one. For the 
stability of the system, it is just necessary that the relative power 
advantage of the hegemon be not undermined, i.e. that the relative 
gains of free riders are inferior to those of the hegemon. Free-riding 
does not necessarily mean decline.
Finally, I would like to stress the ideological overtones of the 
concept of public goods. Kindleberger is explicit in his ideologically 
informed use of the argument. He therefore refrains from using the 
word hegemon, because this would imply imposed rule, and prefers "to 
think of leadership and responsibility."39 40He is explicit that this 
approach and the implied argument about free riders puts first the 
responsibility for the non-provision of the public good away from the 
leader, and/or can argue for a more equal repartition of the burden 
and its provision, the never ending argument about burden-shar-
38 Duncan Snidal, "The limits of...", op.cit., p.591.
39 Charles P. Kindleberger, International Public Goods without International 
Government. The American Economic Review, vol.76, no.l, March 1986, p.10.
40 See also Susan Strange who explicitly links the emergence of the regime 
literature to the USAmerican debate of burden-sharing in her "Cave! Hie Dragones: 



























































































Hegemonic Stability Theory 169
The question is how to distinguish domination and exploitation from 
responsibility in the provision of cosmopolitan goods in the world economy, 
and whether there are not occasions when the world suffers from the 
underproduction of the public good of stability, not because of greedy 
vested interests and domination or exploitation but because of the principle 
of the free rider (...) it is of some interest that on two occasions - in 1931 
and again in 1971 - it was the small countries, more or less simultaneously 
and in pursuit of their private interests, that pushed Britain first, and 
then the United States, off the gold standard.41
This claim of a universal interest provided with an international or­
der that is beneficial to all (even in different degrees), is exactly the 
point on which Gilpin and Krasner stay apart. They are, as good Rea­
lists, too much reminded about the classical harmony o f  interests 
argument that was so forcefully attacked by E.H.Carr. Since ideas, for 
a Realist, derive from politics and power and not vice versa, the claim 
to a harmony of interests is nothing more than the result of a specific 
configuration of power and the successful implementation of a parti­
cular interest so as to let it appear a universal one.42
This rounds up with a strong critique from Dependency scholars 
or the first school of HST (Gilpin, Krasner). Hegemony is there consi­
dered as dominance, in order to extract revenue, or value surplus. 
This implies that a public good is always and foremost a private one 
of the hegemon and that free riders and the decline of power just 
means a lower benefit to the hegemon and therefore the end of the re­
gime. Being less able to impose the extraction of benefits, the hege­
mon will come to a point were it becomes to his disadvantage to pro­
vide the so-called public good. To make the free rider responsible is 
to blur the causalities.
The implication of the argument is to fault the weaker free-riders 
that the hegemon is not able or legitimately not interested any more 
in providing the common or public good. But this means actually only 
that in an even less regulated environment, the weaker have even
41 Charles P. Kindleberger, "Dominance and Leadership in the International 
Economy. Exploitation, Public Goods, and Free Rides." International Studies 
Quarterly, vol.25, no.2, June 1981, pp.247,249.




























































































170 Part 111. Responses to the Crisis o f Realism
less possibilities to benefit form the international anarchy. Because 
actually the international regimes did adapt; it did provide the stabi­
lity necessary for the stronger to still ripe the benefits. It is not a 
question of the U.S. (government? firms ?) paying for its communal 
burden, but a shift in the way privileges are tried to be kept.
2. Theoretical critique o f the three theses
Different qualifications have been added to the hegemony thesis.
First, it is admitted that the existence of a hegemon is no sufficient 
condition for the provision of the public good. With regard of it being 
a necessary condition, different ideas appear and the core of the initial 
debate can be located. Strictly speaking, the theory of collective goods 
does not rule out the provision of a public good by more than one lea­
der. Keohane’s thesis that an international public good (as e.g. a 
regime) can be managed through cooperation is theoretically possible. 
Yet, the initial Realist argument consisted in claiming that the provi­
sion through one leader is the most likely to occur. Kindleberger, e.g., 
makes an extensive analysis of the different possibilities for the provi­
sion of the public good and discards all of them except what he calls 
leadership. Altruism is excluded, because it will be generally over­
ruled by self-interest. Enlightened self-interest does not guarantee 
that an aggregation of enlightened self-interested actors will neces­
sarily be of a beneficial outcome (also the free-rider problem). The 
management by rule is equated with the management of institutions 
and therefore structurally dependent on governments and their inte­
rests. Finally, regional blocs are excluded because they cannot func­
tion in an integrated economy. Only leadership or benevolent despo­
tism is a likely solution.43
Keohane’s answer consists in pointing out that this is not necessa­
rily so. And the dialogue of the deaf continues between a pragmatic 
(Kindleberger) and a theoretical (Keohane) statement. (See also dis­
cussion of Keohane, HST and Realism)




























































































Hegemonic Stability Theory 171
Second, there has been an argument that power must be linked to 
issue areas, i.e. that the falling provision of a specific public good 
should be explainable by the falling power within a specific issue area. 
This, Keohane’s argument, is already developed in his and Nye’s 
Power and Interdependence,44
Third, there is the argument that possible regional hegemons could 
arise. Gilpin’s argument of a tri-partition of the world into a USAmer- 
ican hegemony, a Western European and a Japanese hegemony, as 
well as Krasner’s argument of different systems of collective self- 
reliance actually plead for a régionalisation of politics, big enough to 
allow the level of interdependence to subsist, but protected enough to 
fetter the negative impacts of it.45 46
The entropy thesis has already been criticised with regard to the 
principle of relative gain in free-riding. Only if the benefits of free-ri­
ders that are converted into power entail a relative and significant 
power decline of the hegemon, can one apeak of entropy. Barry Buzan 
has synthesised some of the main reason for entropy.**
1. the character of the hegemonic state and mainly internal reasons 
of loosing power:47 e.g. home-made inflationary policies.
2. the impact of the hegemonic role on the hegemonic state:
long-term economic self-weakening through the export of inflation, and the 
outflow o f capital and technology; the growth of structural rigidities in the 
economy as a result of sociopolitical demands arising from the sustained
44 (Boston: Little Brown, 1977). See for the underlying fungibility issue, chapter 
11.1., fa. 9.
45 See Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy o f International Relations, chapter 
10 for a plea for a regional mercantilism; and Stephen D. Krasner, Structural 
Conflict. The Third World Against Global Liberalism (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1985), e.g. pp. 13,30 for the de-linking of North and South in 
collective self-reliance.
46 See Barry Buzan, "Economic structure and international security: the limits 
of the liberal case." International Organization, vol.38, no.4, p.621/22. For a general 
discussion, see Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, chapters 4 and 5.




























































































172 Part III. Responses to the Crisis o f Realism
experience of power and success; and the disproportionate costs, particular­
ly military, that burden the hegemon’s economy in relations to its rivals.48
3. the problem of system management, because of mounting resis­
tance in the weaker states (for alleged or real abuse) and/or 
dissemination of industrial centers through the export of capital 
and technology from the hegemon.
4. the production of surplus capacity, and the necessary strengthening 
of domestic mercantilist pressures
With regard to the decline thesis, one can see a direct link of 
American foreign power projection and the emergence of the theory. 
HST was formulated after the economic Vietnam-Syndrome: the end 
of Bretton-Woods. Deriving the theory from a destroyed regime that 
provided the international monetary stability considered necessary to 
the international economic system, the authors implied from the decli­
ning provision o f the public good a declining power o f the hegemon. 
Yet, this reversal o f thesis 3 is fallacious,49 The declining provision 
is the deliberate choice of the hegemon.
For the U.S., increased discord was a precondition for cooperation on 
American terms.50
The U.S. have come under increased criticism for their way of hand­
ling International Relations.
Thus the deeper question is whether there really has been a decrease in 
order as opposed to a decrease in American control over order.
Here is the strongest theoretical critique which refers to the way to 
assess a declining American power. If one takes just the trade figures 
(and gold reserves), then, indeed, the U.S have a less dominant 
position today than 40 years ago.
48 Barry Buzan, "Economic structure and international security...", p.621.
49 See esp. Susan Strange, "The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony", in 
International Organization, 1987, vol.41, n.4. But also Robert O. Keohane, After 
Hegemony, p.196, for a methodological distinction between the appraisal of a regime 
in decline and the causal link to a declining hegemonic power.



























































































Hegemonic Stability Theory 173
Susan Strange argues, however, that one should integrate into the 
analysis:
- a common appraisal of the four structures from which power in the 
international system derives (security, financial, production, knowl­
edge), then the U.S. might overall not have lost its hegemonic posi­
tion.51
- a distinction between relational and structural power, i.e. the dis­
tinction between those powers that can, also through non-intentional 
action, influence international politics and that require the adaptation 
of other powers and those who have just bargaining power. Structural 
power refers to those who can control the settings within which power 
relations take place.52
12.3. HST as an alleged critique of Realism
Leaving aside the order- or security-version of HST that is anyway 
only a replay of traditional Realism, Kindleberger’s and Keohane’s 
version should be analysed to what extent they belong to or actually 
depart from Realist thought.
Kindleberger’s version seems the strong Realist in case - also be­
cause Keohane wants to criticise it as such. He derives outcomes from 
the distribution o f power, and is thereby rather skeptical about the 
consensual working of the international system: it remains after all 
anarchical, because even though there are different states with diffe­
rent capabilities, there is no overarching (and sanctioning) govern­
ment (see title of article: "international public goods without interna­
tional government"). His argument remains basically state-based. Not 
that other actors (as MNCs e.g.) could not be taken into account. 
Sometimes, they are. But the overall argument runs about national 
(American) power and derives its explanatory value from it. The state­
51 See also Bruce Russett’s conclusion in his 'The mysterious case of vanishing 
hegemony: or is Mark Twain really dead?", in International Organization, 1985, 
vol.39, n.2.



























































































174 Part III. Responses to the Crisis o f  Realism
centering is also necessary to make historical comparisons. The argu­
ment is largely zero-sum. What the hegemon looses, the others gain. 
Since one needs hegemons to provide public goods, all the non-hege- 
mons are potentially mean free-riders, all the others potentially gain. 
Yet, there is a strange idealist element creeping into his discussion
I am a realist when it comes to regimes. It seems to me that the momen­
tum set in motion by a hegemonic power...runs down pretty quickly unless 
it is sustained by powerful commitment...There needs to be positive 
leadership, backed by resources and a readiness to make some sacrifice in 
the international interest.53
It is curious to claim a Realist lineage, if the argument is based on 
sacrifices done in the "cosmopolitan interest" (See above mentioned 
ideological critique). It makes only sense if these sacrifices have a 
bigger pay-off for the hegemon, now or later. The cost-benefit analysis 
m ust be positive - following the rational actor assumption of Realism.
In this respect, Keohane seems at first hand more promising. He 
starts from the rational actor assumption of Realism and tries to 
show that from within Realism, one can account for cooperation and 
institutional rule, i.e. for regimes.
His basic research programme is to look for
the effects of changes in hegemony on cooperation among the advanced 
industrialized countries (41)
Like Kindieberger, he starts for the idea of market failures, or more 
generally the suboptimal provision of specific goods in the interna­
tional realm due to anarchy. The Kindieberger - Keohane debate re­
presents one of those dialogues of the deaf to the extent that Kindie­
berger talks about the public good of an international liberal economic 
order which asks for the provision of public goods to work, whereas 
Keohane sees cooperation as such already as an indicator for the 
provision of public goods, because it allows a more optimal manage­
ment of international relations. Yet, cooperation is a much weaker 
indicator than Kindleberger’s



























































































Hegemonic Stability Theory 175
...not all instances of cooperation involve the provision of public goods.54
Keohane is therefore right in arguing that
logically, hegemony should not be a necessary condition for the emergence 
of cooperation in an oligopolistic system. (38)
Just that nobody had claimed that.
On top of it, he then strips off everything which would make this 
approach a departure from Realism. He argues for a definition of 
cooperation, not as the absence of conflict, but "as a process that 
involves the use of discord to stimulate mutual adjustment" (46). This 
is very much a traditional argument for the Balance of Power. Then, 
he maintain a Realist, that is, instrumental view of the role both of 
norms
On the contrary, the norms and rules of regimes can exert an effect on 
behavior even if they do not embody common ideals but are used by self- 
interested states and corporations engaging in a process of mutual adjust­
ment. (64)
and of cooperation
Rational choice analysis is used in this book not to reinforce the conven­
tional wisdom that cooperation must be rare in world politics, but to show 
that it can be pursued even by purely rational, narrowly self-interested 
governments, unmoved by idealistic concern for the common good or by 
ideological commitment to a certain pattern of international relations.(78)
His argument is one of the typical exercise in building up strawmen, 
here: Realism.
For him, Realism limits "mutual interests in world politics.... to 
interests in combining forces against adversaries" (p.62) and thereby 
"fail to take the role of institutions into account." (p.63) His instru­
mental role of institutions is certainly taken into account. Nearly all 
the classical realist writers were after all international lawyers.
Then he presents Realism as implying the crude dichotomy "...of 
the inevitability of either hegemony or conflict." (p.84) This is just not 
the case. As already seen in chapter four and especially five, there are



























































































176 Part III. Responses to the Crisis o f  Realism
many Realist writers developing these points. Yet, in Keohane, there 
is no reference after these quotes -and no references in the whole 
book about Realist writers that have developed the idea of a concert: 
Aron, Bull, Kissinger. He refers once to Stanley Hoffmann as an ex­
ception "not representative of Realism" (p.8, fn.l) and gives the im­
pression that Wolfers’ more subtle account of the concept of egoistic 
self-interest is exceptional. It is not exceptional at all in the Realist 
literature that Keohane does not even quote: it is the research pro­
gramme of Realism from the end of the 50’s onwards, at least outside 
the U.S.
We arrive therefore at the rather puzzling conclusion that one of 
the different schools that wanted to update or supplement Realism is 
overtly Realist, but nothing new (international order/security). One 
claims to be new, but relies on a heavy idealist assumption (interna­
tional liberal economic order); and one wants to criticise Realism, but 
is actually within the typical Realist research programme (interna­
tional regime).
12.4. Conclusion: HST as an insufficient update of Realism
Structural Realism à la Waltz has been rightly criticised for its 
inability to explain change. In a much discussed critique of Waltz, 
John Ruggie had pointed to the fact that Waltz’ theory is unable to 
analyse the change from the Medieval to the modem state system - 
except with the simple remark that nothing significant can have 
happened since we are still in world of anarchy.55
Hegemonic Stability Theory at least in Gilpin’s version is an 
attempt to overcome this shortcoming by leaving systemic Realism. 
Gilpin’s War and Change is explicitly microeconomic in his approach. 
The starting point is equilibrium. Change is ever then expected when 
the marginal cost of change is smaller then the marginal benefit for
55 John Gerard Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: 
Toward a Neorealist Synthesis" In Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and its Critics 



























































































Hegemonic Stability Theory 177
any actor. Applying the model of the homo economics and its ratio­
nality assumptions to the state, Gilpin recovers traditional Morgen- 
thau-type Realism. This solution has apparently left the systemic 
approach of Waltz (the marlet analogy) for a individualist cost-benefit 
calculator and utility maximiser. Thereby he is able to account for the 
dynamic international system by moving to the individual motivations 
that, although being stable (utility maximisation), might entail actual 
policy change.
Now, Waltz and Gilpin’s approach are not as different as Gilpin 
claims.56 True, Waltz is a systemic and Gilpin a rational choice 
approach. Yet, insofar as they follow economic (utilitarian) theory 
both are mutually dependent. Gilpin needs a more systemic approach 
(in the utilitarian Waltzian sense57) to account for different power 
configurations to make actors cost-benefit analysis and the resulting 
behaviour changing. Microeconomic theory without a theory of a mar­
ket would be insufficient. Waltz needs for the account of the dynamics 
of his static system a recourse to the actor level in order to explain 
why power configurations can change. On top of it, also Gilpin re­
mains unable to counter Ruggie’s critique: he has introduced a dyna­
mic element, sure, but only within endlessly recurrent cycles of power 
from the ancient times till today. The change from one anarchical sys­
tem to another cannot accounted for by Neo-Realism, at least in this 
version. Hegemonic Stability Theory in this sense is nothing new un­
der the Realist sky. It just tries to apply once more economic theory 
to International Relations - in a way similar to Kaplan’s systems and 
process already criticised and largely refuted by Raymond Aron in his 
first section on International Relations Theory.58
56 "The Richness of the Realist Tradition." In Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism 
and its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984/86), p.302.
57 For a good criticism of the utilitarian understandings that underpin Neo- 
Realist thought, see Richard Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism." In Robert O. 
Keohane, ed., Neorealism and its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press), 
pp.273-279.
58 See for the original version: Morton A. Kaplan, "Variants on six models of the 
international system" In James A. Rosenau, ed., International Politics and Foreign 




























































































178 Part III. Responses to the Crisis o f  Realism
The new elements are then not to be found in the economics of 
international political relations, but in what one can call, also follo­
wing Susan Strange69, the politics of international economic rela­
tions. Now, as already alluded to in the prior chapter on international 
regimes, this approach is less utilitarian and more open to actual 
historical differences (reducing its consciously) predictive capacities. 
It might, in some respects, also open up to more interpretativist posi­
tions, as e.g. also in Ruggie. Yet, a basic tension remains that has 
been very succinctly worked out by Kratochwil and Ruggie: Regime 
theory posits an intersubjective ontology, but provides only an indi­
vidualist methodology.58 960 In other words: how is it possible to analyse 
satisfactorily the communicative or other community that is supposed 
to be larger than and prior to the explanation of unit-levels, if the 
analytical methodology starts from exactly those units. Regime 
analysis is by now so hegemonical in specific circles that it can 
conceal in its variety this contradiction. But the contradiction points 
to a still necessary attempt to reform or overcome Realism.61
58(...continued)
303.For the critique: Raymond Aron, Paix et guerre entre les nations (Paris: 
Calmann-Lévy, 1962/8.ed.l984), pp.33-183.
59 See e.g. her States and Markets. An Introduction to International Political 
Economy (London et al.: Basil Blackwell, 1988), p.12.
60 Friedrich Kratochwil & John Gerard Ruggie, "International organization: a 
state of the art on an art of the state." International Organization vol.40, no.4, 1986, 
pp.753-775.
61 See also Beate Kohler-Koch, "Zur Empirie und Theorie intemationaler 
Regime", in Beate Kohler-Koch, ed., Regime in den internationalen Beziehungen (Ba­
den-Baden: Nomos, 1989), pp. 17-88, for an explicit critique of the individualist ratio­




























































































IPE at the convergence of 
Realism and Structuralism
This chapter is more heterogeneous than most of the preceding ones. 
However, the taking into account of non-state actors and non-inter­
state structures (like markets or the international division of labour) 
is common to all approaches. It is also very often voiced as an explicit 
critique of U.S. policies - domestic and foreign.
We will start by taking up where we left chapter 6 on imperialism 
and make a more elaborated presentation of (Western) marxist ap­
proaches to International Relations, that we will call, as a shorthand, 
dependency theories. Then more idiosyncratic approaches will round 
up to present, besides Neo-Realism, the second major contender in the 
present theoretical debate: IPE as an overcoming o f Realism.
13.1. Intellectual roots of dependency theories
Two important intellectual roots can be discerned in the development 
of dependency theories, first (Western) Marxist theories of imperial­




























































































180 Part III. Responses to the Crisis o f Realism.
1. (Western) Marxist theories of imperialism
Were the classical theories of imperialism mainly interested in the 
intra-"bourgeois" struggle of industrialised countries, so do past-WWII 
approaches attack the North-South issue. A first new school, that one 
could call theories o f surplus absorption tries to understand how capi­
talist classes in the core through state and MNC action actually "un­
derdevelop" the South though means of (economic) exploitation (See 
Figure 4).
Three new phenomena are discussed by these schools as compared 
to classical imperialism:
- the new kind of monopoly which explains underconsumption, thus 
expansion (linked to militarism and integrating the new socialist 
challenge)
- the relation between state and MNC as actors of international 
capitalism
- the means of exploitation.
Baran and Sweezy argue that one cannot more adopt the Marxian 
analysis of capitalism because it rests on the assumption of a compe­
titive economy (even in Lenin’s monopoly competitive form). In a si­
tuation of monopoly capitalism, price competition is eliminated, thus 
prices are downwardly rigid. Non-price competition (product differen­
tiation, advertising, cost-reducing innovations) is heightened and ge­
nerates a tendency of falling costs. Rigid prices and falling costs com­
bine to the new absolute law of monopoly capitalism, i.e. the tendency 
of the absolute surplus to rise, which replaces Marx’ tendency of the 
profit to fall, which seems to be empirically falsified by the recurrent 
ability of capitalism to avoid the falling through technological innova­
tion.
This is a considerable break. In the same time, they assess that 
the capitalist society fails in sustaining a demand able to cope with 
the rising profits. Incentives to invest are low. The normal state of 
monopoly capitalism is stagnation. They consider remedies against 
stagnation (price reductions, means of subsidisation through the fiscal 
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Figure 4 Theories of surplus absorption (Baran & Sweezy)
that military spending can smooth, but not eventually overcome it.
In this context, the discussion of military spending is revealing for 
the way IR is indirectly integrated into the analysis. Baran/Sweezy 
accept their importance, because not only surplus is absorbed, but 
foreign markets controlled and the socialist threat checked. The bipo­
larity of the central balance is part of the debate. The specific way of 
surplus absorption must take into account the socialist threat and ex­
pansionism (closing off markets) and the Third World socialist (natio­
nalizing) threat.
The relation between MNC’s and states is not analysed in equal 
terms. Baran and Sweezy argue that their interests differ and that 
therefore, one cannot analyse it in the classical (monolithic) manner. 



























































































182 Part III. Responses to the Crisis o f Realism
enterprises for "survival and growth", where the state must adapt to 
the wishes of the finance capital. In a similar vein, O’Connor tries to 
link the internationalization of finance capital with the decline of 
national rivalries in the core especially since a socialist camp con­
stitutes a threat to the capitalist world order. The main actor remains 
the MNC and the
global foreign policy corresponds to the interests and perspective of the 
multinational corporation... The multinational corporation has become the 
instrument for the creation and consolidation of an international ruling 
class, the only hope for reconciling the antagonisms between national and 
international interests.62
This is a view of ultra-imperialism, an extremely aggregated ap­
proach of the international system with a dominating First World 
(read MNC) exploiting the Third World and challenged by a rising 
Second World.
The roots for a World System analysis are already here. It is only 
one step from an abstract unified actor (international finance capital) 
to a structural argumentation.
With regard to the third new point, the means o f exploitation, 
O’Connor analyses the control over foreign exchange assets, the 
means of private direct investment, the control of local savings (either 
via IMF and BIRD or via the MNC’s in LDC’s), and finally the control 
of mineral, agricultural, manufacturing and other real assets and the 
organisation and management of trade by foreign corporations.
2. The Structuralist Critique o f the liberal theory o f international 
trade
The critique of the liberal theory of international trade (specialisation 
according to comparative advantage (Ricardo) or resource-endowment 
(Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson) is most commonly linked to the thesis 
of Raul Prebisch. The general argument is that the international divi­
sion of labour favours the centre and not so much the periphery, be­
62 James O’Connor, ''The Meaning of Economic Imperialism." In R. Rhodes, ed., 



























































































IPE as an attempt to overcome Realism 183
cause their structures of production differ substantially. The centre 
has a homogeneous and diversified economy, whereas the periphery 
becomes, through the integration in the international economic sys­
tem, specified and heterogeneous.63
Prebish sustained that primary goods exporting countries would 
continue to experience a deterioration in the Terms of Trade due to 
changing patterns of demand in the principal export markets, to in­
creasing competition amongst primary producers (given the inelastic 
demand for primary goods), and due to mechanisms inhibiting pro­
ductivity gains resulting from technological innovation in the centre 
from being passed on to Third World consumers in the form of lower 
prices. The declining Terms of Trade will obviously affect the capacity 
of Third World countries to acquire necessary capital goods without 
recurring to foreign debt. Without foreign capital, however, the tech­
nological innovation, and thus their development is impossible. The 
recurrent resort to foreign capital, on the other hand, dooms the 
countries (since their export gains diminish) to insolvency.
The solution of the problem is largely inspired by the German 19th 
century economist (and prominent liberal constitutionalist thinker) 
Friedrich List, who argued for protective measures in to protect the 
German "infant industries" against the more competitive British 
production, until they became competitive. The solution adopted by 
the ECLA was called "Import-Substituting Industrialization" (ISI). 
Unfortunately, ISI proved insufficient to allow the development of 
LDC’s and Prebish’s dualism was the target of the first dependency 
formulations.
6,1 The concept of heterogeneity has been extended by Dieter Senghaas later. Here 
it refers more particularly to the "dualist” economies in the periphery with a 
capitalist and industrialised export sector which has no spill-over effect to a 
generally backward national economy. See Dieter Senghaas, "Autozentrierte 
Entwicklung." In Dieter Nohlen & Franz Nuscheler, eds., Handbuch der Dritten Welt 
1. Unterentwicklung und Entwicklung: Theorien - Strategien - Indikatoren (Hamburg: 



























































































184 Part III. Responses to the Crisis o f Realism
13.2. The content of dependency theories
Two different approaches can be distinguished, the "development of 
underdevelopment" school and the "dependent development school".
1. "The development o f underdevelopment" (Frank/Dos Santos, 
Wallerstein)
The most often quoted definition of dependence has been given by Dos 
Santos
By dependence we mean a situation in which the economy of certain 
countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another 
economy to which the former is subjugated. The relation of interdepen­
dence between two or more economies, and between these and world trade, 
assumes the form of dependence when some countries (the dominant one) 
can expand and can be self-sustaining, while other countries (the 
dependent ones) can do this only as a reflection of that expansion, which 
can have either a positive or negative effect on their immediate develop­
ment. The concept of dependence permits us to see the internal situation 
of these countries as part of the world economy.64
Thereby, he follows A.G. Frank’s, research on Latin American coun­
tries and his view of the international capitalist system. The tradi­
tional dichotomy of the owner and non-owners of the means of pro­
duction is transposed to the international level - but not just since 
1945, but since the very beginning of world capitalism. Four main 
theses can be extracted from Frank:
1. The periphery has been incorporated into the world economy 
since mercantilism (and especially through conquest): "the expansion 
of the capitalist system over the past centuries effectively and enti­
rely penetrated even the apparently most isolated sectors of the un­
derdeveloped world."65
2. Such incorporation has transformed peripheral societies in capi­
talist societies.
64 T. Dos Santos, "The Structure of Dependence.” American. Economic Review, 
1970.




























































































IPE as an attempt to overcome Realism 185
3. The world capitalist society becomes a "whole chain of constella­
tions of metropolis and satellites for surplus extraction" (7), in which 
the surplus generated at each stage is successively drawn off towards 
the center.
4. Peripheral societies are not dualist. The underdeveloped sector 
is integral and necessary part of the developed one. Not "because 
sectors remain underdeveloped that the country does not overcome its 
dependence", but "since some sectors are developed, other must 
remain underdeveloped.
The most elaborate version is perhaps the one by Immanuel 
Wallerstein (Figure 5). He shares with Frank the general outlook and 
historical explanation.66 Moreover, he introduces some conceptual re­
finements.67 There is most prominently the category of semi-peri­
phery which is constituted both by rising peripheral countries and 
core countries in decline. They function as a transmission-belt, 
fettering the demands of the periphery and replacing direct control of 
the core. This dynamic element is compounded by a cyclical view of 
the world political economy. Following Kondratieffs cycles, Waller­
stein establishes the recurrences of wars for the replacement of the 
hegemon (necessary in a World Capitalist system). Thus, tow 30 years 
wars, 1618-1648 and 1914-1945, can be understood as the violent 
rearrangement for the new international leadership. In these 
hegemonic wars, Great Britain replaced the Dutch, before being in 
turn superseded by the U.S. Today’s situation is, for Wallerstein, 
characterised by a declining hegemon and rising contestation by anti- 
systemic movements from within (e.g. pacifism) and outside the 
system (the socialist bloc).
66 He stresses thereby the formation of the modern capitalist state as a specific 
European feature due to the balanced power position on the European continent.
67 See for his general framework: "The Rise and Future Demise of the World-Ca­
pitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis." In his collection The Capitalist 
World. Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Paris: Editions de la 
Maison des Sciences de l’Homme, 1979/ repr. from 1974), pp.387-415. For an 
application to IPE, including his treatment of hegemony wars that is the base of the 
figure, see his collection The Politics of the World-Economy. The States, the 
Movements and the Civilizations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press and Paris: 



























































































































































































IPE as an attempt to overcome Realism 187
2. The school o f "associated-dependent development" (Cardoso, Evans)
Whereas the World Systems approach treats mainly the international 
level and has to a certain extent rightly been criticised for its outside- 
in determinism, this second school wants to analyse the non-mechani­
cal and non-determinist interplay of external and internal forces in 
the political and economic development of LDC’s.68 A central concept 
in this approach is the phenomenon of "crippled" economies in the 
Third World.69
capitalist accumulation in dependent economies does not complete its cycle. 
Lacking ’autonomous technology’ - as vulgar parlance has it - and 
compelled therefore to utilize imported technology, dependent capitalism 
is crippled...It is crippled because it lacks a fully developed capital-goods 
sector. The accumulation, expansion, and self-realization of local capital 
requires and depends on a dynamic complement outside itself: it must 
insert itself into the circuit of international capitalism. 70
The stress is laid on the domestic political and economic structure for 
the explanation how actually policies are made, applied, and which 
chances there are for a country to overcome its backwardness.
In general, the recommendations are of a neo-mercantilist type, 
where one tries to selectively use the necessary foreign input without 
becoming in the same time overexposed to its competitive influen­
ces.71 Closer to the structuralist/dualist school than the World 
System, it acknowledges the exploitation done through the core con­
trol of international product and financial markets, and technology, 
but is less optimistic and tries to develop strategies of industriali­
sation and démocratisation.
68 See for this defense of dependency: Fernando Henrique Cardoso, "The consump­
tion of dependency theory in the United States." Latin American Research Review, 
vol.12, 1977, p.22.
69 Dieter Senghaas reminds in "Autozentrierte Entwicklung" that the expression 
"crippled" ("verkriippelt") has its origin in Friedrich List’s writings.
70 Fernando Henrique Cardoso, "Associated-dependent development: Theoretical 
and Practical Implications." In Alfred Stepan, ed., Authoritarian Brazil. Origins, 
Policies, and Future (New Haven, London: Yale University Press), p.163.
71 This is Dieter Senghaas’ formulation in his Konfliktformationen im interna- 



























































































188 Part III. Responses to the Crisis o f Realism
Therefore, this approach does not come up with a clear-cut theory 
of the way underdevelopment is produced or how, for any country, 
one can change this fact. It is closer to a historical-sociological method 
trying to understand the ways semi- and peripheral countries work 
in a global economy, i.e. to understand the specific inside-outside 
articulation of domestic systems and the world political economy.72
13.3. The ’Politicisation" of dependency
1. The political critique o f dependency
André Gunter Frank has become a kind of a bête noire (and also a 
strawman) for different marxist writers some of whom are sympa­
thetic with his thesis ("the development of underdevelopment"), but 
not with his argumentation, and some of whom refuse both.
The starting point of this inner-Marxist critique is Frank’s concept 
of capitalism. Ernesto Laclau retraces Frank’s definition in three 
steps. Capitalism is:
- a system of production for the market, in which
- profit constitutes the motive of production and
- this profit is realised for the benefit of someone other than the direct 
producer, who is thereby dispossessed of it.
Thereby, we can conclude that from the neolithic revolution onwards, there 
has never been anything, but capitalism.73
Laclau agrees with Frank in the rejection of dualist theories (stating 
no link between backward and progressive sectors in LDCs econo­
mies), but sustains that this does not imply one single mode of 
production, i.e. capitalism. He argues for a concept of "economic 
systems", which can encompass different modes of production.
72 See also the presentation by Gabriel Palma, "Dependency and Development: 
A Critical Overview. In Dudley Seers, ed., Dependency Theory: A Critical Reassess­
ment (London, 1980), pp.20-73.
73 Ernesto Laclau, Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory: Capitalism, Fascism, 
Populism (London: Verso Ed.), p.23. The article to which the discussion refers was 



























































































IPE as an attempt to overcome Realism 189
In a similar vein is Robert Brenner’s critique of Frank.74 The label 
"Neo-Smithian" is attached at Frank, and also Wallerstein, because 
their approach is rooted in the sphere of exchange (market relations). 
He rigorously opposes the simple outside-in vision that Frank’s wri­
tings sometimes display, because of its implication that the (peripher­
al) class system might be determined -i.e. might be a dependent va­
riable of- by the international system is obviously a claim turning 
marxism upside-down. For Brenner the causes for the remaining pre­
capitalist modes of production (and for the underdevelopment) are to 
be found in the "internal barriers to capital accumulation imposed by 
the forced labour systems, i.e. class structures, in the backward 
countries.”
Thus, neither Laclau, nor Brenner tackle the more historicist (and 
much less determinist) approach of Cardoso, nor the empirical content 
(underdevelopment) of Frank’s thesis.75 Underdevelopment or the 
necessary persistence of pre-capitalist modes of production has be­
come the explanandum of the analysis. This is far from the Leninist 
theory of imperialism.
It is undeniable that the reconceptualisations of these critiques are 
able to cope with the different historical formations in a more 
convincing way, than a strawman-version of Frank’s "all-capitalism" 
which "bulldozes" everything into one concept. Yet, they are not 
without problems. Let us reconsider Laclau’s approach. In the pas­
sage, where he makes a comparison between the mercantilistic and 
the present epochs, he asserts that the development of the dominant 
economic structures could generate underdevelopment by:
74 Robert Brenner, "The origins of capitalist development: A critique of Neo- 
Smithian Marxists." New Left Review, vol.104, pp.25-92.
75 For a comprehensive critique of Wallerstein where the writers extend behind 
the rather simple sphere of exchange - sphere of production controversy, see Aidan 
Foster-Carter, "The modes of production controversy. New Left Review vol. 107,1978; 
Theda Skocpol, "Wallerstein’s world capitalist system: A theoretical and historical 
critique", American Journal o f Sociology, vol.82, 1977, pp.1075-1090; and also 
Anthony Brewer, Marxist Theories of Imperialism (London: Routledge and Kegan, 
1980). For a recent assessment, see Robert A. Denemark & Kenneth P. Thomas, "The 




























































































190 Part III. Responses to the Crisis o f Realism
reducing the economic surplus of the peripheral countries and fixing their 
relations of production in an archaic mould of extra-economic coercion, 
which retarded any process of social differentiation and diminished the size 
of their internal markets...Through its monopoly positions, metropolitan 
Europe fixed the price of commodities...while by means of extra-economic 
coercion it exploited labour-power in the mines and plantation-systems.™
Laclau is hence describing power relations within the sphere of 
exchange (monopoly) and within the political system (extra-economic 
coercion). Thus, we are back to the traditional view of imperialism. 
The core expands in the periphery for economic reasons (related to 
the process of accumulation in the centre) but through political 
means. Yet, Laclau never discusses this link between economic sour­
ces and political means. Therefore, we remain left with the political 
means, which, interestingly enough indeed, would anyway suffice to 
explain economic dependence as defined by Laclau himself: economic 
dependence means "the constant absorption by one region of the eco­
nomic surplus of another region."76 7 This purely descriptive definition 
would hardly embarrass a mercantilist. It is perfectly possible to 
explain within this frame dependence by the better power position or 
the greater advantage, taken by the advanced capitalist states from 
the structure of the world political economy.78 79
Similarly, other critiques of dependency argue for a distinction 
between the political impact of the international system and the 
economic working of capitalism. Bill Warren’s™ critique is thereby 
not only directed against the implications of dependency at the 
national level, but also against its view of the international system.
76 Ernesto Laclau, Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory, p.37 (italics added).
77 ibid., p.36.
78 This is the stand taken by Benjamin J. Cohen, The Question o f Imperialism: 
The Political Economy of Dominance and Dependence (London et al.: Macmillan). He 
describes the international system as characterised by an "asymmetry of interdepen­
dence" (sic!) that reflects the considerable greater bargaining strength of the 
dominant capitalist nations and argues that underdevelopment is not a necessary 
feature of capitalism, but of the logic of power politics. A more radical (and, in my 
view, a more stringent) IPE approach would start questioning exactly this distinction 
by pointing to the links between power politics and the working of the international 
capitalist system.




























































































I PE as an attempt to overcome Realism 191
Warren is reestablishing a part of the autonomy of politics, rejecting 
the economic determinism that looms in certain dependency writings 
(Frank). He tries to save a more political concept of imperialism, and 
the progressive character of capitalism for pre-capitalist societies, 
both closer to Marxist traditional orthodoxy. For him, the (Leninist) 
confusion of imperialism and the extension o f the world market made 
it impossible to distinguish between the negative effects of the growth 
of capital (economic) and the impact of advanced capitalist countries 
(political) and to distinguish between the anticapitalist struggle 
(socialism) and the anti-imperialist struggle (bourgeois nationalism 
in the Third World). Warren is part of the first, not of the second.
In a slightly different vein, Sanjaya Lall dismisses dependency. He 
does neither deny "the existence...of growing inequality and mass 
unemployment in several LDCs", nor "any factual statements about 
external influence and conditioning", but "that there is something 
peculiar in their occurrence in LDCs, which can be said to constitute 
dependence." These characteristics are not exclusive to LDCs, but - 
and here Lall’s position resembles Warren’s - to capitalist develop­
ment in general ("features of capitalist growth"). Lall proposes instead 
a political conceptualization of different levels of dependence:
a pyramidal structure of socio-political dominance ...in the capitalist world 
with the top (hegemonic) position held by the most powerful capitalist 
country and the bottom by the smallest and poorest ones.811
Now, to replace dependence by dominance or power is not a consi­
derable advance in explanatory value, if one cannot specify the con­
tent of the new concept. Yet, what appears from this critique is there­
fore not so much the confusion between capitalism and imperialism, 
as an interrogation concerning if  the concept o f power can be separat­
ed from the "motion" o f the international economic system. 80
80 Sanjaya Lall, "Is ’Dependence’ a useful concept in analysing underdevelop­




























































































192 Part III. Responses to the Crisis o f Realism
2. Power relations and international capitalism
Is the new focus on "bargaining power in asymmetrical interdepen­
dence" sufficient to apprehend power relations in the global world 
economy ?
I PE as an attempt to overcome Realism has as research programme 
the link between power relations and the logic o f international 
capitalism.
Frank had suggested a link between market position - economic 
resources - power - market position. It is the circular concept of 
"market power" which can possibly link structure (economic base) and 
superstructure (politics), through the actor, the class, which is 
replaced by countries and MNCs81. Cardoso would suggest that the 
expansion of international capitalism (market relations) and the 
organisation of the domestic economic and political system, undertak­
en in order to cope with the constraints of the global political 
economy, reflect power relations in which LDCs are dominated.82 
James Caporaso tries to integrate the "second face of power" in order 
to counterattack the challengers of dependence theory by saving an 
approach that he calls dependency. Caporaso admits Lall’s critique 
and acknowledges that dependence is, on the bargaining level, no 
demarcation criterion for LDCs. Yet, and here Caporaso departs from 
Lall, Cohen and Warren
to focus exclusively on the concrete bargaining among actors and the 
various ways in which actors effectively exert their wills over others is to 
ignore the fact that the social structuring of agendas might systematically 
favour certain parties.83
It is supposed to rescue a concept of dependency, very close to 
Cardoso,
81 If this is a possible extension of the Marxist approach is, o f course, another 
debate.
82 For a political analysis partly inspired by Cardoso, see for instance the 
different writings of Guillermo O’Donnell and Peter Evans in chapter 15.
83 James Caporaso, "Dependence, dependency, and power in the global system: 
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Dependency focuses on the absence of actor autonomy...Actor autonomy is 
limited by internal fragmentation and the reliance on external agencies for 
the completion of basic economic activities.84
The definition of structural power runs as follows:
This kind of power is a higher-order power because it involves the ability 
to manipulate the choices, capabilities, alliance opportunities, and pay-offs 
that actors may utilize...We say this is a higher order form of power 
because it is a power to govern the rules which shape bargaining power.
It is this type of power, structural power, which is crucial to the under­
standing of dependency.85 86
Out of this approach stem also those attempts in IPE that try to inte­
grate concepts of hegemony into the analysis. This is an ongoing re­
search programme. They all display a certain eclecticism in their at­
tempt to integrate Realist and Marxist thought. So is Robert W. Cox 
integrating the anarchical political system in his triad of analysis81*, 
and Stephen Gill and David Law explicitly understand their analysis 
as a specific form of (structural) power analysis.87
13.4. The "Structuralisation" of Realist syntheses in IPE
1. Gilpin’s three dialogues
Robert Gilpin started in 1975 to argue for what eventually became a 
conventional typology in International Political Economy. In an
84 Ibid., p. 18,23. In a similar vein, Philip O’Brien tries to describe the point where 
the quantitative asymmetry of interdependence becomes a qualitative difference: 
"Whereas developed countries face rules of competition, underdeveloped countries 
face and have always faced, rules of domination. Dependency, therefore, is 
introduced to emphasize the difference between a developed capitalist nation and an 
underdeveloped one, and hence, presumably, the way in which internal relations of 
dominance express themselves in each case.'VDependency revisited." In C.Abel & 
C.Lewis, eds., Latin America, Imperialism, and the State (London, 1986), p.58/59).
85 James A. Caporaso, "Introduction to the special issue on dependence and 
dependency in the global system." International Organization vol.32, 1978, p.4.
86 See Robert W. Cox "Social Forces...”, op.cit., and for his first attempt to analyse 
hegemony. "Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method." 
Millennium vol.12, 1983, pp.162-175.
87 See especially their "Global Hegemony and the Structural Power of Capital." 



























































































194 Part III. Responses to the Crisis o f Realism
article he set out "three models of the future"88 which he analysed 
as different frameworks of analysis for the study of multinational 
corporations (MNCs). The typology has had a considerable impact on 
the literature in IPE89, because it proposes the trilogy we have 
already met in the Inter-Paradigm Debate. His definition of IPE
the reciprocal and dynamic interaction in international relations of the
pursuit of wealth and the pursuit of power90
became a standard reference.91 It claimed to be broad enough to 
integrate the three "models of the future" into one discipline. And 
since it is now conventionally wisdom, he elaborated the triptych to 
a forceful statement of "three ideologies" in his, indeed very impres­
sive, textbook on IPE.92
Yet, he has some difficulties to handle the "liberal model". There 
is, at least, a tension in the solution, he provides us. In his thesis on 
Multinational Corporations, the liberal model was subsumed to be the 
interdependence model whose essential claim was that increasing eco­
nomic interdependence and technological advances in communication 
and transportation are making the nation state an anachronism and 
shifting the control of World affairs to transnational actors and 
structures (e.g. Eurodollar market). Out of this framework grows a 
world view of voluntary and cooperative relations among interdepen­
dent economies, the goal of which is to accelerate the economic 
growth and welfare of everyone through the MNC as transmission 
belt of capital, ideas, and growth.
1,8 Robert Gilpin, "Three Models of the Future." International Organization vol.29, 
no.l, 1975, pp.37-60. The article is excerpted out of a book which studies USAmer- 
ican Multinationals: U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporation.
89 See for similar triads (with only slightly different labelling), see Nazli Choucri 
(1980) "International Political Economy: A Theoretical Perspective." In Change in the 
International System, edited by George/Holsti/Siverson, pp. 103-129; R. J. Barry Jones 
International Political Economy: Problems and Issues. Part I. Review of International 
Studies voll, 1981, pp.245-260; and finally Stephen Gill & David Law, David, The 
Global Political Economy (New York et al.: Harvester, 1988).
90 Robert Gilpin, "Three Models of the Future...", p.40.
91 See an example, already ten years later: Martin Staniland, What is Political 
Economy? (New Haven and London: Yale University Press).



























































































IPE as an attempt to overcome Realism 195
This second idea, indeed the international liberal economists’ 
credo, does not sit easily on the interdependence idea. This latter 
analyses the shift of control, i.e. power from the national to the trans­
national actors and structures. Political or power-analysis is an endo­
genous variable of the explanation. Liberal international economics, 
however, treat power as exogenous. By the force of his definition 
(where power and wealth are integrated), he would be pushed to ex­
clude liberal international economics from the body of theory. This 
does not sound very useful. Therefore, he accommodates the definition 
in the 1987 textbook to what seems to be the present orthodoxy for 
the definition of IPE, the "state-market nexus". This definition allows 
to integrate liberal economic theory as the model for the study of 
markets - even if power is treated as exogenous variable. Neverthe­
less, he cannot but admit later that therefore "liberalism lacks a true 
political economy."93 This squaring o f the circle (how to integrate the 
liberals even if there are of no use) leaves one rather perplex.
The renewed stress on political economy (as in his first definition) 
was a reaction against the ’compartmentalisation’ of the subject mat­
ter in two different disciplines which often treat the other as exo­
genous to the subject. Economics was considered insufficient, because 
it did not integrate power analysis in its explanatory models and in 
its turn, political science often treated economics as exogenous or 
sometimes only dependent on the political setting: the autonomy of 
market forces was missed. To alter the definition which stresses the 
"organization" of the pursuit of power and wealth, rather than the 
"objectives” of this activity94 is to fall back on a conceptual and 
disciplinary split, political economy was supposed to overcome.
Quite in coherence with his earlier view, Gilpin actually tries to 
overcome this split by elaborating an approach which is a mix of the 
two "real" theories of political economy: mercantilism and marxism. 
He is often at pains to disentangle the two approaches - as he sees 
them.
93 Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy o f  International Relations, p.45.



























































































196 Part III. Responses to the Crisis o f  Realism
Trying to analyse change in world politics, Gilpin states that 
"every theory of International Relations requires a theory of the 
state."95 Gilpin uses a historic approach which he borrows from a 
neo-marxist writer, Samir Amin. He emphasizes the special impor­
tance of the latter’s concept of "social formation" (be it now originally 
Amin’s or not), because it determines how the economic surplus is 
generated within and among societies.96
Finally, Hegelian-Marxist approaches in general, and Lenin’s law 
of uneven development" in particular are judged of "heuristic value", 
but too deterministic and ahistorical.97 Yet, neo-Marxist writers in 
the dependency-tradition of Cardoso or stemming from a critical 
theory like Cox, see themselves as part of a "historicist Marxism that 
rejects the notion of objective laws of history."98
Gilpin does sometimes acknowledge the similarities of Realism and 
Marxism in their perspectives on the nature and dynamics of 
International Relations. They differ essentially, according to him, 
with respect to the "underlying dynamic: Realism stresses the power 
struggle between states, and marxism stresses the profit motive of 
capitalist societies."99 But for himself (and also for marxists) "the 
struggle for power and the desire for economic gains are ultimately 
and inextricably joined."100
In his later work, he again discusses the difference between these 
two ideologies as being essentially the respective concept of human 
nature: Marxism believes in the malleability of man and in the 
"withering away" of imperialism, war and the state after a communist 
revolution.101 Here, he touches, I think, a profound point. Realism 
is based on philosophical skepticism of the human nature to an extent
95 Robert Gilpin, War & Change in World Politics, p.15.
96 ibid., p. 108.
97 ibid., p.48/49.
9* Robert W. Cox (1981), "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond 
International Relations Theory (+ Postscript 1985)" In Robert O. Keohane, ed., 
Neorealism and its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p.248.
99 War & Change in World Politics, p.94.
100 ibid., p.46.




























































































to which marxism might be not. It points, like the values in Holsti’s 
case, to a philosophical or ethical level where indeed incompatibility 
exists.
In order to summarize Gilpin’s approach, his eclectic mix could be 
presented as the spelling-out of three "dialogues". The first is explicit 
in his War & Change where he describes the function of the state (to­
wards the internal as well as the external realm) being the protection 
of property rights and the personal security of the state’s members. 
Raymond Aron calls this the dialogue betWeen Clausewitz and Lenin:
je n’ai jamais méconnu le dialogue entre Clausewitz et Lénine. Le premier 
ne mettait pas en doute la notion du bien de la communauté (ou de 
l’intérêt national, dans le vocabulaire d’aujourd’hui)...Lénine répliquait à 
Clausewitz qu’il admirait, que dans un Etat de classes, il ne pouvait y 
avoir de bien commun. L’action extérieure des États exprimerait la volonté 
d’une classe ou d’une autre. Les événements, depuis la révolution de 1917 
réfutent simultanément, me semble-t-il, les théories extrêmes.102
The second dialogue is between Marx and Keynes:
The logic o f the market economy as an inherently expanding global system 
collides with the logic of the modem welfare state...The welfare state has 
only transferred the fundamental problem of the market economy and its 
survivability to the international level.103
And finally there is the dialogue between Lenin and Kautsky, i.e. bet­
ween imperialism and ultra-imperialism which is repeatedly acknow­
ledged and somewhat relabelled in neo-mercantilist terms (coopera­
tion or new protectionism after the hegemonic decline of the US).
2. Strange’s Realist Structuralism
The second writer attempting a marxist-realist rapprochement is 
Susan Strange. But above all she pursues an ideological and empiri­
cal critique of American mainstream IPE as represented by regime 
theory and Hegemonic Stability Theory (see also chapter 12). She ar­
gues for a structural approach that, on the one hand wants to inte­
grate the marxist concern with production and the Realist concern
102 Raymond Aron, Les derniers années du siècle (Paris: Julliard, 1984), p.30.
103 The Political Economy o f International Relations, p.63.



























































































198 Part III. Responses to the Crisis o f Realism
with security into a wider analysis of the world political economy 
around a concept of structural power.
[IR scholars’ ] focus on the territorial state has directed attention to the 
political consequences for only two out of the four major factors of 
production - land and labour - and has left in the shadows the power 
derived from the other factors of production, notably knowledge (or 
technology) and capital, the two that have most easily escaped the control 
of the state and that can most easily slip across territorial frontiers... 
[structural power is] the ability - most unevenly distributed throughout the 
system - to shape the basic structures of production, security, credit and 
knowledge.104
...This means more than the power to set the agenda of discussion or to 
design (in American phraseology) the international "regime" of rules and 
customs.105
In a rather complex move, she links this structural level of four basic 
structures (production, security, knowledge, and finance) to the "unit- 
level". This is done through two assumptions. First, although she does 
not develop a full-fledged theory of the state, she starts from a model 
of societies around values. Since she had criticised the conservative 
bias of the "Politics of International Economic Relations" approaches, 
she bases her model of society on four social (not individual) values: 
security (order), wealth, justice and freedom to choose. The priorities 
given to some values and not to others, determine the central rela­
tionship between "authorities" (state and non state actors) and "mar­
ket". Second, this "sea-saw" between market and authorities is de fac­
to moved by the authority106. Authorities decide (those who have the 
power and the interests) the environment, the extension and the form 
of market relations. MNCs, as authorities, can impose order on mar­
kets (oligopolies) on market relations.
The articulation of the structural and the unit levels is the follo­
wing: changes in the (transnationally conceived) structures will affect
104 "International Political Economy: The Story So Far and the Way Ahead." In 
W. Ladd Hollist & Lamond Tullis, eds., The International Political Economy 
(Boulder: Westview), p.15.
105 "The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony," International Organization 41 
(4/1987), p.565.



























































































IPE as an attempt to overcome Realism 199
the power of authorities. This in turn will affect the relations of 
authorities and markets in one society and thereby the particular mix 
of the four social values and hence the particular group(s) which 
benefits from a certain mix. This line of argumentation is recommend­
ed for "sectorial analysis" which has the advantage to focus on parti­
cular bargaining situations in their structural context and which 
allows easier debates across ideological barriers.
In this approach, IPE supersedes IR. Waltz’s systemic realism is 
still there, but only in one out of her four structures (the security 
structure). In a framework wider than Gilpin’s and Cox’, she meets 
some characteristics of the "cob web" approach107.
Central for this conceptualisation is once more a structural concept 
of power. As in recent dependency or world system writings, Susan 
Strange opposes the traditional Realist focus on overt conflict and 
stresses those power relations which are prior to the actual conflict 
(the active shaping o f structures), or non-intentional influences o f 
decisions and non-decisions-108
This, of course, is the paradox: that US strategies for global financial 
integration have pulled other states and their economies further into 
involvement with the world market economy and in doing so have enlarged 
opportunities for American providers of financial and other services. But 
at the same time, this deliberate creation of a open world economy in the 
image of the USA has inadvertently restricted opportunities for blue-collar 
workers in the United States. But the fact that strategies, as in war, some­
times have consequences unforeseen by their creators does not mean that the 
latter are powerless, only that they cannot always see into the future, or 
forecast the full costs as well as the benefits o f  their actions.109
107 As one scholar of John Burton has put it, the cobweb view implies "a world 
made up of networks of transactions that could be conceptually organised as 
’systems’ which interconnected, overlapped and interacted.” See C.R. Mitchell, "World 
Society as a Cobweb: States, Actors and Systemic Processes." In Michael Banks, ed., 
Conflict in World Society. A new perspective on international relations (Brighton: 
Harvester PressAVheatsheaf Books, 1984), pp.59-77. Strange sees four such systems.
108 For a stringent account of the effects of non-decisions, see her Casino 
Capitalism (London et al.: Basil Blackwell, 1986).




























































































200 Part III. Responses to the Crisis o f Realism
I think there are two different points in the analysis of American 
power to which she alludes and which depart from actual (may be not 
potential) regime analysis.
The first is her critique of the distorted impression that the sheer 
existence of constraints implies an erosion of American power. Gro­
wing interdependence has also opened the door for more U.S. foreign 
influence possibilities. The analysis must weigh both factors.
The second is that even if the US do not intend to challenge for­
eign countries on their policies, i.e. to put constraints on their options, 
this does not mean that their actual decisions cannot do it. The U.S. 
have certainly a lot of non-intentional/non-conscious power which does 
not guarantee that they can control every outcome, but according to 
which all the other participants of the international game must adapt 
their behaviour. It is the unintended consequence ("influence") of 
conscious or unintended abilities, which they must take into account 
(typically in "worst-case" - scenarios).
She thereby comes very close to dependency approaches and uses 
a concept of power recalling Perroux’s dominance. Yet departing from 
the Mainstream Realist IPE account a la Klaus Knorr
...dominance exists when economic events and domestic economic policies 
in A persistently affect economic events and policies in B more than the 
other way round.
...such effects are incidental...economic dominance may reflect superior 
economic innovation that is not cultivated, at least primarily, to cause 
adjustments in other economies.110
she sees this as important power relations. Or to use an image of 
Pierre Hassner’s for the description of a condominium: It does not 
make any difference to the trampled grass if the elephants above it 
make love or war (the origin is said to be Chinese).
110 Klaus Knorr, Power and Wealth. The Political Economy o f International Power 
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13.5. IPE as a critique of Realism
As the recent reformulations of Neo-Realism, the main item of attack 
in the Realist research programme becomes the double and circularly 
defined concepts of sovereignty and anarchy. Circularly defined be­
cause sovereignty means the recognition that there exists no higher 
authority than the state, and anarchy means a system without over­
arching authority, i.e. made out of sovereign states. This has always 
been the basic ground of Realism, even though it became more sophis­
ticated in the writings of the British School, of Aron, Kissinger, and 
Wolfers.111
The Neo-Realist move had consisted in the redefinition of Waltz’ 
second level, the level of differentiation. Since anarchy at least in its 
formal sense can be said to persist, the second level (of what Buzan 
calls the deep structure) must be qualifiable and not circularly 
defined to the level of anarchy as Waltz does. Concepts like Buzan’s 
interaction capacity and Ruggie’s density are built for this pur­
pose.112
This Marxist-Realist IPE research programme starts from the pre­
supposition that this is not a departure radical enough. It is not 
enough just to add the MNC’s to the list of actors and the market to 
the list of processes or structures, as Neo-Mercantilist IPE does, to 
have solved the problems. Certainly not the economics of internatio­
nal politics, but neither the politics of international economics will do. 
This IPE research programme looks indeed for a political economy, 
i.e. the interplay between capitalism and the modem state system in 
its evolution. Quite contrary to the idea of an end of history, this IPE 
schools is heading for a new conceptualisation of the international. 
Anarchy (Realism), international society (British school), world society 
or cobweb (Burton), world system (Wallerstein) are in fact all insuf­
ficient to account for what should actually be the main core of the 
analysis of IR or IPE. It is therefore not fortuitous that at this speci­
111 See chapter 5.



























































































202 Part III. Responses to the Crisis o f Realism
fic point in time the theoretical thought has turned to power: in Rea­
lism power configurations explained the way the international looked 
like. One way to expand and improve the analysis is to improve the 
concept of power and the link from it to the international, whci one 
could call e.g. rule.
Has this research programme already yielded some results?
The answer is yes, but may be not enough.
On the ideological level, as we have already seen in the critique of 
HST (chapter 12), it has highlightened the aim of de-responsibilisa- 
tion that can lay in such concepts like system o f self-help (Waltz) 
linked to the weak state-strong state distinction (Krasner), tectonic 
plates (Krasner), and public goods (Kindleberger) we already dis­
cussed above. Self-help connotates the idea that morals do not apply 
to the international realm and that weak states lose or get exploited 
because they are weak. There is very few about the way how states 
can be systematically weakened in the international system. Power 
arguments are very much arguments about stocks and not flows in 
this view. Krasner’s tectonic plates tell the Third World countries 
they should not overdo their use of regimes, because if those are too 
much against the interest of the strong, the regime with its limited 
advantages for the weaker will erupt (think about the UNESCO 
debate that arose around that time). There is not very much about 
the power configuration of an international system where the threat 
"take it (the regime) or leave it" seems natural at least to Krasner. 
Finally, we get to the core: anarchy/sovereignty. The Neo-Realist 
solution is partly contradicting the Waltzian model. In a systemic 
approach the two first must be linked. If there exists a functional 
differentiation, there is indeed a non-anarchical system. Anarchy can 
accept a differentiation based on capacities (big powers versus small 
powers: hierarchy of a pick-order without a leader) - not a structured 
system of subsystems that are not the same. There is allowed to be a 
quantitative difference of being, but not a qualitative difference of 
task and function. This is one the main reasons why the transposition 
of ideas from the domestic realm to the international realm (the so- 



























































































IPE as an attempt to overcome Realism 203
Expanding on Susan Strange’s structures, however, I would con­
ceive the world as functionally differentiated - without being hier­
archical in the sense of the domestic system. The financial functions 
are certainly not distributed more or less to the sovereign state. 
There is a specific regime, if one wants to call it like that, made up of 
different state (government and central banks) and private actors, 
specific mechanisms (stock and exchange markets) that interplay in 
a specialised way: there exists an international division of finance. 
The same applies for the international ruling of conflict or the 
international organisation of production. It is a transnational fun­
ctional differentiation where it makes more sense to think about 
transnational configuration of actors where governments are sub­
sumed to be part of it. At first hand, those systems are neither 
anarchical, nor hierarchical in the domestic sense, where authority 
seemed mostly concentrated at the state level. Yet, with the modern 
concentration and diffusion of power also at the domestic level, 
traditional stratification and pluralist theories get into trouble: the 
way how the state can be conceptualised is far less obvious than the 
IR anarchy/hierarchy dichotomy would let us to believe. In other 
words, the refusal to give up the anarchy concept is based in a poor 
domestic political theory. The interplay of Western democracy and the 
Western capitalist organisation of the state reproduces at the 
domestic and the international level at the same time an expansion 
of capacities and an unequal diffusion of them. This IPE research pro­
gramme is also about the problem if the last two items are linked 
systematically.
Thus the underlying IR/IPE puzzle about how to conceptualise the 
’international’ reflects the domestic debate about a theory o f the state. 
This makes it even more difficult to come to grips with one of the 
burning research questions today: the integration of a theory of the 
state into IR/IPE or the exact articulation of the internal/external 
divide. Anarchy, hierarchy and sovereignty are thereby just useful as 
formal concepts or in the important legal context. Sure, the security 
dilemma still exists. But all this is just able to provide an increasing­



























































































204 Part III. Responses to the Crisis o f  Realism
ruled. The International system is moving and the historical process 
of internationalisation (and societalisation, démocratisation, individu­
alisation?) above and below the state should not be concealed in 
making the traditional anarchy concept just more complicated. By 
making power structural, IPE points to the move to replace anarchy 




























































































Managing the International Monetary System: 
The Political Economy of Bretton Woods113
As in the second part, theoretical chapters are followed by empirical 
ones. The two more applied topics chosen stem from IPE. The first on 
Bretton-Woods, is one of the major topics in mainstream IPE, espe­
cially for HST. It is a more historical account of foreign economic 
policy (analogous to the containment chapter in part 2). The second 
on Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism (BA) is a specific approach for the 
understanding of the intemal/external articulation for semi-peripher­
al countries in today’s stage of capitalism. As the chapter on crisis 
decision-making, it focuses on policy elaboration - yet, in a different 
way. Whereas foreign policy analysis focuses on processes internal to 
the government, BA focuses on state-society relations. It analyses the 
external and domestic constraints put on a country that is historically 
situated: It is not an approach applicable to all countries, but to some 
of them that find themselves at a specific stage of nation-building and 
economic development. Both chapters have been chosen to show the 
shift of analysis that happened in IR, or now, more precisely, IPE.
113 This section relies heavily on Susan Strange’s analysis as worked out in her 
International Monetary Relations, vol.2 of Andrew Shonfield, ed., International 
Economic Relations in the Western World, 1959-1971 (Oxford University Press, 1976); 



























































































206 Part III. Responses to the Crisis o f  Realism
14.1. The objectives of Bretton-Woods: "Embedded Liberalism"
The Bretton-Woods agreement of 1944 reflected the twofold objective 
of an international monetary system stable enough to allow some 
national autonomy in macroeconomic policy (demand management) 
and based on convertibility and fixed rates. The solution was a Anglo- 
American compromise, whereby the U.S. power position prevailed.
1. "Embedded Liberalism" as a lesson o f the past
First, Bretton-Woods was conceived to preserve some achievements 
of the 20’s and 30’s international monetary management. Neither the 
free flowing at the beginning of the 20’s, nor the collapse of the 
international monetary system during the depression should be re­
peated. The Bretton Woods system draws on a managed (limited) gold 
standard as it is expressed in the conference of Genoa 1922 and the 
Tripartite agreement 1936.
The Genoa conference of 1922 institutionalised - in the context of 
gold supply shortages - a system where some (later so-called) "key 
currencies" could be used as reserve assets. Whereas the key-cur­
rencies (first Sterling, later more Dollar) would keep a gold standard, 
the others could have a Gold-Exchange standard. As during the tradi­
tional Gold Standard, Gold was convertible and freely circulating.
The Tripartite agreement in 1936 was a reaction to the increasing 
short-term ("hot") money flows, due partly to the multiplication of 
financial centers after London’s (relative) decline. Great Britain, 
France, and the U.S. agreed that during "hot"-money attacks, the cen­
tral banks will cooperate to check the exchange rate pressure (be­
cause of short-term balance of payments disequilibria). As under the 
Gold Standard the exchange rates were aimed to be fixed.
Thus, Bretton Woods established a system based on a Gold Ex­
change standard, whereby only one currency was convertible in gold 
and all currencies were supposed to be convertible among them along 
fixed exchange rates - after a transition which took finally much 
longer than originally envisaged: the major European currencies 



























































































The Political Economy o f Bretton Woods 207
Second, BW wanted to release some of the international con­
straints that the Gold Standard put on domestic economic policy.
To recall: the automatic adjustment in a fixed exchange rate 
system with a fixed gold standard was to be done domestically. In a 
country with a balance of payments deficit, the export of gold 
contracts the monetary base (at least in monetarist theory). The 
deflationary effect makes export cheaper and imports dearer. Hence, 
by compressing domestic demand the balance of paymentwill be re­
equilibrated.
It is true that this deflationary policy was rarely applied. Monetary 
authorities - even under the Gold Standard, as Triffin and Arthur I. 
Bloomfield argue, tended to "accommodate" the deflationary pressure 
in order to avoid domestic contraction. Finally, the exchange rates 
were adjusted. Only Great Britain followed this rule, especially 
through interest-rate adjustments. The "leader" took the responsibili­
ty - "delegating" the adjustment to the Empire, esp. India.
In order to avoid these painful domestic adjustments, BW accepted 
a certain domestic autonomy in the balance of payments regimes of 
the different countries. If intervention it was, it was post hoc. This 
was especially important for the leading country, the U.S., which was 
persuaded not to repeat Britain’s policy. Another reason was the 
Keynesian revolution of the 30’s, the New Deal. The U.S. did even at 
that time already make clear that there are certain domestic prio­
rities that could not be challenged.
Bretton-Woods can be summarized as a IMS based on exchange- 
rate stability (even though limited and flexible over time) and gold 
convertibility guarantee (even though only for one currency), i.e. a 
system of loose pre-established rules for multilateral intervention. 
Yet, the fact that this very idea of a national autonomy, which could 
effectively only apply to the key currency in the system, became so 
prominent, is already an indication that BW’s objectives were quite 



























































































208 Part III. Responses to the Crisis of Realism
2. "Embedded liberalism" as reflection ofU.S. interests
Following in a straightforward fashion a Realist approach, the BW 
regime is a surface phenomenon of the underlying power distribution 
in the World Political Economy. The strongest actor by its reserve 
position (more than 60% of total world gold reserves), its credit con­
trol, production competitiveness, and military force prevailed in the 
bargain for the decision of how to mix the objective o f international 
stability and national autonomy.
The French proposal was much in the line of the Tripartite agree­
ment, with a sole link to gold. The common gold-pool should be rela­
tive to the currency held abroad. The British proposal was the most 
ambitious. Under the supervision of Keynes, the UK proposed an in­
ternational currency (BANCOR) as future reserve asset, which was 
fixed to gold. The Gold rate, in turn, could change. This currency 
would be controlled (and supplied) by an international organisation 
which could create credit - and implicitly control every country, the 
U.S. included. Countries in Balance of Payments disequilibria would 
pay interests to this central bank o f central banks. The final draft 
was, however, close to the "White Plan". The size of this central 
bank’s central bank was much smaller (8.8 Bio.$) and credit facilities 
were based on the votes relative to the quota within the International 
Monetary Fund. The adjustment was not to be undertaken by all 
countries, but by all minus one, the one being the U.S. The U.S. veto 
power made of the scarce currency clause a piece of paper. In addition, 
BW did not consider questions of distribution from North to South as 
a priority.
Thus, Bretton Woods became a system which made of the Dollar 
the key currency without imposing any form of international control 
for the national management of this after all international currency. 
This corresponded closely to Western interests. Only later, when the 
U.S. did try to avoid any of the domestic adjustments necessary to 
run an international currency, when burden sharing and exorbitant 
privilege started to be incompatible, U.S. interest ostensibly prevailed 



























































































The Political Economy o f Bretton Woods 209
14.2. Insufficient instruments
The instruments of BW were, however, rudimentary and failed to 
recognize:
- crucial links between the gold market and the exchange market and
between both and the reserve currencies
- problems of liquidity
- rules for IMF intervention
1. The market links
The system was based on the Dollar-Gold-convertibility at a fixed 
price of 35 $/ounce. Exchange rate fluctuations were limited at ±1% 
to the pair value of the currency. The adjustment was to be done by 
"all minus one" (i.e. the Dollar). In order to link international stability 
and national autonomy, an international organisation was put up to 
check the weak link in the whole system, the balance of payments: 
the IMF/IBRD. Especially, the IMF can be seen as an institutio­
nalised "Tripartite agreement" providing short-term credits for 
balance of payments difficulties. The amount of the credits was 
relative to the (fixed) quota the country had in the IMF and was 
submitted to rising conditionality.
Yet, this system failed to recognise the potential tension between, 
on the one hand, a stable gold price fixed by a U.S government decree 
of 1934 and supported now by an international agreement of 1944, 
and on the other hand, a private market for gold. Indeed, the history 
of BW can be partly seen as the history of various attempts to defend 
the discretionary fixed gold price.
Only when the other major currencies became convertible and once 
London had two markets, one for gold, one for the exchange-rates, the 
fluctuations and spill-over between both increased, so to make the 
management of gold necessary.
In 1961, it was no longer possible to fix the price at 35$/ounce by 
decree. A multilateral buffer stock, the Gold pool, was constituted. 



























































































210 Part III. Responses to the Crisis o f Realism
Feb. 1962 on, for buying gold on the market through the Bank of Eng­
land. This worked well, mainly because the Soviet needed foreign cur­
rencies and sold massively gold on the market. When this stopped 
and the production of gold fell in 1967, the Gold Pool busted.
The Two-Tier agreement in 1968 prohibited the selling or buying 
of gold by central banks on the market. It could only be exchanged 
between central banks. A private and an official market was created, 
with no certain rules (a 35$ floor for the private market, as well) and 
with the strong resistance of some gold producers as South Africa. 
Here, the principle of a stable gold price (for stable exchange rates) 
abolished part o f the convertibility o f the key currency into gold. BW’s 
original principles were thus self-contradicting, if not accommodated 
by an intergovernmental adjustment for which there were no rules.
The Bretton Woods system failed consequently to recognise the 
effect these markets could have on the stability o f the reserve 
currencies. First the Sterling, then the Dollar had to be "saved" by 
multilateral agreements.
Starting with the weaker link in the chain: the Sterling. Deeply 
instable because of an "overhang" of balances over reserves and 
susceptible to large-scale shifts of capital through market operation 
in London, Great Britain sought to reinforce its position through a 
series of short and medium-term credit lines, the reinforcement of 
reserves and if all that was not enough, through devaluation. In 1961, 
the first Basle agreement rescued the Sterling from a crisis. Not an 
automatic support by the IMF, but a central bank management 
defended Sterling as a reserve currency through:
- central banks accumulate Sterling for three to six months (with 
exchange rate guarantee)
- hot-money recycling.
In 1964, the IMF help was not enough for the renewed crisis: a massif 
3 Bio.$ loan in 24 h by central banks saved the Sterling. In 1967, 
linked to a package of 3 Bio.$ (IMF = 1.4, GAB = 0.5) credit, the UK 
had to devalue. In 1968, the second Basle agreement put even more 



























































































The Political Economy o f  Bretton Woods 211
a fall of British reserves could be caused as much by Australia, then 
by Great Britain herself.114
The Dollar was backed by different arrangements to provide a 
buffer against its structural overhang over reserves. The short-term 
solutions (that helped also the Sterling) were:
- the $6 Bio. of the GAB (General Agreement to Borrow) installed in 
1961/62 which was not at the disposal of the IMF, but of the 
multilateral surveillance of the Group of Ten. The voting formula has 
been carefully devised in order to give the combined voting power of 
the EEC participants a veto on a borrowing by the two reserve 
countries. (French and Dutch pressure). No delegation to IMF. No 
inclusion of other countries.115
Specific American help mechanisms were:
- the increase of the quota (and therefore the amount of cheap credit) 
in 1959,
- the introduction of SDR’s (67: in Rio, 68: Stockholm), and finally
- the breakdown of the Dollar’s convertibility: 68 in Two-Tier 
agreement and then in 1971 through the suspension of Gold-Dollar 
link.
2. The liquidity debate
The defence of the Dollar was, in a certain way, disguised as a liqui­
dity debate. In BW, no mechanism was established for the creation 
of liquidity. In a world of rising trade and increasing "hot''-money 
movements through the integration of financial markets, the part of 
currency reserves as compared to gold was logically rising (Gold 
supply being restricted). Liquidity becomes linked to the Dollar 
supply, which, in turn, is at the discretion of a national authority 
whose balance of payment can go unchecked.
114 Britain’s liability was transformed from an obligation to provide foreign ex­
change for Sterling held in London into an obligation to write up the values of gua­
ranteed balances in case Sterling should be devalued or $ revalued (= $ guarantee. 
Generally a monetary guarantee for mutual protection against exchange rate 
volatility).



























































































212 Part III. Responses to the Crisis o f Realism
The erratic growth of liquidity was therefore at the mercy o f U.S. 
interests. U.S. strategic policies (Vietnam) and its private foreign 
direct investment provided the liquidity - but without an internation­
al check and eventually without the monetary base (reserves). The 
Gold-Dollar Exchange Standard became a Dollar-Paper Standard. 
Meanwhile, this served well American interests abroad in the inter­
national production and security sphere.
3. The rules for IMF intervention
No rules for the permission of credits were developed beforehand. 
They evolved during the late 50’s as e.g. the letter of intent (with the 
stand-by agreement for Peru in 1958) and the later attenuated "prior 
notice" clause (the IMF right to suspend credit) applied 1958 for 
Bolivia.
The logic of the tasks the IMF had to perform ("to adjust the 
international monetary system") contributed to an increase of its 
responsibilities:
- through "multilateral surveillance" delegated by the Group of Ten
- through the later crated SDK’s and
- through the stand-by agreements (from 1952 on).
Yet, its institutional bias fixed at BW, still reflects an intergovern­
mental bargain, where the Western World, and in particular the U.S., 
can let their interests prevail.
14.3. The internal contradiction of the regime of Bretton 
Woods
BW was based on an internal contradiction between, on the one hand, 
its aim, i.e. the mix of an intergovernmental regime and national 
autonomy, and, on the other hand, its main principle, the "one 
currency" standard. To be put in a nutshell: the only country for 
which autonomy can mean anything in a one-currency system, the 
currency provider, is exactly the country where no need to adjust is 



























































































The Political Economy o f Bretton Woods 213
intergovernmentality for the others. (As the Balance of power policy of 
Great Britain in the 19th century: power for Britain, and balancing 
the rest.)
On the one hand, BW has an intergovernmental logic; therefore, 
the IMF (even though the voting power makes some more equal than 
others). Yet, for the stand-by agreements and for the eventual deva­
luations, no set of rules was established that could automatically be 
applied to situations, especially of chronic international debt and 
requiring the imposition of multilateral surveillance on the debtor 
country. In addition to that, creditors could always opt out, as the 
French did with regard to Britain in 1965 and in 1967. The interna­
tional form of the surveillance had to be developed as the Working 
Party III of the OECD and the BIS during the 60’s.
Yet, this intergovernmental logic was strongly attenuated by the 
passible veto of its strongest parts and most prominently by its re­
liance on one country, for which no check was provided, no self-re­
straint pursued. A system cannot be automatically adjusted, if some 
of the basic functions are reserved to the discretionary politics o f one 
country.
If there is one coherence in the behavior of the United States 
within BW, then that the international constraint was never allowed 
to interfere too much into domestic policies - a goal other countries 
could not even pursue. The U.S. handled the international currency, 
the Dollar, as if it were a strictly domestic one.116 It did not adjust 
domestically, as did the UK (with the "burden sharing" help of e.g. 
India). The new asset, the SDR, potentially an improvement into the 
direction of a real intergovernmental system, was in fact not intro­
duced to help the U.S. mitigate the external constraints.
In a system which expresses the underlying balance of bargaining 
power (or maybe better: the correlation of forces?) where the leader 
was neither confronted with a fixed set of rules for crucial adjustment 
processes, nor constrained by the existing principles, to act in self-en­



























































































214 Part III. Responses to the Crisis o f Realism
lightened manner, the tension between the national and international 
logic might not always be resolved in favour of the former.
When the leader does not adjust to the system, the system adjusts 
to the interests of the leader.
14.4. Bretton Woods: A case of Hegemonic Stability Theory?
The very way the Bretton Woods system has been presented here, fol­
lowed a rather typical IPE approach that integrates from the outset 
the main actor’s capabilities, interests and policies into an analysis 
of international economic relations. This is important to note. The 
study of political mechanisms and bargains is not introduced post hoc 
to explain why suboptimal economic choices have been made. This is 
the typical move an economic policy analysis. It starts by presenting 
blueprints for policy action that are based on strictly economic criteria 
of efficiency. It compares actual choices with the blueprints and ac­
counts for the variance with the popular argument that the politi­
cians ’messed it up.’ Politics corresponds here to a residual category, 
the dummy variable of a statistical equation. Political Economy re­
fuses such an approach. If the blueprint does not work it should inte­
grate the variables that are political.
Now, having followed the evolution of Bretton-Woods, the rele­
vance of Hegemonic Stability Theory can be assessed with regard to 
international monetary relations: Do we need a (one) hegemon? Were 
the U.S. and GB comparably strong to play such a role? Is the decline 
of U.S. power responsible for the breaking up of Bretton Woods?
With regard to the first question, it is of some interest that 
Kindleberger’s initial study was primarily on monetary (and not 
trade) relations. One should expect therefore that Hegemonic Stabi­
lity Theory fits rather well the case. And indeed, there seems to be a 
difference also in the domestic management of money and commerce.
The management of money is something which cannot just be left 
to the market or economic agents. Nowhere it is. It seems that it 



























































































The Political Economy o f Bretton Woods 215
the development of stable labour relations and markets)117, but a 
centralized structure with a primordial currency as standard of value 
and measuring rod. Therefore, a functioning international capitalist 
system presupposes a centralized money management - yet in a way 
that no other economic ’issue area’ does.
Now, centralized money management does not mean a monopoly 
position for one country and its currency: it could very much be a 
multilateral management with a basket currency, i.e. something like 
Keynes’ initial plan or what is at stake at the European Central Bank 
and the ECU. Also SDR’s could have been developed in that way. Yet, 
monetary management is so primordial for economic relations, that 
those countries with a relatively independent currency are rather 
jealous for any intrusion into their ’sovereignty’. In that respect, we 
might indeed need a hegemon - but because the hegemons wants it 
like that, not because of any economic or financial necessity.
A last remark on this first question of the necessary hegemon. 
There is this strange word of the hegemons’ sacrifices for the interna­
tional interest.’118 Besides the idealist assumptions exceptional for 
Realism, this argument can only run, if one takes the hegemon as a 
kind of unified actor. Obviously, the amazing development of (initially 
almost exclusively USAmerican) MNCs have indirectly provided the 
U.S. with considerable windfalls. Their declining bases in the U.S. 
might indicate a loss of U.S. power (even though the argument is not 
straightforward). Yet, the export of production sites abroad (the 
haunting de-industrialisation) of the U.S. is no effect o f free-riding (as 
the second thesis of HST has it). Foreigners cannot be blamed for it. 
The responsibility, if there is an individualised one, lays exactly in
117 This is one of the main initial insights of Institutional Economics. See e.g. S. 
Todd Lowry, "Bargain and Contract Theory in Law and Economics." In Samuels J. 
Warren, ed., The Economy as a System o f Power. Papers form the Journal of 
Economic Issues, Vol.I: Corporate Systems (New Brunswick, N. J.: Transaction Books, 
1979), pp.261-282; among O.E. Williamson’s writings, see e.g. Economic Organiza­
tion: Firms, Markets, and Policy Control (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1985); and Geoffrey 
M. Hodgson, Economics and Institutions. A Manifesto for a Modern Institutional 
Economics (Cambridge et al.: Polity Press, 1988).



























































































216 Part III. Responses to the Crisis o f Realism
the free trade dogmas the U.S. (and others) are most prominent to 
championing. In other words, the hegemonic position might entail 
some national costs, but even more private American benefits that 
derived from the open world economy where the U.S. could profit 
from its hegemonic position. During the decolonization the U.S could 
disclose new markets and production sites, as well as cheap sources 
of raw material. The Third World wars have resulted in a type of 
pacification where a rather reliable legal framework for the working 
of the MNC’s could be installed.
Decolonization meant acceleration of the introduction of advanced 
capitalism into the Third World, and the United States was the most 
efficient capitalist. The postwar regimes in international trade and finance 
brought worldwide prosperity, not least to the United States.119
Let us then turn to the second question: to what extent are GB 
and the U.S. comparable powers for the role of the hegemon? Bruce 
Russet has put together some of the main economic indicators 
through which hegemony could be assessed. The results shed some 
twilight on the possibility to empirically operationalise ’hegemony’ as 
understood by HST. The U.S. is still more leading in GDP, manufac­
turing, than UK at any time of its so-called hegemony. The decline is 
a relative one, understandable in comparison with the exceptional 
post-worldwar II height.120 The United Kingdom was never the do­
minant power as measured by either GNP or military expenditures. 
If they are comparable cases of hegemony, HST must provide more 
specific analysis of historical ways hegemony emerges. Otherwise, the 
concept is too vague to explain very much.
From this follows, that claims for ’burden-sharing’ or for whatever 
other help to sustain the hegemon cannot be unambiguously substan­
tiated. It might be true that the U.S. could no longer be reasonably 
expected to sustain the system. The opposite argument, however, 
could hold as well, namely that it just shifted unilaterally the burden
119 Bruce Russett, "The mysterious case of vanishing hegemony: or is Mark Twain 




























































































The Political Economy o f Bretton Woods 217
of adaptation and stabilization to the international system. One could 
call this the hegemon’s privilege to export adjustment.
The core of the explanation, in turn, shifts from an insufficient 
structural power constellation to a rigid state-society relation in the 
U.S. Maybe there is even a more general point to be made. Welfare 
States might structurally be less able to manage such a system 
(especially if they go to a costly war). Then, HST either implies 
turning back to the 19th Century state or to a form of multilateral 
management where the hegemon must over time give up part of its 
privileges.121 Or there is just the incapacity of the U.S. state-society 
to handle its domestic and international development. Such topics are 
not yet part of HST.
Finally there remains the related question if it was indeed a loss 
of power that induced the U.S. to break off the system. The assess­
ment of power is, however, not as easy as HST would wish. Even 
granted we could take economic indicators that are roughly measur­
able, a loss of U.S. power position appears only after the mid 70s. 
Only then got the U.S. sufficiently ’weak’ to expect the demise of a 
’regime.’ Contrary to regime’s expectations, though, it seems rather 
more reasonable to argue that the breakdown of the regime preceded 
a significant weak power position. Naturally this can be explained 
away by anticipation or another clever move. The main point is that 
the concept of power, as it is used here, does not provide a sufficient 
measure to sustain the argument. Its use feigns a solution to a pro­
blem that power itself conceals.
Take some other features of power. States might have lost 
generally of their capacity to control outcomes (to structures like 
markets or other actors like IOs or MNCs). If this is true, no 
intergovernmental collaboration might be enough - i f  the rules o f  the 
game remain untouched (through which markets, regimes, and actors
121 The same argument applies if a version of HST should appear in a German 
led European Union, or for the same European Union with regard to its peripheral 



























































































218 Part III. Responses to the Crisis of Realism.
might get constrained). Secondly, as long as a hegemon can avoid or 
veto any different international economic management, it is enough 
to preserve its interests: the other must adjust. The exact line where 
this might not hold any longer, seems rather impossible to assess. 
Finally, one should just refer to the extraordinary ideological 
monopoly that free-trade capitalism enjoys today. It is by now so 
encompassing that it appears hard to imagine any alternative. The 
American way of life has been seen very close to a cultural hegemonic 
position. All those items benefit the U.S. (exports, e.g.), without being 
measurable or reducible to a material base.
Conceptually and empirically, therefore, the assessment of the 
validity of theses 2 and 3 of Hegemonic Stability Theory are strenu­
ous. Thesis 1 could be reasonably defended for the monetary regime. 
But it is also the only one which was part of the discourse in 





























































































The Political Economy of Development. 
Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism in Brazil
Introduction
As in Part II, one of the two more empirical chapters covers a more 
systemic example, i.e. one of the macro-level of international rela­
tions, whereas the other concentrates on the micro-level, i.e. insertion 
and policy-making of an international actor in the international 
realm. Was the first on crisis-management focusing on a specific and 
typical feature of the Cold War and East-West relations, so is this 
example taken from the North-South divide which increasingly came 
onto the agenda during the 70s. This implies a shift in the approach. 
It is neither the question to see how the international system articu­
lates the North-South conflict (as the chapter on Bretton-Woods men­
tions it by the very exclusion of the Third World as a principal actor), 
but how one country and its societal actors link up and are shaped by 
the integration into the world political economy. In other words, the 
question is about the internal and external determinants for economic 
and political development, as exemplified by a case of the South. The 
case could have been spuriously chosen. The reasons why Brazil and 
why at a specific moment in time need yet to be justified.
First, Brazil is a big country with a large internal market. It has 



























































































220 Part III. Responses to the Crisis o f Realism
War II that made one expect to find them following the track of the 
Northern rich democracies. In that respect, it is a better case to think 
about possibilities of development than countries that have not even 
started their industrialization. Brazil is in, what I. Wallerstein would 
call, the semi-periphery, i.e. economically and politically closer to the 
North, therefore for a longtime considered on a presumed way to it. 
In 1964, however, rid by an already uncontrolled external debt crisis 
and internal domestic inequalities, the military once more take over 
the government. The conventional ’modernisation thesis’ which links 
up economic development with political democracy seemed not to 
hold: Brazil was getting more developed - and more authoritarian.
The second reason is the effective integration of Brazil into the 
world political economy. It is a country since long exposed to the 
international market and to the investments of foreign firms. The 
case is therefore an obvious example of the effects such integration 
can have on development. Theories of dependency have been using 
the Brazilian case extensively. Some of the outstanding scholars in 
the field are Brazilian.
Finally, the Brazilian case has been studied domestically and 
internationally with the use of frameworks that allow not only the 
traditional dependency approach, but to integrate it with the analysis 
of the domestic regime. This interplay of external constraints and 
domestic adaptation is the basis of O’Donnell’s approach in compara­
tive politics that has become known as bureaucratic-authoritarianism. 
To quote one of the leading scholars in political development, Samuel 
P. Huntington,
O’Donnell’s theory of bureaucratic authoritarianism was a first approxima­
tion of such a model and is, in a sense, a prototype of the sort of region- 
and culture specific theoretical model that is desirable.122
This case, as the Cuba chapter, will be analysed from a point of crisis, 
here the military coup of 1964. The stress on policy-making, however,
122 Samuel P. Huntington, The Goals of Development. In Myron Weiner and 




























































































Bureaucratic Authoritarianism in Brazil 221
is here not only diplomatic and military, but also social and economic. 
The Cuba case linked up international relations with political science, 
in the sense of decision-making. This Brazil case will link up interna­
tional political economy with comparative politics.
15.1. Chronology of a coup: Brazil 1964
1. The origins o f a dilemma
Brazil was caught from the 50s on into a dilemma of external and 
internal disequilibria.
The balance of payments deficits added up already in the 50s to 
$2.5 Bio. Driven by a trade deficit, this latter was financed essentially 
through borrowing on the financial markets, rather than through for­
eign direct investment (FDI) or bilateral and multilateral loans. 
Meanwhile the domestic policies never really controlled inflation. The 
instrumentarium of aggressive export promotion or import control 
was not particularly appreciated by the International Organisations 
it depended on. The haunting recession, in turn, led different govern­
ments refrain from attacking the structural trade deficit by deflation 
and recessionary import reduction. So, they fueled the domestic 
growth with expansionary policies. The socio-political reason was that 
the coffee planters, upper and normal middle class, as well as urban 
working class were all mobilized social actors. So, every president 
was elected by a populist coalition which discouraged strategies that 
could have put a member of the coalition at a disadvantage. Inflation 
and growth allowed not to make painful distributive choices.
In a certain way, therefore, the chronology leading to the coup can 
be read as the final stroke to a series of failed attempts to stabilise 
the worsening economic disequilibria.
2. Chronology o f failed stabilization policies
Let us start with the populist government under President Getulio 



























































































222 Part III. Responses to the Crisis o f Realism
controls (against inflation, especially unpopular with local business), 
exchange rate reforms (to liberalise trade) and the abolition of profit 
remittances (to attract foreign investment). Yet faced with rising 
discontent, Vargas decreed a 100% increase in the minimum wage. In 
1954, Vargas, pushed by a "ultimatum" of the military, committed 
suicide leaving the famous letter that accused international cartels for 
his failure.
Under his successor Café Filho, and in close consultation with the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), another stabilisation policy with 
even more drastic credit controls was installed. After the bust of 
many banks and firms, the policy was relaxed, the basic problem not 
resolved.
In 1958, his successor Juscelino Kubitchek needed to secure a $300 
Million loan form the United States in order to come to a (stand-by) 
agreement with the IMF on stabilisation measures. He cut back the 
coffee purchase programme (a measure obviously opposed by the 
agrarian elite) and re-tightened the credit control. Yet, after strong 
critiques from the agrarian elite, business that was backed by the 
President of the Bank of Brazil, and nationalist fractions in the 
military, and after only half-hearted implementations, Kubitchek 
broke off the negotiation. At the time, it was still not too difficult to 
find the necessary money on international markets. Yet, this money 
was generally short-term high-interest borrowing.
Hence, Kubitchek just handled over a bigger problem to his suc­
cessor, Jânio Quadros. Faced with a foreign debt of $2 Bio. to be 
repaid in his four years of office (600 Mio. in the first year 1961), 
Quadros imposed another stabilisation programme mainly based on 
a new and simplified dual and finally (July) single exchange-rate 
system and another credit control. He succeeded to negotiate new 
credits and to let reschedule old ones with the U.S. and European 
creditors. Yet, after eight months, Quadros resigned. This has fueled 
several conspiracy theories. True, Quadros mixed a domestically tight 
policy with a foreign more nationalist and more anti-U.S. standpoint, 
especially with regard to the question of Cuba. But this foreign move 



























































































Bureaucratic Authoritarianism in Brazil 223
to keep it as a loyal opposition.123 Domestically, it seems that he 
resigned to be asked back in a stronger position.124 He was not and 
got replaced by his Vice-President, Jodo Goulart who had condemned 
Quadras’ reforms.
It was up to Goulart to tackle an economic crisis. In 1963, 
GNP/capita fall by 1.5%. In March 1964, the projected inflation was 
100%; the debt repayment burden ate up 45% of Brazilian exports. 
Goulart had to get a stand-by agreement with the IMF. The resulting 
stabilisation policy included a reduction of the budget deficit, of the 
money supply, of wages and a return to Quadras’ simple exchange 
rate system. Yet, Goulart did not resist to the pressures: he raised the 
pay of government employees (including the military) by 70% and re­
introduced a "Profit Remittance Law" in 1962. This prompted U.S. re­
actions of a specific kind. Following Cheryl Payer
The U.S. indicated its distaste for Goulart in numerous ways, but 
primarily through its aid policy. It did not merely cut off aid to the central 
government, refusing all budgetary and balance-of-payments support that 
would benefit Goulart directly. It continued giving aid to certain conserva­
tive state governors with whom it thought it could do business - the so- 
called ’islands of sanity’ strategy. This ploy was aimed at keeping a 
foothold in Brazilian politics despite Goulart, and most probably also 
intended to encourage subversion of the Goulart government (Testimony 
of US officials to Congressional committees on this subject is laced with 
security deletions.)125
Goulart shifted even more to the left announcing the expropriation 
and redistribution of land and the nationalisation of the oil refineries 
in Brazil.
The 1.4.1964, the military took over power in a coup. The new 
President Castello Branco found no foreign exchange reserves and 
had $300 Mio. of current bills to pay mainly to U.S. companies.
123 For this argument, see Robert R. Kaufman, "Democratic and authoritarian 
responses to the debt issue: Argentina, Brazil, Mexico. International Organization, 
vol.39, no.3, pp.492ff.
124 This is Cheryl Payers’ view, otherwise not very sympathetic to the U.S. See 




























































































224 Part III. Responses to the Crisis o f Realism
3. Military against society: stabilisation 1964-67
The new economic programme, considered not a chock-treatment, but 
a gradualist policy, included a programme to diversify and promote 
exports, a reduction of the size of the public sector, full-cost pricing 
polcies in public enterprises (utilities, transportation), an encourage­
ment of the expansion of private enterprises, the reorganization of fi­
nancial structure through creation of central bank and the creation 
of a market for government securities. This represents a policy impro­
ving the policy makers’ control over the market and privileging priva­
te capital; yet not as drastic as post-73 Chile or post-76 Argentina.
As successes can be considered: the reduced rate of inflation (41% 
in 1966), a major foreign debt renegotiation, the surplus of balance of 
payments, a reduction of the federal deficit from 4.2% of the GDP in 
1963 to 1.1% in 1966. Yet, the backdrops are important: high un­
employment and bankruptcies, a balance of payments surplus that 
was not that much linked to improved exports but to recession-indu­
ced declining imports. Still, the two main architects of the pro­
gramme, Campos and Bulhoes continued to believe in excess demand.
Politically, economic policy-makers had the biggest room for 
manoeuvre since 1945 due to a strong repression: stripping congress­
men of their legislative mandates, purging governors and mayors 
from their offices, prohibition of most student organizations and virtu­
ally all political parties of the left.126 This allowed a redistribution 
within the society which was blocked before. Negatively affected were:
- wage earners (cut in real wages 20-25% from 1964-1967 and freeze
of the federally decreed minimum wage);
- a part of domestic entrepreneurs (reduced protection, end of the
frequent policy to provide subsidized credits from the Bank of
Brazil in times of liquidity difficulties)
- coffee producers (less subsidies through fixed buying)
126 Thomas E. Skidmore, "The political economy of policy-making in authoritarian 
Brazil, 1967-1970." In Generals in Retreat, edited by Philip O’Brien and Paul 



























































































Bureaucratic Authoritarianism in Brazil 225
Positively affected were especially the state and its policy makers 
(through an expansion of state enterprises and a reformed central 
bank system), and foreign investors, because the profit remittance 
law was abolished and concessions granted to foreign capital engaged 
in export trade. Yet, Castello Branco’s government did not manage to 
rescue its balance of payment position through FDI, but through pub­
lic loans or credits. Between 1964 and 1968, the U.S. granted aid of 
about $1.6 Bio. (!) and in 1965, the IMF accepted a stand-by agree­
ment.
4. Military and ’dependent development’, 1967-1970
With the new government of General Costa e Silva, a new equipe of 
economists around Antonio Delfim Neto took over the economic policy­
making.127 For them, inflation was cost-induced. They eased credits 
and in 1967, credit expanded by 57%, with an inflation of only 24% 
and a growth rate of 4.8%. The outlook of these policies was not at all 
the ’Chicago-boy-type’, but strengthened further the state influence 
on the economy, while trying to develop a local entrepreneurial class 
able to cope with the international competition for the Brazilian and 
foreign markets.
This policy intervened in the agricultural sector to stabilize expec­
tation through tax advantages and minimum prizes. It controlled 
price increases and manipulated the minimum wage for a long-term 
wage control. Finally, it introduces a more stable environment on the 
foreign exchange market: with a structural inflation rate gap to the 
U.S., Neto decided to use the reformed central bank for a more fle­
xible exchange rate management with frequent, yet small devalua­
tions, Brazil’s so-called crawling peg.
So far, for the chronology. How does one analyse this crisis and the 
underlying dilemma between the need for modernization to face up 
with international economic competition and domestic political claims



























































































226 Part III. Responses to the Crisis o f  Realism
vis-à-vis a political system on its way towards democracy? Is the 
military coup the expression of a typical reaction of a semi-peripheral 
country at a specific point of its industrialization? If modernity means 
democracy, does modernization sometimes, but necessarily entail 
authoritarianism? What is the articulation of the world political 
economy with a country in the struggle for economic and political 
development?
Those are the kind of questions that arise with approaches com­
bining comparative politics in the South with dependency and related 
IPE approaches. Since the latter have been presented before, we will 
turn to comparative politics as applied to Latin America.
15.2. Comparative politics of military rule: Brazil’s 'Mass
Praetorian Coup"
Since the 60s, the prevailing existence of military regimes had attrac­
ted not only research in the traditional static comparative manner, 
namely as an example of authoritarianism in a typology of political 
systems, but also as part of dynamic theories and typologies. The 
most influential have certainly been Samuel Finer’s work that concen­
trates on the conditions and dynamics of military intervention with 
regard to the political system128 and Samuel P. Huntington who ex­
panded his research in order to link it up with theories of economic 
modernization, i.e. to a theory of political development.129
It is this latter which is our starting point. Huntington’s basic idea 
is that socio-economic modernization does not automatically entail po­
litical development, but should be analysed around the possible gap 
between aspirations raised by modernusation and actual performance. 
This is the classical demand-performance gap theory (see Figure 6).
In this analysis, the initial gap will then produce instability if the 
political system is not able either to fetter it either economically, or
128 Samuel E. Finer, The man on horseback (London: 1962/69, 3rd ed.).
129 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: 



























































































Bureaucratic Authoritarianism in Brazil 227
Figure G Huntington’s gap theory (in Lee Sigelman, Understanding Political 
Instability. An evaluation of the mobilization - institutionalization approach. 



























































































228 Part III. Responses to the Crisis o f Realism
through social mobilization or finally through political participation. 
If we just for a moment apply this idea crudely to our Brazilian case, 
it seems that since neither the social, nor the political mobility was 
given (for the relatively inflexible class-structure), stability was 
achieved through economic wealth. Once this wealth cannot be upheld 
anymore (because not domestically financed), the political system dis­
aggregates and the risk of a coup increases (if the military is a 
prominent actor in the political system).
Such a system, where the military can play a major role is called 
a praetorian system.
In a praetorian system, social forces confront each other nakedly; no 
political institutions, no corps of professional political leaders are 
recognized or accepted as the legitimate intermediaries to moderate group 
conflict.130
The role the military plays, is dependent on the degree of societal 
development
As society changes, so does the role of the military. In the world of 
oligarchy the soldier is a radical; in the middle class world, he is a 
participant and arbiter; as the mass society looms on the horizon, he 
becomes the conservative guardian of the existing order.131
Following this general line, Brazil’s military can indeed be analysed 
as having gone through three stages.
1. Latent praetorianism132 or the primacy of the professional 
soldier (1889-1920/30). Following the war against Paraguay, the 
military became a major actor in Brazil. As the government does not 
fulfil its claims, in a coalition with the coffee oligarchy it overturns 
the Empire in 1889.
2. Radical praetorianism or the military as participant and arbiter 
(1920/30-1945). The corporatist need to provide the military with ever 
expanding resources, pushed the more reformist part of the army to 
ally itself with the middle classes against the former allies, the coffee
130 Huntington, Political Order..., p.196.
131 ibid., p.221.
132 This expression is Amos Perlmutter’s in The Military and Politics in Modern 



























































































Bureaucratie Authoritarianism in Brazil 229
elite. The "Revolution" of 1930 that brought to an end the "Old 
Republic" marked the definite entrance of the military as a partici­
pant on the political scene, it became a military party.133 The rule 
under the Estado Novo of Vargas realised all the military wishes. Yet, 
bit by bit Vargas’ nationalist and increasingly populist stand was cri­
ticised by the military, aware of the need of foreign capital for the 
industrialisation necessary to sustain the growth of military power. 
Finally, the externally oriented branch prevailed and Vargas was 
removed in 1945.
3. Mass praetorianism or the decline of the professional corps 
(1945-1964). The increased politicisation of the military made its role 
as an arbiter more and more strenuous. The possible military appeal 
directly to the labor forces alienated the middle classes traditionally 
in favour of its arbiter role. On the other hand, the exercise of power 
put strains on the internal coherence of the corps. Finally, the labor 
movements threatened the corporate interests of the military. In the 
end, the military became not an arbiter (poder moderador), but a 
guardian intervening by veto-coups.
This is a long story for explaining why in a society which has not 
developed and institutionalised in the same pace as the economy, the 
military as the major force intervenes to uphold the internal stability 
- in its interests. The coup in Brazil is thereby explained essentially 
from the inside, the logic of the corporatist behaviour of the major 
force, the military party. This domestic approach is considered 
insufficient by Guillermo O’Donnell who will try to integrate this 
domestic gap approach with international constraints given by late 
late industrialisation.
133 See for this Manuel Domingos Neto, "L’influence étrangère et la formation des 
groupes et tendances au sein de l’armée brésilienne (1889-1930)." In Alain Rouquié, 
ed., Les Partis Militaires au Brésil (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des 



























































































230 Part III. Responses to the Crisis o f Realism
15.3. Bureaucratic Authoritarianism
1. Origins o f Bureaucratic Authoritarianism (BA)
Late late industrialisation is A. Hirschman’s extension of the eco­
nomic historian Gerschenkron’s analysis of the different dynamics 
and necessities of those countries that have a delayed industrializa­
tion. It stresses the competitive influence that the international 
market exerts on newcomers and develops the internal dynamics that 
have led to authoritarian turns in different countries (see 
Figure 7).134
As shown by the figure, there are three primary variables, two of 
which produce the demand-performance gap, namely first, popular 
mobilisation and second -this is where O’Donnell departs from Hun­
tington- the necessities linked to the industrialization process of late 
late industrialisers having come to the end of the initial phase of in­
dustrialization (and import substitution). This last point has been 
called the deepening process and needs some explanation.
O’Donnell has analysed especially the Argentinian and Brazilian 
case of industrialisation. In both countries, he has noticed a certain 
correlation between phases of industrialisation and political regimes. 
So, for instance, do the initial phases of industrialization appear to be 
linked to populism. Yet, what is an initial phase? In the Brazilian 
case this applies to the inter-war period till around 1950. The Great 
depression had a stimulating impact on Brazilian industrialisation. 
Through the fall of possible imports and the attempt to smooth the 
effects by pump-priming policies, especially the light industrial 
branches (e.g. consumer goods like textiles) played an important role 
in providing industrial input. This phase is therefore one of (more or 
less involuntary) import substitution. It was coupled with a political 
populist, i.e. broad, regime that could handle it without imposing a
134 The figure is taken from David Collier, "Overview of the Bureaucratic 
Authoritarian Model." In David Collier, ed., The New Authoritarianism in Latin 
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232 Part III. Responses to the Crisis o f Realism
hegemonic class structure.135
O’Donnell argues that this phase came to an end and that indus­
trial bottlenecks arise in the passage to the second phase. The second 
phase is reached when an economy passes from the import-substitu­
tion of light industries to the autonomous production of consumer 
durables and intermediary capital goods, i.e. deepening. Deepening is 
necessary to sustain a (relatively) self-reliant industrialisation. 
Unfortunately, developing countries face a dilemma. Either they avoid 
the dependence on foreign capital by opting for an autonomous deve­
lopment, but risk thereby to engage in a long-term and insecure pro­
ject (the not particularly successful Eastern European socialist stra­
tegy) whose main result could be the protection of domestic elites. Or, 
they take the shortcut by relying on imported technology and capital, 
but thereby put multiple strain on the traditional populist policies. 
First, foreign exchange is required to pay the industrial imports. Or, 
in order to avoid this problem, one must provide a positive ’invest­
ment climate’ for foreign investment that provides the technology.136 
Finally, one should encourage exports.
Now, an efficient fiscal systems giving the government resources 
for intervention, export promotion, and exchange rate stability 
possibly with foreign exchange surplus, maybe linked to trade 
liberalisation (freer access to the markets for those that should come 
to invest) - all seems to presuppose a strong policy shi|t away from
the more traditional populist strategy. It constrains the buying out ofw
interest groups, where clear cut distribution choices remained impro­
bable due to the insecure policy base of government\oalitions in 
praetorian societies - and were diligently avoided. Since, on top of it, 
the initial industrialisation left
135 For this argument, see Robert R. Kaufman, "Industrial change and authoritar­
ian rule in Latin America: A concrete review of the bureaucratic authoritarian model. 
In David Collier, ed., The New Authoritarianism in Latin America (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1979), p.202f.
136 Yet, foreign investment does not automatically provide the necessary spill­



























































































Bureaucratic Authoritarianism in Brazil 233
a high-cost industrial structure, unable to compete effectively in world 
markets, an undercapitalized or inefficient agro-export sector; and 
inadequate mechanisms for mobilizing public and private resources137
only the state and international capital were able to provide the sta­
bility and carry out the policies necessary for the deepening.
Yet, Brazil is faced with an international system where first indus- 
trialisers (Great Britain) and late industrialisers (Southern Europe) 
have already accomplished these industrial phases.138 Therefore, 
strong external constraints and internal socio-political stalemates of 
a praetorian society (with strong military parties) will produce the 
demand-performance gap which is supposed to trigger a violent solu­
tion. The double corporate reaction of the military and the technocra­
tic elite able to link up with foreign actors and to supervise the new 
phase of industrialisation, will forge the coalition base of the new 
regime, bureaucratic-authoritarianism.
2. Dynamics o f BA
O’Donnell has elaborated on this model (mainly applied to Brazil, Ar­
gentina and Mexico), as an ideal-type for comparison with other au­
thoritarian regimes of different dynamic (Chile 1973 and Uruguay) 
and outside Latin America (Officer’s Greece, Franchist Spain, Tur­
key).
Two main dynamic aspects, i.e. internal contradictions that spur 
change, have retained his attention: first, the nature of the intra- 
coalitional relations, and second, the relation of the regime to its 
political base in the civil society.
137 ibid., p.204. Just to give a figure for the efforts of the Neto equipe. It raised 
the number of individual tax payers from 470000 in 1967 to 4 Mio. in 1969.
138 At least to a certain extent. See James K. Kurth, "Industrial Change and 
Political Change: A European Perspective." In David Collier, ed., The New 
Authoritarianism in Latin America (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 
pp.319-362; and Dieter Senghaas, Von Europa lernen. Entwicklungsgeschichtliche 



























































































234 Part III. Responses to the Crisis o f Realism
The BA coalition of state-international capital coalition is built on 
a mutual dependence of the BA state on international capital for dee­
pening and vice versa for the stabilization policies necessary to create 
a favorable ’investment climate.’ The BA state, even in all the critical 
literature, is characterised by the political and economic exclusion of 
the labor forces and the popular sector. The gap is bridged by dimini­
shing the possibilities of raising demands or aspirations from the wea­
kest corporate actor or interest group in the system, organized labor 
and lower classes. Decreasing real wages and the abolition of all poli­
tical channels (outside the military or bureaucratic corporations) are 
just some indices. Yet
international capital alone would have created a political impossibility: 
namely, an increasingly internationalized national economy in which its 
most dynamic sectors would devour, in unfettered Darwinian fashion, what 
was left of national capital. Because of this, the BA neither floats above 
the social classes in sovereign fashion, carrying out its projects of "national 
grandeur", nor is it the puppet or representative of international capital, 
even during the first stage when it opens itself and society to it. Social 
reality is more complex and changeable.139 140
Therefore the BA state will try in a second stage to strengthen the 
local bourgeoisie creating thereby a triangle on which it can gain leve­
rage between both, local and international capital. The articulation 
of this triangle is, in Peter Evans’ analysis, a way to understand 
dependent development.140 The obvious corollary of this kind of 
analysis is a renewed and intensive research on the concept and the 
theory o f the state which becomes the central point of articulation of 
the analysis141, and, indeed, for all those theories in IPE that at­
tempt to overcome the limits of Neo-Realism. Without a conceptuali­
139 Guillermo O’Donnell (1978) Reflections on the patterns of change in the 
bureaucratic-authoritarian state. Latin American Research Review vol.13, no.l, p.15.
140 Peter Evans, Dependent Development. The alliance o f multinational, state and 
local capital in Brazil (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), p.31.
141 See O’Donnell, "Tensions in the Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State and the 
Question of Democracy", p.287f., and Fernando Henrique Cardoso, "On the 
characterisation of authoritarian regimes in Latin America", p.53f. Both in David 
Collier, ed., The New Authoritarianism...-, P. Evans, T. Skocpol and D. Rueschemeyer, 



























































































Bureaucratie Authoritarianism in Brazil 235
sation of the state (it does not need and cannot be a full-fledged 
general theory), this project of IPE will not advance.
The state-society relation is the second dynamic aspect, O’Donnell 
analyses. The basic puzzle is the recurring rhetoric of democracy deli­
vered by a regime that has come to power exactly for the opposite 
goal. O’Donnell argues, and therefore this requires a specific concep­
tion of the state, that the BA state, by cutting the traditional media­
tions between the state and civil society deprives itself from the con­
sensual mechanisms necessary to rule. It cannot appear any more as 
the external arbiter, but is participant in the system, here dominating 
and responsible for its naked exercise of power. The question of legi­
timacy becomes all the more pressing as national development pro­
jects or nationalism (which are the traditional links of military regi­
mes) are clashing with the transnational perspective of the upper 
middle class, the social base of the regime, and the economic state- 
technocracy. Once in power, the military corporate actor rehearses 
the nationalist development - transnationalist dependency dilemma 
of its modern ideology that has provoked so many splits and retreats 
to the barracks.142 "Democracy" is the belated and weak attempt of 
a regime to open up its support to a wider base than fear and terror 
and that is striven from its traditional legitimation procedures. 
O’Donnell’s analysis in 1979 is therefore already convinced of the 
"intrinsic weakness" of the BA regime, long before it collapsed in 
Brazil in 1985.143
142 This requires a methodology of the analysis of military actors that stresses the 
interplay between corporate logic and external needs: the military is neither 
instrument for the fulfilling of the aims of whatever specific class, nor an indepen­
dent unified actor. Both approaches suffer from a black box conception. See 
especially: Antonio Carlos Peixoto, "Armée et politique au Brésil. Une critique des 
modèles d’interprétation." In Alain Rouquié, Les Partis Militaires au Brésil, pp.25-40. 




























































































236 Part III. Responses to the Crisis o f Realism
3. The critique o f Bureaucratic Authoritarianism
Since the approach has been largely derived from Brazilian history, 
the model fits the Brazilian case rather well. The critique is therefore 
not levelled against the understanding of the Brazilian case, but 
against two theses and, more generally, against the methodology ap­
plied. The disputed theses are the necessary link between phases of 
industrialisation and specific political regimes, the deepening thesis 
and the potential for generalisation of the BA approach.
The interplay between phases of industrialisation and political 
regimes have been widely criticised. And indeed, following Kurth’s 
studies on European industrialisation, it seems that whereas in Latin 
America two phases (consumer durables and capital goods) cluster, in 
Europe they didn’t - and that they had no specific pattern of political 
regimes. Even though the shift to capital good industries has been 
accompanied generally by more authoritarian regimes, Kurth points 
to many other reasons, which made the industrialisation bottleneck 
a concomitant, but probably not necessary and certainly not a suf­
ficient condition for a turn to authoritarianism
Together, these observations show that the political impact of industrial 
phases in Europe, for good or for ill, has been more configurative than 
determinative. And this suggests that in the future, as in the past, there 
will be ample space for the play of political actions.144
It therefore appears wise to use industrialisation-bottlenecks as one 
of the possible variables and it has been an important finding by 
Gerschenkron that has been developed by Hirschman and O’Donnell.
By looking at the deepening thesis, José Serra has strongly at­
tacked the BA-model. For him, deepening took place before the rise 
of BA; it was not necessary for capitalism to survive (because there 
is no direct link between delayed ISI of the second phase and eco­
nomic crisis); it was neither aimed for by the BA coups, nor part of
144 James K. Kurth, "Industrial Change and Political Change: A European 
Perspective." In David Collier, ed., The New Authoritarianism in Latin America, 



























































































Bureaucratic Authoritarianism in Brazil 237
their economic policies.145 Even though the last point is theoretically 
no contradiction to O’Donnell (actors are not always fully conscious 
of what might have caused their action), it seems reasonable not to 
overemphasise a necessity to deepen for the economic system to sus­
tain growth and to develop. Also Hirschman, more sympathetic to the 
approach, argues more for a domestic explanation stressing the re­
quired phase of more orthodox policies that follows the initial ISI 
(especially to stop inflationary pressures). The turn to authoritarian­
ism should be seen as the outcome of a political conflict over redis­
tribution, not an economic necessity. External economic constraints 
have to be analysed through the prism of the domestic political 
system and state-society relation.146 147
In the same vein are the criticisms of Alain Rouquié & Ricardo 
Sidicaro, and Paul Cammack. Expanding on Rouquié and Sidicaro, it 
appears that the major common point of Brazil’s and later, e.g. 
Chile’s, authoritarian regimes, seems to be a ’revolution from above’ 
that would allow a national entrepreneurial class to develop.147 This 
project has failed because having pointed to economic success as the 
sole criterion for its political legitimation (here they rejoin O’Donnell), 
military corporate actors cannot endlessly sustain political fragmenta­
tion and polarisation in the society because it backfires on internal 
discipline and unity, i.e. on the very identity of the military.148 In
145 José Serra, "Three mistaken theses regarding the connection between 
industrialization and authoritarian regimes." In David Collier, ed., The New 
Authoritarianism in Latin America, pp.117, 120, 124.
146 Alfred Hirschman, "The turn to authoritarian Latin America and the search 
for its economic determinants." In David Collier, ed., The New Authoritarianism in 
Latin America, pp.73, 81.
147 Paul Cammack, "The political economy of contemporary military regimes in 
Latin America: from bureaucratic authoritarianism to restructuring." In Philip O’ 
Brien and Paul Cammack, eds., Generals in Retreat (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1985), pp.1-36; and especially the short and very dense article by 
Alain Rouquié & Ricardo Sidicaro, "Etats autoritaires et libéralisme économique en 
Amérique Latine: une approche hétérodoxe." Revue Tiers Monde, vol.XXIV, no.93, 
1983, 105-113.
148 See in this respect Alain Rouquié’s general approach which seems the one 
most able to integrate an internal analysis of the military actor (parti militaire) into 




























































































238 Part III. Responses to the Crisis o f Realism.
other words, one should take the non-economic determinants (and do­
mestic class relations) of the model very seriously. The fact that 
Cardoso and the later O’Donnell have repeatedly stressed exactly this 
part in their analysis, indicates a consensus that International 
Political Economy without a domestic analysis is very limited.14 *49
This discussion has already largely answered the remaining criti­
cism on the model’s general heuristic value. There is a big problem 
with the later coups in Chile and Uruguay which have produced 
much more monetarist strategies than one should have expected from 
a military government and that conflict with the dynamics of the BA 
regime in Brazil and Argentina. The solution proposed by O’Donnell, 
namely to link the level of popular threat before the coup to higher 
repression and more monetarist policies, seems, indeed insufficient to 
account for the difference.150
Yet, here we link up with the methodological question. The ap­
praisal of the approach depends very much on whether one considers 
it a model that applies to similar states in the semi-periphery or more 
a framework of analysis that proposes a particular explanation of a 
militarist reaction to the political and economic modernization pres­
sures in the semi-periphery - and which could produce others. The 
aims of the latter are less ambitious - and therefore easier generalisa- 
ble. The analytical interest does not consist in finding out laws of the 
necessary change in the semi-periphery, but in the providing of a 
framework that integrates a theory of the state, the analysis of the 
domestic actors, the dynamics of the international capitalist and 
political system for the analysis of policy outcomes in a specific part
14S(...continued)
militaires, définitions et dynamiques", in his La politique de Mars, les processus 
politiques dans les partis militaires (Paris: Le Sycomore, 1981) or "Les processus
politiques dans les partis militaire au Brésil. Stratégie de recherche et dynamique
institutionelle", in his edited Les partis militaires au Brésil; finally his L’Etat 
militaire en Amérique Latine (Paris: Le Seuil, 1982).
149 This rejoins the Brenner-Wallerstein debate, we already alluded to in chapter 
12. See especially footnote no.75.
150 See for this argument: Karen L. Remmer & Gilbert W. Merckx, Bureaucratic 



























































































Bureaucratic Authoritarianism in Brazil 239
of the world at a specific time of its development. Is this a core 
framework for IPE?
15.4. IPE+Comparative Politics=Historical Sociology?
O’Donnell himself has opposed the possibility to read the BA 
approach as an ahistorical model. Quite the opposite. With this 
framework, he wants to investigate other cases in the semi-periphery, 
where no coup was needed, or why and where the triangle did not 
appear, and so on, using the BA model as one possible ideal type for 
a comparative analysis of semi-peripheral countries. The result is a 
form of historical sociology
... it is necessary to historicize the social sciences, or equivalently, to 
structure the history we write; that is, we must make of the historical 
tempos the sites on which structures are analyzed... As a consequence, the 
boundary between the historian and the social scientist, as well as the 
limits between the social science disciplines of economics, sociology, and 
political science is obscured.151
Historical sociology can be divided into two schools, one more posi­
tivist, one more interpretativist. The first is represented by Theda 
Skocpol. Here, a causal model is applied to different cases. The con­
structivist part of historical writing is here well exposed, yet with the 
obvious backlash that one needs to arrange the data a bit to let the 
model fit.152 To a certain extent, this corresponds to a variable- 
oriented approach.
The other approach is the one preferred by Cardoso, O’Donnell, 
Evans which consists of two interrelated parts. The analysis requires 
a conceptual clarification, that allows for the selection and ordering 
of the information and whose language unifies the comparative analy­
sis. The case analysis will then try to take into account all the parti-
151 O’Donnell, Reflections..., p.4
152 See for this approach: Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions. A 




























































































240 Part III. Responses to the Crisis o f Realism
Figure 8 A synthesis of Barrington Moore’s framework in his Social Origins of 



























































































Bureaucratic Authoritarianism in Brazil 241
cularities of the subject. This analysis is considered case-oriented'.153 
The scientific objective of the two approaches are different: whereas 
the first uses theoretical generalizations to allow for comparisons that 
will explain the specific case, the second uses ideal-type comparative 
analysis for the understanding of the particular case in order to allow 
for prudent abstractions:
Let it be noted that, although these works depend on general notions that 
are being enriched by analysis (what is capitalism and domination), their 
referents are historically situated. It is neither "any" nor "all" capitalism, 
but certain types of capitalism within which specific cases are recognized.
It is from specific cases and types that these authors ask about patterns 
of socioeconomic change and contrapunctual relationships with systems of 
political domination.154
Thus, IPE and comparative politics leads to historical sociology. 
Therefore, O’Donnell’s initial approach, which started from a specific 
event and tried to generalise explanations from this specific event, 
was wrong. He should have started from the interplay of the varia­
bles that he sees clearly and that have neither necessary, nor purely 
contingent links. At the end he quotes Weber, Hintze, Anderson, 
Moore for the approach to be followed. Rightly so. As Moore’s still 
fascinating study shows, the comparative analysis should not start 
from a common effect to look for common causes, but for the interplay 
of the major social actors, institutions and socio-economic forces to 
account for the variance of comparable cases (See Figure 8. The 
lineages are -from the left to the right- Great Britain, Germany/Ja- 
pan, France, India, China). This framework of analysis does not try 
to explain the laws, but understand the differences. These points will 
be taken up in the conclusive chapter.
153 For this distinction, see Charles C. Ragin, The Comparative Method. Moving 
Beyond qualitative and quantitative strategies (Berkeley et al.: University of 
California Press, 1987), chapters 3 and 4.











































































































































































































































































































































































Realism is dead. 
Long live Realism?
16.1. Introduction
This conclusion will not be another swan song on Realism. The lat­
ter’s multiple resurrections seem rather to indicate that there is 
something in it that seems to capture either the nature of politics in 
general, or at least of international politics such as to elude any 
attempt to destroy it.
In the 70s and 80s, Realism’s incredible resistance to major blows 
has given rise to the Inter-Paradigm Debate, that is, the idea that 
since different approaches start from incompatible values, they are to 
be considered like Kuhnian incommensurable paradigms. In other 
words, that neither Realism nor Marxism could be removed by criti­
que was seen as an indication that in the social sciences falsification 
was not possible because of the impossible separation of the analyst 





























































































As already analysed in chapter 10, this derivation of incommensu­
rability seems to be more taken-for-granted than analysed.1 There is 
never any deep analysis, not why values affect the analysis in social 
sciences (which is not an issue), but how it determines the methodolo­
gy used of the researcher, the world view implied by it and the out­
comes of the analysis. That conservatism should be linked to tradi­
tional methodology, a world view that is states-based and should 
derive its explanatory thrust from the conceptualisation of anarchy 
as the international realm is never stringently explained. We are 
confronted with ideologies that arrive in packages that seem more 
tied together by the analysts’ lazyness than by internal coherence. 
The obsession with triads2 can be explained by the simple application 
of the anglo-american ideological distinction of conservatism, libera­
lism, and radicalism to the social sciences. Yet, especially the middle 
category, be it called liberalism, interdependence, pluralism or 
Grotian school, conceals a variety of heterogeneous approaches that 
defy any use of such a category: world system a la Burton, linkage 
approaches, traditional British writers (Bull, Wight), regime theory, 
normative theories (Beitz), ..., brief everything which is not part of 
the two other strawmen: Marxism (generally presented as outside-in 
and economic determinism), or Realism (cynical conservative, and 
only state-centred anarchy determinism).
It was argued in Part III, that in front of the loosening grip of 
Realism, International Political Economy could be partly defined as 
an attempt to update the traditional Realist research programme, by
1 See for this recently: Yale H. Ferguson & Richard W. Mansbach, The Elusive 
Quest: Theory and International Politics (Columbia. S.C.: University of South 
Carolina Press, 1988). They derive from the unavoidable value content of social 
sciences the impossibility of cumulation. That they attribute to Kuhn the view that 
sciences can cumulate and is not influenced by its environment is just another 
indication that international relations’ epistemnological turn not always implies an 
even cursory knowledge of the literature.
2 See for an impressive list of the different triologies recently: Volker Rittberger 
& Hartwig Hummel, "Die Disziplin ’Internationale Beziehungen’ im deutschsprachi- 
gen Raum auf der Suche nach ihrer Identitat: Entwicklung und Perspektiven." In 
Volker Rittberger, ed., Theorien der Internationalen Beziehungen. Bestandsaufnahme 
und Forschungsperspektiven (Sonderheft 21/1990 der Politischen Vierteljahresschrift, 
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slightly enlarging Neorealism (chapter 12), and partly as an attempt 
to provide a wider framework with a more encompassing comprehen­
sion of the international that more radically breaks with traditional 
security centred theorising (chapter 13). The debates, unlashed in IPE 
cannot be satisfactorily be accounted for by the Inter-Paradigm De­
bate. The conclusion will therefore try to synthesise first the episte­
mological turn of theorising in the 80s, then argue for a different way 
for the categorisation of present research that captures its dynamics 
better then the static IPD, and finally present some of the substantial 
issues that seem to be the focus of present research. As before, it will 
be done in a confrontation to the Realist and Neorealist research pro­
gramme.
This new categorisation is not done because of some esthetical pre­
ferences or for analysts’s play: to capture the possible interlinkages 
of ongoing research might provide IR/IPE with the outlines of a cohe­
rent framework that can be established, outside mainstream Neorea­
lism tNeo-Institutionalism. It wants to unravel methodological and 
theoretical spaces where fruitful research can be pursued, and that 
the IPD had buried under its taken-for-granted incommensurability 
between different canonised strawmen. This new categorisation is an 
explicit attempt to break up the epistemological scholastic of the 80s.
16.2. Neorealism and the epistemological turmoil of the 80s
Chapter 11 had interpreted the Waltzian research programme as a 
particular reaction of a scientific community that felt its self­
definition challenged. The behavioural ’revolution’, even though often 
within the Realist paradigm, had undermined one important paradig­
matic function of Realism. By presupposing an equal methodology for 
domestic and foreign policy research, it contested the inter- 
nal/external distinction the Realist paradigm reposes on.3 It delegiti-
3 R.B.J. Walker argues in Political Theory and the Transformation o f World 





























































































mated the Realist paradigm’s claim that the international realm is 
qualitatively different from all other social systems and requires 
therefore different research.
Waltz reaction was to reassert the specificity of the international 
that cannot be apprehended through domestic politics approaches 
(called misleadingly reductionist). This closing in terms of the field of 
IR has been coupled to a specific view of the right methodology and 
epistemology to follow. Waltz has reerected the economical utilitarian 
approach as the major line to follow. It is a double sided approach 
that posits stable individual state interests (survival) and two catego­
ries of an international structure (anarchy ruled by the distribution 
of power) to apply the micro-economic market competition logic to IR. 
Yet, here, the attacks have been substantially most damaging, even 
though this is easily swept aside with our favourite reply that the de­
bate is about unresolvable value-assumptions and therefore vain foot­
work. This is all the more astonishing, because those interventions 
that were most widely held representative of the debate3 4 pointed ex­
tensively to a wider epistemological realm - and not to values. It is on 
this ground that Neorealism (including regime) has been challenged 
in a way to preclude any comfortable answer.
First, I might recall that the economistic approach to IR had 
already been strongly criticised in the Second Great Debate. Aron had 
argued convincingly that there is no concept in IR that could provide 
a substitute for economic utility. The basic reason is the limited 
power-money analogy: economists can reduce the variability of indivi­
dual utilities (National Interests) because of the standard of measure 
and fungibility of money (power). The IR scholar cannot. Power is a
3(...continued)
pp. 14-15) that the two great debates happened when two challengers (universalist 
idealism and general behavioralism) challenged the specificity of IR.
4 That is Hayward Alker & Thomas Biersteker, Notes for a Future Archaeologist 
of International Savoir Faire. International Studies Quarterly, 1984, vol.28, pp.121- 
142; and Friedrich Kratochwil & John Gerard Ruggie, International organization: a 
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too multi-faced concept. Neorealism just goes on by implying this 
specific concept of power - without anytime redefining it.5
Second, regimes and game-theoretical rational choice approaches 
that underlie new institutionalism have come under another well 
known attack, namely against its inherent methodological individual­
ism, i.e. an approach that takes as an assumption that collective 
behaviour can be understood out of the analysis of individual actions 
and their aggregation. Kratochwil and Ruggie argued, that even ac­
cepting the possibility of such an approach, regime theory entails a 
clash between its individualist methodology and its intersubjective 
ontology. Less conceptually expressed, this means that regime litera­
ture poses the intersubjectively constituted existence of norms and 
rules prior to individual preferences and action, but analyses regimes 
out of the aggregation of individually given preferences and actions. 
Whereas this last critique has never been answered in the literature, 
some debate has developed out of the first. After all, Neorealism is 
also called Structural Realism: how can it be found guitly of a metho­
dological individualist approach?
Richard Ashley has made the first major attack along these lines.6 
He argues that Neorealist structuralism is tied up with statism, utili­
tarianism and positivism. This means that its particular form of 
structuralism is not independent of the elements that constitute it, it 
takes them for granted. If it were independent, it would not preclude 
thinking about a variety of factors and actors outside the internation­
al (political) state-system. Instead it reposes on the state and the 
concept of state-sovereignty to construct anarchy, from which, in turn, 
structural effects are derived. Ashley tries to show that whereas Neo­
realism argues from the latter, it logically requires, but hides the 
former.
5 See herefore chapter 5.
6 The Poverty o f  Neo-Realism, in Robert O.Keohane, ed., Neorealism and its 




























































































In a similar vein, Alexander Wendt has criticised Neorealism.7 He 
noted again that Waltz is not a truly structuralist approach, because 
he works in analogy to economic theory for firms and markets: in a 
world of anarchy (market structure), states (firms)’s capabilities will 
define the particular system, as e.g. 1979’s bipolarity (duopoly) that, 
in turn, determines the actor’s behaviour, not the constitution o f the 
elements themselves.8 Instead of explaining the "powers and interests 
of agents in terms of irreducible properties of social structure", they 
are given.
Hollis and Smith defend a reading of Neorealism (that they, 
however, reduce to Waltz) as a structuralist account of IR. They rely 
themselves on market theory and want to uphold the distinction of 
Neorealism to game-theoretical analysis, that would be qualitatively 
akin to Neorealism if Ashley’s and Wendt’s charge were accepted. Yet, 
it seems that their reasons are not fully convincing.9 10
First, they show that the anarchical structure, as much as the mar­
ket, might be derived from the units, but acquires then an inde­
pendent and causal status in explanation. Market actors must live 
with and adapt to the constraints of the market - most succinctly 
expressed in market prices that the actors are obliged to take}0 But 
this argument, besides the fact that Ashley himself advances it, does 
not contradict Wendt’s and Ashley’s critique. They claim that units 
are prior to the structure - and this is reasserted here. They do not 
claim that the structure is something distinct from units and can 
have causal effects. They do not have to claim that structures are 
inexisting in an account that is ontologically individualist. The second 
argument is that Waltz requires a systemic notion of causation,
7 The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations. International 
Organization, 1987, voi.41, pp.337-370.
8 Se also for the following paragraph: Alexander Wendt, Bridging the theo- 
ry/meta-theory gap in international relations. Review of International Studies, 1991, 
vol.17, p.389-90.
9 Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Beware of gurus: structure and action in 
international relations. Review of International Studies, 1991, vol.17, pp.399-403.
10 This obviously only holds for the perfect conditions for competitive markets 
that underly textbook neo-classical market theory. Both recent economic theory and 
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because otherwise his whole enterprise is doomed. This, as well, has 
been noted by Ashley, but does not constitute a counter-argument: 
requirements and potential of a theory must not coincide. Waltz 
would not be the first writer to have an insufficient methodological 
apparatus for the proclaimed intention of the theory.
In order to resolve the question, I propose to look again at the 
market analogy. I think that Ashley and Wendt are right for the par­
ticularity of this so-called structuralist approach, and that Hollis and 
Smith are theoretically (but not practically) right about the difference 
with rational choice or game-theory.
Neo-classical economic theory allows, indeed, for a double cau­
sation at the individual and market level. Where Ashley and Wendt 
are right is the fact that the structural explanation presupposes the 
existence and the constancy of actor’s preferences: only by presuppos­
ing economic man (Waltz’ like-unit), who wants to survive in its 
environment (basic preference), and does so by rationally calculating 
the cost/benefit of alternative action, can market (anarchy) con­
straints be understood. Economic theory is very powerful because it 
conceals and inextricably links these two levels: at the level of the 
market, market dynamics are the result of individual utilitarian rea­
soning and behaviour; and at the individual level, the market statics 
are the permanent background on which strategic behaviour of indivi­
duals is articulated. Both, individual preferences (in the macro ana­
lysis) and the non-institutional or automatic working of the market 
(in the micro-analysis) must be theoretically taken-for-granted and 
analytically held constant to allow for the explanatory articulation of 
both levels of neo-classical theory. Without it no marginal economics 
could work.
This being said, Hollis and Smith are right to distinguish game- 
theory from a Waltzian analysis. But the difference is not qualitative 
between a holistic and an individualist approach. Both are merely the 
two different levels of the utilitarian analysis. Hollis and Smith’s 
insistence captures the inherent and mutually irrreducible double­
logic of the market approach. Yet, and here the practical difference 




























































































analogy to market theory, leaves a systemic level that is the ’least 
structural’ possible: the ’invisible hand’, or what Ashley calls the 
"atomist structure"11; in the state-system, the environment of the 
actors (the states) are just the other states. By arguing for a market - 
anarchy analogy, ways to study the emergence of states and of their 
power, i.e. the constitution of the realm we take for granted as 
international are excluded. Change is the black box of such an 
approach. By limiting structural change to the first level (anarchy - 
hierarchy) and by defining anarchy as the lack of international 
government, Waltz nearly rules out change at the structural level. As 
long as Neorealism remains founded on the anarchy/sovereignty 
divide, all attempts to integrate dynamic factors at the second tier of 
Waltz’s approach must remain limited.12 By stating unified actors 
as given, rational choice approaches are weak to apprehend their 
historicity and their domestic dimension13 and actually undermine 
the transnational insights with which the regime programme started 
off. In this respect, the just mentioned epistemological critique joins 
in with recent studies in historical sociology that try to capture the 
interwoven logic of state-building and the very constitution of the 
international system.14
It should by now be clearer, why the theoretical debate has increa­
singly turned towards the epistemological foundations and consequen­
ces of Neorealism. Since Neorealism proposes an international system 
of eternal return and repetition to legitimate its approach, it is impor­
tant to show that the approach is coined in a way to make change
11 Richard Ashley, "The Poverty of Neorealism", p.286f.
12 See especially John Gerard Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the 
World Polity..."and Barry Buzan, Charles Jones & Richard Little, The Logic of 
Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism (forthcoming, 1992).
13 See Hayward R. Alker jr. (1986) "The Presumption of Anarchy in World 
Politics." In After Neorealism: Anarchy, Power and International Collaboration, 
edited by Hayward R. Alker and Richard Ashley (quotable draft, still forthcoming),
p .2 1 .
14 See especially Michael Mann, The Sources o f Social Power, vol.I (Cambridge 
et al.: Cambridge University Press, 1986); and Anthony Giddens, The Nation-State 
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very difficult to assess. This circularity will be analysed again when 
we tackle below the anarchy/sovereignty core of Neorealism.
It is therefore also not fortuitous that the meta-theoretical writers 
turn to what Lapid has called the Post-Positivist agenda.15.
16.3. International Theory at the beginning of the 90s
All the foregoing section cannot be integrated in our neat triads of the 
IPD. There is an enormous exchange at the meta-theoretical, but also, 
as I will already allude to in this section, on the theoretical level. To 
use the IPD language one could say that out of three paradigms there 
are remaining two: the official Mainstream and its challengers.16 
Even though this rightly stresses the nature of the debate about 
borders of the discipline, it obscures much of the dynamics of the 
ongoing debate.
By crossing the two major organising principles of today’s meta- 
theoretical debate (naturalism versus interpretivism and agent versus 
structure), I have established a map of today’s approaches that 
pitches the difference an appropriate level and clarifies those links at
Yosef Lapid, "The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in 
a Post-Positivist Era." International Studies Quarterly, 1989, vol.33, pp.235-254; and 
"Quo vadis International Relations? Further Reflections on the ’Next Stage’ of 
International Theory." Millennium, 1989, vol.18, pp.77-88. For the radicalisation of 
the epistemological debate, see the arguments for a critical hermeneutical, realist or 
for a more radical constructivist epistemology that eventually has been taken to 
deconstruction and intertextual analysis. See for the first, e.g. Robert Cox, "Social 
Forces, States and World Orders..." and Fernando Henrique Cardoso, "The consump­
tion of dependency..." For the discussion of epistemological realism in IR, see 
Alexander Wendt, The Agent-Structure Problem..., Roger Tooze, "The Unwritten Pre­
face: ’International Political Economy’ and Epistemology", Millenium, 1988, vol.17, 
pp.285-293; and David Dessler, "What’s at stake in the agent-structure debate?" in 
International Organization, vol.43 (1989), pp.441-473. For constructivism, see now 
Nicholas G. Onuf, World o f our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and Inter­
national Relations (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1989) and for the 
post-structuralists, see James Der Derian & Michael Shapiro, International /  inter­
textual Relations. Postmodern readings in World Politics (Lexington: Lexington 
Books, 1989). Marc Hoffman, "Restructuring, Reconstruction, Réinscription, 
Rearticulation: Four voices in Critical International Theory", Millennium vol.20 
(1991), pp.169-185, provides a succinct and interesting comparison.
16 Robert Keohane, "International Institutions: Two approaches,” in his Interna­
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which theories engage in contests (See Table Table 4). I will concen­
trate on those outside the (grey-shaded) mainstream IR/IPE where 
the more official theoretical debate happens and where a challenger 
to Neorealism is developing a wider research programme.
This programme emerges out of different rapprochements. The 
first vivid encounter takes place on the ground of the hermeneutical 
tradition, that starts from the idea that whereas in the natural scien­
ces (to which positivism ideally aims), the subject of the science (i.e. 
the researcher) and 'its external object (nature) are independent, 
humanities have to deal with an internal intersubjective relation. 
Humanities always have to integrate human mind, in its psycholo­
gical (individualist) and semantic or communicational (intersubjective 
or structural) component.17 For all of their differences, Weberian 
historical sociology as much as post-structural discourse-analysis are 
close to this tradition. This does not entail that there are no differenc­
es. Quite the contrary. But these differences are articulated in a way 
which falls completely outside the IPD. Take different examples. 
First, IR’s ’historical sociologists’ (Aron, Hoffmann, Rosecrance), i.e. 
traditional Weberians have been rediscovered by writers stemming 
originally from Marxist backgrounds. Their affinity to the British 
School is rather strong.18 These Realist writers have also attracted 
the defense of scholars from Critical Theory19 for their historical 
sensitivity. The new impact of comparative historical sociology opens
17 See chapter 1.
18 See respectively Fred Halliday, "’The sixth great power’: on the study of 
revolutions and international relations." Review o f International Studies vol.l6(3), 
1990, pp.207-221; and e.g. Richard N. Rosecrance’s, Action and Reaction In World 
Politics. International Systems in Perspective (Boston: Little Brown, 1963/77 2nd ed.); 
and Wight’s Systems o f States.
19 This is where one could put Ashley in his Habermasian phase. See for Ashley 
especially Ole Wsever, Tradition and Transgression in International Relations: A 
Post-Ashleyan Position (Copenhagen: Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, 
Working Paper 24/1989) and explicitly also R.B.J. Walker in "Realism, Change, and 
International Relations Theory." International Studies Quarterly vol.31, 1987, 
pp.71/72, with his re-apprehension of more historicist Realists and in "Ethics, 
Modernity and the Theory of International Relations" (Paper prepared at the Center 
of International Studies, Princeton University, 1988/89), p.44, for the closeness 




























































































up a debate largely on Weberian grounds where Classical Realism can 
meet dependency approaches.20 Central becomes here the conceptua­
lisation of the state or the state-society relation.21 This is a battle­
ground, where dependency and Classical Realism meet comparative 
historical sociology. It could be one way o f defining a framework of 
IPE.
Second, there is a renewed interest of Radical and Post-Structuralist 
writers in Normative Theory and vica versa.22 There are multiple 
reasons for it. Both share a marginalised position in the theoretical 
debate. But there is more importantly a common conceptual sensibili­
ty, be it for the way ideas shape reality (as more idealist normative 
writers would have it), for the ideological use of concepts that are 
always also political tools (as critical theory conceives it), or for the 
concealement of power relations that only a deconstruction of texts 
can reveal. The two latter share an explicit interest in the pow- 
er/knowledge relation. As a shorthand, these three schools can be 
represented by Rawls,23 Habermas and Foucault as the main figures 
and link it thereby to recent political theory.24
What seems to emerge out of this is an intricate agenda, that is 
complex and heterogeneous as Weber’s research. Weber can actually 
be seen as a way to supply a focus, first, because the methodology 
underlying IPE becomes more and more Weberian, and second be­
20 See Neo-Weberians like Skocpol, or Michael Mann, The Sources o f  Social 
Power. Vol.I(Cambridge etal.: Cambridge University Press, 1985). Slightly different 
Anthony Giddens, The Nation State and Violence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1985). 
I refer here especially to the dependent development school (See chapter 13).
21 See Evans, Rueschemeyer & Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State Back in (Cam­
bridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1985) and now Michael Banks & Martin 
Shaw, State and Society in International Relations (London: Harvester/Wheatsheaf 
Press, 1991).
22 See e.g. R.B.J. Walker, "Ethics, Modernity and the Theory of International 
Relations", and also Vincent’s very positive reaction to Ashley’s work on anarchy (in 
"Order in International Politics." In Order and Violence. Medley Bull and Internation­
al Relations, edited by J.D.B.Miller and R.J.Vincent, pp.38-64. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1990).
23 Charles A. Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1979).
24 Ole Waever, Beyond the ’Beyond’ o f Critical International Theory (Centre for 
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cause Weber is at the cross-roads of Realism and the debates just 
mentioned, from Kant to Habermas, from Nietzsche to Foucault and 
from Marx to Gramsci, we find always: via Weber.
Thus, to sum up the borders of the disciplinary debate (see also 
?2B), one could say that there is an emerging fourfold division of 
labour between, on the one hand:
- ’conceptual theory’ that rediscusses central and taken-for-granted 
concepts that are typically underlying empirical analyses in interna­
tional studies
- ’reflexive theory’ that develops the normative and knowledge- 
/power implications of such research; that both provide the open 
framework for, on the other hand, the historically and theoretically 
informed 25
25 The border is open at the case-oriented and reflexive edge. Even though it 
might at first hand appear counter-intuitive for the highly abstract reflexive theory, 
I think that those are the most aware of historical contingencies, the one reflecting 
more localised change and the other the permanent ideological struggle of political 




























































































- ’case-oriented’ analysis that allow for the richer understanding of 
specific state-society relations in the global political economy
- ’variable-oriented’ analysis that in an explicitly comparative way 
tries to integrate theory and historical sociology.26
Hence there is some convergence on methodology and epistemo­
logy, that has found expression in the term of post-positivism. There 
seems, however, also to be an appearing research agenda that I will 
approach in the final section. The boundaries of this agenda, much 
larger than Mainstream IR/IPE, have been ’retraced’. But there to­
day’s debate just starts: not the extension of the discipline, but its 
very core is re-apprehended; not the explosion and integration of dif­
ferent variables is at stake, but the meaning of those that made up 
International Theory. Basic concepts, such as the state, power, sove­
reignty, anarchy, are reanalysed. Whereas these reconceptualisations 
’take ... seriously’ and ’make sense of...’, and ’go beyond ...’, traditional 
writers, unable to keep a unique conceptual approach, tag now elu­
sive. Most elusive, however, is not the quest for these concepts or for 
theories in IR/IPE, but the very core that appears more and more dif­
ficult to grasp, the international.
16.4. A new conceptual agenda for an ’international’ unknown
The demise of the state-system as the main reference in international 
affairs has left international theory in a unbalanced position. A new 
conception of IR was needed. There are the Waltzians who just say 
that one cannot map IR comprehensively and that in the division of 
academic labour our job is a more humble one, e.g. to come back to 
good old inter-state politics. The regime research programme takes as 
a starting point the existence of institutionally concerted (in the 
loosest sense) behaviour within specific fields of action. Here the 
range of actors include all those that can and do mutually affect each
26 See for the distinction: Charles C. Ragin, The comparative method. Moving 
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other across border.27 IPE (as defined above) reconceptualise inter­
national global structures and sometimes integrates the state-society 
relation. On top of it, there is undoubtedly an individualisation of 
international theory, most visibly in (liberal or radical) normative 
theories, but also in other agendas as the question of migration 
shows. The result is a picture where international means global at 
both the individual and ecological level.
The object of this section is to see how recent theory has and can 
deal with it.
1. Anarchy / sovereignty
Reconceptualisations take Realism seriously at least in the sense that 
they do not only try to plead for new concepts, but re-approach the 
most traditional ones. The dyad anarchy/sovereignty has been found 
the basic double concept of particularly the Neorealist research 
programme, its deconstruction one of the most challenging underta­
kings of the Eighties.
Several writers have become skeptical about the anarchy concept 
as it appeared in Waltz. It allowed only for two state of affairs, one 
being hierarchy (as in domestic societies), the other being anarchy. 
Even though Waltz is explicit that anarchy does not mean chaos, the 
intemal/external distinction is paradigmatic. The first move consists 
in accepting the importance of the lacking international government, 
but want to qualify it by a term with less connotation to Hobbes, the 
state of war, and danger. Bull had argued for an anarchical society, 
Onuf and Klink want to replace by it by rule (Weberian Herr- 
schaft).28 The most articulate attempt to reconceptualise it comes via 
a critique of Neorealism by Ashley.
Richard Ashley argues that the anarchy problématique is the 
underlying research programme of today’s Neorealism. Its two basic 
elements are the need for cooperation in an interdependent world,
27 Marcel Merle, Sociologie des Relations Internationales, p.90.





























































































and the competitive (anarchic) environment where this cooperation 
takes place: Cooperation under Anarchy is then only possible by the 
development "of lasting and reliably coordinated expectations of state 
performances", i.e. regimes.29 Add positivism as epistemology and a 
rational choice approach as methodology and you get Neorealism. 
Ashley’s deconstruction sets in by showing that the plausability of 
this research programme relies on a taken-for-granted distinction 
between domestic sovereign states and the international anarchical 
realm. Yet, anarchy and sovereignty are circularly defined: the 
international realm is so long anarchical as there are sovereign 
states; and there are so long sovereign states as there is no world 
sovereign state. To remove circularity the two concepts are put in a 
hierarchical order, where anarchy is only a residual category of sove­
reignty. The domestic sovereign state is an uncontested place of order 
beyond whose borders both the universe of reason ends and identity 
turns into difference.30 This, what he calls heroic practice, enables 
the anarchy problématique to exclude the imagination of rule without 
a center, of cooperation that is not instrumental, but already set in 
a normative context,31 and of states that are not like-units. It ena­
bles to resort to the ’blackmail of the heroic practice’: either "realisti­
cally to honour or idealistically to repudiate the anarchy problémati­
que" (p.254), thereby constituting only one, the idealist alternative, 
that is by this move discredited and leaves Realism as the only pos­
sible way to stand the grim face of international power politics.
In a next step, the concept of sovereignty is analysed as a silencing 
practice that excludes form discourse any conceptualisation of identity 
outside the frame of the modern-state. In a complementary world 
where the international realm is the struggle-ground for irreducible 
pluralism and the modern-state the locus for potential universalism; 
where the potential common identity of mankind clashes with its par­
29 Richard Ashley, "Untying the Sovereign State. A double reading of the Anarchy 
Problématique." Millenium, 1988, vol.17, p.237.
30 See also R.B. J. Walker, "Realism, Change, and International Relations Theory", 
p.69.
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ticularistic organisation in states,32 the idea of sovereignty has 
played a crucial role in bridging these thrifts. Bom at the beginning 
of the modern-state system it offered and still offers both a spatial 
and temporal solution to reconcile universalism (as the aspirations of 
Medieval Christendom) and community particularism. The spatial 
and temporal solution is the sharp distinction between political life 
inside a community, where a progress to future is possible, and the 
mere relations outside the territorial boundaries that are the realm 
of repetition and where "the present is destined to return."33
As with the heroic practice, sovereignty conceals specific points 
from view. This can be exemplified by the way Realist writers have 
reacted to the literature of transnationalism. Some have refused to 
speak about growing interdependence or pointed to the fact that sove­
reignty never meant autonomy in order to argue for an international 
system profoundly unchanged. Multinational Corporations were inte­
grated as new actors into the analysis to the extent they affected 
state policies. But the external/intemal division where community is 
only thought in terms of modem state-society relations actually 
blends out the possible emergence of transnational communities or in­
ternational regulations done by actors, as much as impersonal struc­
tures like markets, that cut across different state boundaries and 
challenge sovereignty as the sole organising principle. If this trans­
nationalism were accepted or if one accepts, as Kenneth Waltz34 
does, the need for a theory of the state, a Pandora’s Box opens, 
because Realists must start thinking about the always particular and 
historical significance of boundaries and of state-society relations. In 
short, one does not conceive international relations as the anarchical 
articulation of different sovereignties, but as a global system in which 
always contested boundaries are just one of the ordering principles. 
These boundaries are not only contested in the spatial sense (where
32 Andrew Linklater, Men and Citizens in the Theory o f International Relations 
(London: Macmillan, 1982).
33 R.B.J. Walker, State Sovereignty and the Articulation of Political Space/Time. 
Millennium vol.20, 1991, pp.458/59.




























































































they are put), or physical sense (how permeable they are), but in 
what they actually represent. To expand on Marcel Merle’s account, 
boundaries and thus sovereignty means theoretically and practically 
something different for lately decolonised countries that acquired it 
during a completely different period from the one in which it origi­
nated and which is the taken-for-granted meaning in much of IR- 
literature.35 They are not, pace Waltz, like-units.
This rejoins the critique we advanced at the end of chapter 13. 
Although structural Realism does not claim to explain comprehensive­
ly outcomes, it does claim to understand constraints on the range of 
outcomes.36 This means that even if one integrates a theory of the 
state, the structural level is logically prior. In the Neorealist division 
of labour, the structural approach establishes the range out of which 
the unit-level analysis can account for the actual behavior and the 
resulting outcomes. By allowing for always specific state-society 
relations and policy traditions, state behaviour is not necessarily 
bound by the structural range. Or to reuse Wolfers’ argument: if 
politics is at the pole of indifference, then more options are available. 
The domestic and the international are then not the two sides of the 
same coin, but differing accounts. Only post hoc can Neorealism make 
sense of such divergent accounts and leave policy formulation 
untackled.
Thus, the discussion of sovereignty/anarchy opens up to the theory 
of the state. To avoid a wrong discussion: the question is not if  the 
state is important anymore, but what kind o f state (-society) is 
important for the understanding of today’s international relations.
35 See Marcel Merle, Les acteurs dans les relations internationales (Paris: 
Economica, 1986), pp.43-58. One should not, however, as Robert Jackson does, stay 
at the legal-formal level and criticise a situation where the new states (that remain 
a coherent bloc in the argument of the analysis) reversed the order: they got 
sovereign before they arrived at empirical statehood. After all, they did not choose 
to become part of an ’international society’ that colonised (the largest part) of them. 
An assessment of the ’undue advantages’ of the decolonised (through the internation­
al positive right of "incapacity and inequality", p.30) should at least try to see the 
benefits, (part of) the North derived and still derive from the instiutional setting that 
is not codified, e.g. the market. See his Quasi-states: sovereignty, international 
relations and the Third World (Cambridge et al.: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
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2. The state / society relations and world capitalism
Once this basic thrust of Neorealist thinking is attacked, other con­
cepts follow like in the cherished domino-theory. State/society rela­
tions are not any longer the implicit and constant foundations of an 
international society of states, but the very ground on which inter­
national relations take place. International relations are not some­
what on top of societal relations, but the transborder processes that 
embrace them.
It is probably not fortuitous that writers in IPE have been particu­
larly sensitive to these issues: since it tried to integrate the working 
of the now global market (or capitalist) system into the analysis, the 
never innocent working of this transnational structure makes a view 
that encompasses specific state(-society)-market articulations all the 
more compelling. Traditionally, Realists were not much willing to do 
so. Yet, more recently, in an attempt to integrate domestic politics 
into the overall analysis, a small theory of the state has been presen­
ted. But it remains a static view of the domestic environment. 
Krasner, for instance, uses a weak /strong state distinction as one 
explanatory variable for development.37 Yet, this takes for granted 
what should be explained: in the absence of an autarchic development 
in world politics today, how can we understand why some states are 
developing weak? Weak/strong states is no answer, but begs the 
question. By noting similarities of their argument with dependency 
writers, Mastanduno et al. overlook first, that for Evans, whom they 
mention, the actual articulation of local, state, and foreign capital is 
something that needs to be explained in the historical and societal 
setting and second, that the state is to be apprehended as something 
more than a top-down machinery for the mobilisation of foreign policy 
tools.38
The French Regulation School similarly tries to research the arti­
culation of political regimes under the stress of a specific phase of
37 Strctaral Conflict, pp.40-45.
38 M. Mastanduno, M., D.A. Lake & G.J. Ikenberry, Toward a Realist Theory of 




























































































capitalist development (as e.g. Post-Fordism). Even though initially 
derived from the study of developed economies, it has been expanded 
to the Third World, and can be expanded to study the state in a new 
way.39
Finally, the study of revolutions as a specific interface of the 
intemal/external articulation, has taken an international turn. Even 
though international factors were by no means absent in the analysis 
of comparative historical sociology, Skocpol makes out of the inter­
national factor her specific contribution.40 Halliday takes her Weber­
ian reconceptualisation of the state as a way to open up, here again, 
the study of IR for more enriching questions that problematise the 
origins and dynamics of statehood (and state-building) in the inter­
national political economy. Having refered to frameworks in historical 
sociology and IPE, Halliday glimps through the study of revolutions 
and the theory of the state toward the elusive core of IR. It gives one 
way to approach the still unresolved question "of what constitutes the 
[international] system."41
3. Power: Agency and Impersonal Governance
Another field of study, power, has known an increased conceptual and 
analytical interest as a privileged access to the international un­
known. This can be explained by the traditional central explanatory 
place power held in Realist and Neorealist theory. After all, since 
anarchy does not change, it is the shifting balance and configuration 
of power that makes the analysis dynamic and allows for the quali­
fication of the anarchic international power structure; the aggregation 
of national powers explain specific forms of rule under anarchy. As
39 Carlos Ominami, Le tiers-monde dans la crise (Paris: La Découverte, 1986); and 
Bob Jessop, Regulation theories in retrospect and prospect. Economy and Society, 
vol.19, 1990, pp. 153-216.
40 See here States and Social Revolutions. For another integration of international 
factors, see Perry Anderson, Lineages o f  the Absolutist State.
41 See for his discussion of the state concept: State and Society in International 
Relations: A second agenda. Millenium, vol.16, 1987. The quote is taken from his 
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long as the basic logic of anarchy/sovereignty and the fundamental 
state-based agency rest unchallenged, this works. Once both are con­
tested, international theory must start again to account for the locus 
of agency in international affairs, and the exact link between actor’s 
capabilities and international rule: anarchy and the right of might, 
international society, regimes, governance, world capitalist system, 
ecology; all these are indices of an ’international’ that somewhat 
rules, orders, shapes, may be acts, but that appears not reducible to 
the balance of capabilities. The structural move from the end of the 
70s is not only the result of some theorists methodological preference, 
but, and maybe more correctly, an indicator of the impression of a 
diminished agent (=state) impact on world affairs, certainly in the 
U.S. Maybe it was also a way to diminish the uneasy responsibilities 
of super-powers. Yet, in the traditionally agent-based concept of 
power we can analyse a counter-move to integrate institutional fea­
tures into a different locus of agency. Since agency outside the state 
was neglected, these moves, nearly all in IPE, try to dynamise the 
static environment reintegrating it into agency differently conceived.
All these writers oppose the traditional concept of direct, strategic, 
also called behavioral or relational power.42 Stephen Krasner derived 
from an approach that allows for regime’s autonomous causal relation 
to outcomes a concept of Meta-Power that after analysis appears to be 
still a strategic, yet indirect power using institutional channels.43 
Susan Strange, by criticising the undue apology of U.S. policies 
through the argument of power decline, dismisses the small base for 
the measurement of power and argues for a concept of structural 
power, that accounts for non-intentional effects.44 Finally, in order 
to account for the systematic bias of international affairs that favors 
certain agents, or that provides their very empowering, truly imper­
42 For the following section, see in more detail: Stefano Guzzini. Structural Power. 
The limits o f  Neorealist Power Analysis (Manuscript under review).
43 Structural Conflict, p.14.
44 See her The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony. International Organization, 
vol.41, 1987, pp.551-574; and as an application: Finance, Information, and Power. 




























































































sonal effects are integrated into concepts of structural power, or 
hegemony, or governance.45 This critique threby meets the demise 
of the anarchy concept as a heuristically sufficient background on 
which to conceptualise the international system. By the same token, 
it also pushes power analysis outside the Neorealist straightjacket: 
concepts of structural power and hegemony need a meta-theoretical 
underpinning that allows for the apprehension of communicative 
empowering: an intersubjective methodology is needed.46
Unfortunately, many of these concepts still do not sufficiently 
problematise this link between agent-power and system-rule, but, 
instead, conceal this duality within one overall concept, as in the 
traditional Realist power concept. Instead, power can be usefully 
restricted to an agent-concept if it is integrated into a wider dyadic 
power analysis which problematises exactly the relationship between 
impersonal governance and agent power. Yet, if a dyadic concept that 
inquires the link between power and rule can overcome some of the 
shortcomings, it cannot provide a general theory and resolve the basic 
puzzle that pushes people to redirect their attention to power: the 
very understanding of the ’international’.
4. The emerging agenda
After the appearance of competing approaches, that have been unduly 
canonised into generally three paradigms, today’s international 
theorising starts from putting some boundaries from which to ap­
proach the elusive core, the very subject-matter: the international.
45 See for the first: James Caporaso, Introduction to the special issue on 
dependence and dependency in the global system (and) Dependence, dependency, and 
power in the global system: a structural and behavioral analysis. International 
Organization, vol.32, 1979, p.2-43. For structural power and hegemony, see Stephen 
Gill and David Law, Global Hegemony and the Structural Power of Capital. 
International Studies Quarterly vol.33, 1989, pp.475-499. Ashley reintroduces 
governance in "Imposing International Purpose: Notes on a Problematic of 
Governance." In Ernst-Otto Czempiel and James Rosenau, eds., Global Changes and 
Theoretical Challenges. Approaches to World Politics for the 1990s (Lexington, Mass.: 
Lexington Books), pp.251-290.
46 Friedrich Kratochwil, Regimes, Interpretation and the ’Science’ of Politics. 
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Even though there is a ’post-positivist’ rapprochement of writers in 
Critical Theory, IPE and historical sociology that have conceptually 
and theoretically undermined traditional theorising, only vague 
contours of the emerging research programme can be delineated. The 
meta-theoretical matrix tries to capture part of the present debate’s 
dynamic that is spelled out more substantially in the reconceptualisa­
tion of central concepts in international theory. It is a constant move 
of searching and transgressing borders of thought in the discipline.
Therefore, I would like to synthesise the major new dynamics. The 
most basic point is the refusal to divide theory into a national and 
international branch.47 This has, however, different effects once the 
anarchy/sovereignty paradigm is left. There is no question of a uni­
versal state comparable to the national, nor any other use of the "do­
mestic analogy". These moves are still part of an a priori dualistic 
conception of external and internal relations and of a universalising 
project, exporting the domestic system abroad.48 Instead, the Realist 
insights in the plurality of claims and their potential irreducibility 
are not limited to the international realm alone.49
The most important substantial insight seems to spring from a 
major historisation (and for some: genealogy) of the present interna­
tional system in its different aspects: it emerged at the interface of 
the modern state, the first real international polity, the first major 
market extension and the beginning of capitalism, and finally ratio­
nalism (Enlightenment) and democratic theory. Today’s theory in a 
nutshell is a critical reflection of or a move beyond modernity’s 
heritage in changing circumstances.
Two major offshots derive from it. The first is the meeting point of 
Critical theory with normative theory, where the loosening references 
to territories and communities, or in other words, the transantional
47 The logical possibility to accomplish this by reducing the role of the state 
within a nation - whereby the Welfare State becomes a kind of abnormality - is 
indeed realised now by Michael Donelan, Elements of International Political Theory 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990).
48 R.B.J. Walker, State Sovereignty and the Articulation of Political Space/Time, 
p.457.




























































































identities and actors, as well as structures, seem to undermine the 
national base on which liberal theory de facto has been pursued: ma­
jor decision of a national polity elude national decision bodies, and, in 
turn, major actions here can affect, even non-intentionally, state-socie­
ty relations elsewhere. By the same token, the globalisation with its 
communicational integration poses the challenge of a political theory 
whose universalist aspirations often stop arbitrarily at national bor­
ders, but that, as well, provides with its impetus on rights (human 
rights including possibly also ecology and development) one of the 
new major driving forces in international affairs. Generally speaking, 
there seems a move away from the traditional Realist, and also spe­
cific liberal solution: since world government was unlike to develop 
out of cooperation, it would be a form of ’nationalist universalism’ 
(Morgenthau), i.e. a kind of authoritarianism on a world scale im­
posed by one nation, that a classical private/public distinction should 
avoid. International (public) politics is build on loose shared principles 
that, however, never entagle with the national (private) and ’sove­
reign’ realm. It is a realm of moderation. In that sense, Bull’s argu­
ment against the domestic analogy is truly liberal. Yet, Bull himself 
seemed to have come closer to a position where the individual is not 
only object, but also subject of international affairs. Topics like 
humanitarian intervention emerge as legitimate on the agenda.
The second is the historicist Realist and Dependency rapproche­
ment within a truly transnational IPE which articulates global and 
domestic structures. The historisation of processes of nation-building 
that are pursued to the present; the rearrangement of international 
regulatory processes that are not reducible to either leadership, 
hegemonic rivalries, or the invisible hand; the comparative analysis 
of actor responses to an ''accelerating” environment;50 these are some 
of the issues that are taken up.
Both strands meet in subjects like migration where ideally human 
rights and materially wealth distribution are at stake; or the
50 James Der Derian, The (S)pace of international relations: simulation, surveil­
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possibility of international Keynesianism as a way to accomodate 
political ideals and economic policies. Or to put it differently again: 
the question of the démocratisation of global capitalism that is orga­
nised in national and transnational communities. It is this context in 
which the study of traditional topics will be differently pursued. To 
state, for instance, that state power is important does not automati­
cally entail anymore that Realism is right.51 Finally, the disciplines’ 
major topic, war, looks quite distinct, if one extends it from the stra­
tegic interaction approach and connects it to societal and develop­
mental processes: no ’reason of state’ provides anymore a sufficient 
image for the study of war, nor, obviously, for its justification.
16.5. Conclusion: What is left of Realism?
As noted above, Realism is part of the Mainstream research program­
me, in at least one form of Hegemonic Stability Theory, in regime 
theory and in some rational approaches to strategic or foreign policy 
analysis. It is is even more present as a general structural approach 
which is supposed to underly any more historical and empirical re­
search. This, Waltz’ reaction has the paradigmatic advantage of pro­
viding the discipline with definable boundaries that do not only allow 
for the focus of research, but also for the self-justification of the 
discipline. It is highly unlikely that it will completely falter, before 
another school can be found that fulfills these functions.
But Realism is also part of the IPE-Critical theory research 
agenda. True, it is a more historical or sociological Realism that de­
rives from the history of states-systems and of diplomatic cultures. It 
is a Realism that is not stressing the fundamental difference between 
domestic and international affairs, indeed, in this sense it might be 
no Realism anymore. This demarcation foregone, the research agenda 
cannot argue for a discipline which has a particular contribution not
51 See for such a mistaken argument, e.g. Michael P. Sullivan, Power in 





























































































available to others. Even though it is certainly more narrow, than 
Burton’s claim to study all forms of conflict, it is wider than Main­
stream IR: it consists mainly in the contextualisation (or reflection) 
of the origin and dynamics of today’s system, that is a system of 
transborder actors in a world capitalist system whose ideological un­
derpinnings and dynamics must be analysed to understand the natu­
re of this more and more global society. Realists aware of the norma­
tive and historical context of contemporary international relations 
have made contributions in this respect.
Here we move Realism as an analytical tool to Realism as an ideo­
logy. Its major puzzle will be to manage the breaking up of the diffe­
rent thrifts that are concealed in liberalism. Liberalism in political 
thought is driven by three deep tensions. First, the tension between 
a political versus an economic version of liberalism that do not, 
despite some Anglo-American dogma, coincide. Second, there is the 
debate between those that prone republican ideals (liberals of the 
public virtue tradition) versus those with a more cosmopolitan 
conception of polis. Finally, liberalism has known since Rawls a major 
debate between the rights-based versus the consequentialist approach 
to liberal social choice. Thereby, the concept of lioberalism conceals 
major thrifts in today’s political thought that are breaking up in a 
world where the West has lost confidence in the universality of its 
political programme, and its applicability in the new realms of its 
society, yet, without renouncing to it. Since Realism is the approach 
to world politics pursued today by liberal democrats, this issue will 
be one of the most difficult for Realists to solve.
The crisis of Realist thought is certainly linked to this development 
of new actors in the South (the quasi-states) and allover (transnation­
al actors) that are in the same time part of the realist agenda and 
outside it; the major political and ideological contest today is about 
the international reciprocal system of sovereignty that was the tradi­
tional moderator of imperialist tendencies, and of its laisser-faire of 
major international actors (be their so-called hegemons or Multina­
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West proposes.52 If the management of change53 is the basic item 
of long-term Realist policy, Hegemonic Stability Theory looks very 
much at odds with it. There is a basic contradition in Northern poli­
tics that all ideological attempts will not be able to hide. In the new 
global agenda (at the individual and ecological level), the manage­
ment of change means the bargained giving up of privileges in the 
North for the general interest of all. It is not because of the immuta­
ble anarchical structure that this cannot somewhat realistically hap­
pen, but for the short-term vested interests of the main players in the 
game, this time both North and South. After all, the US is not struc­
turally obliged to give up its engagement in IO’s, as little as the 
emerging European Union might be constrained to build a ’fortress 
Europe’. Human Rights could constitute the most challenging way to 
undermine the present sovereign system, but not if one does not add 
to it a powerful body of something recalling traditional collective 
security organizations. It should be more than this old-fashioned tale 
of the instrumentalisation of norms.
Now, this could be a Realist argument against Realism, because 
it is a (wider concept of) power-based ideological critique of a Realism 
that happens to be the main foreign policy ideology. Yet, to conclude, 
it is in that latter sense, that Structural Realism as both an ideology 
and a way to see the world, will certainly be most present. First, as 
long as international politics is conceived as mainly done by politi­
cians, and insofar as the international economic competition can be 
modelled along Neorealist lines (indeed it is the model) as a power 
struggle for market shares, the main decision-makers’ (and their
52 This in two senses. First, the very notion of reciprocity is contested because it 
is considered more and more formal and de facto misleading. Yet, it becomes used 
by the South in an attempt to protect their interests (see for Latin America, the 
treaty on the exploitation of the Amazonian forest), because the international system 
starts to infringe it oflicialy for reasons mainly decided by the West (which does not 
mean that Human Rights are not an issue where sovereignty should be undermined. 
Reciprocity would, however, seem to imply to think about the rights of future genera­
tions in those places that pollute most.)
53 See e.g. Kissinger’s admiration for Bismark’s ’White Revolution’, allowing for 





























































































ideology) will largely embrace it.54 Realist policies might not happen 
because there are structurally necessary, but because we want to 
believe them to be. That strange formula is used on purpose, because 
any ideology is based on values, here of the main actors. And second, 
as long as these actors and the academic communities of super­
powers55 will be mainly responsible for the outlook of the policies 
and the discipline, there is no great hope to believe that some of the 
most salient conservative features of Realism will altogether dis­
appear. Therefore, the academic debate and the political agenda of 
the 90s will be mainly organized in a way comparable to the last 
decades. In this context, tackling Realism may not be realistically 
able to replace Realism as such, but just influence the kind of 
Realism. Old Realism is dying and we hope for a more suitable 
version to face the present international challenges. Yet, one cannot 
forsee, if Realism, too, will stay in the hands of the international 
Realist actors one of those ideologies for which Italians use the 
concept of trasformismo: it has to change to remain the same.
54 This also means that analytically Realism is still important because it informs 
the knowledge base of main decision-makers. But one cannot derive from it any 
necessary political programme, as Krasner or Waltz do. This also implies that we do 
not have to wait for the withering away of the objectified anarchical structure to 
account for change, which would be anyway the politicians’ job. Quite the contrary, 
scholars, by undermining the taken-for-granted grid of Realist reasoning in the 
heads of the actors can actually implement change. The end of the cold war cannot 
be reduced to pure power politics. The long-term effect of détente has certainly 
affected the political map of Eastern decision-makers.
55 It is an open question if the changed environment will affect this statement. 
To have passed from a bipolar military and multipolar economic to a unipolar mili­
tary and multipolar economic system, where competition is mainly economic in the 
North and also military in North-South, might bring different actors and political 
cultures to the forefront that are not so imbued by Realism, yet. This does not mean 
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